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ABSTRACT 
This study explores issues surrounding the potential for the privatisation of some of 
Iran's national institutions. In particular, it addresses the issue of what the determinants 
of the Iranian policy of privatisation are, in order to ascertain whether there is the 
political will to privatise the Iranian oil and gas industry. In order to answer this 
question, this study takes a three-pronged approach which relies on multiple 
methodologies. It begins by providing a theoretical basis for the determination of 
privatisation policy. Subsequently, it explores a set of international precedents that bind 
the possibilities of privatisation policy. It then presents an historical outlook on Iran 
since World War II in order to build a context for the determinants of privatisation 
policy in Iran. This historical analysis is based on a political economy framework. 
Finally, the specific background, legal and institutional framework, and policy-maker 
perspectives are incorporated into the overall analysis. In this final section, particular 
attention is paid to the views of Iranian policy-makers that have been gained through 
personal interviews and questionnaires. Together, these three approaches provide a 
cumulative understanding of the determinants of privatisation policy in Iran. Based on 
this general assessment, the study makes specific appraisals of the political will of 
Iranian policy-makers to privatise the oil and gas industry. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
PART ONE: Introduction 
1.1 Overview and Impetus for This Study 
This study explores the issues surrounding the privatisation of some of Iran's national 
institutions. In particular, it focuses on the oil and gas industry. The aim of the study is 
to understand some of the reasons for an apparent reluctance within Iran's public and 
private sectors towards privatisation through a determination of the factors influencing 
privatisation policy-making in Iran. 
There is significant impetus for this study at the moment, coming from the domestic 
situation in Iran. The Iranian privatisation programme began in 1995. Privatisation 
policies are currently being contemplated or being carried out in the Gulf region. From 
the author's personal knowledge, the concept is also high on Iran's political agenda. 
However, its origins, reasons for popularity, requirements, management, social and 
economic consequences are not that well understood in Iran. 
Furthermore, the recent election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad may have changed the 
calculations concerning the potential for privatisation in Iran. Therefore, it is valuable to 
understand the context of any decisions that Ahmadinejad might make. Thus, given the 
current political climate in Iran and the socio-economic crossroads at which the country 
finds itself, the author undertook an investigation into the privatisation of the oil and gas 
industry in Iran as a means of providing a basis for understanding these crossroads. 
This impetus also comes from external changes. From President Bush's statements at 
the Red Sea Summit in June 2003 and the recent political developments within the 
Middle East, it is not hard to accept the notion that by 2013 the entire Middle East 
region is poised to become a 'Free Trade Zone' (CNN, 2003). To achieve this 
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aspiration, it has been suggested that the countries of the region will have to embrace 
market economy concepts and agree to move towards transparency and 'privatisation', a 
word often used synonymously with the sale of assets, deregulation and 
decentralisation. 
Furthermore, there is a dearth of understanding concerning the relationship between 
Iranian politics, society, economics and privatisation. For instance, whilst the term 
'privatisation' is currently popular in the region, and in Iran in particular, the 
consequences of privatisation are rarely thought through. This is especially true as they 
relate to standards of services, prices, costs, cross-subsidisation, competitiveness, re-
allocation of human resources, safety and other components linked to the public interest, 
as well as to implications for the private sector and existing government organisations. 
From this investigation, the author will consider the problems that the Iranian oil and 
gas sectors face in adopting a privatisation model, and what solutions might be found to 
fit the unique circumstances in Iran. Thus, the study will also review existing literature 
to establish the void in available research on Iranian privatisation plans in general, and 
on the Iranian oil and gas industry in particular (see Appendix VIII). 
1.2 Context to the Study 
This study is not taking place in a vacuum. There is a wide-ranging context to 
privatisation in Iran. On one level there is an ongoing and extremely long-term debate 
concerning privatisation in theory. On another level, there is an historical background 
which must be taken into account. Finally, there is a longer-term history in which this 
privatisation argument in Iran is only the latest example of deeper historical structures. 
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1.2.1 Privatisation Debate 
Privatisation has a long history of debate, and this history should be taken into account 
in an analysis of Iranian privatisation. Whilst the answer to the question "Why consider 
privatising?" is as old as the subjects of economics and management themselves, there 
still exist many ambiguities. 
In every great monarchy in Europe the sale of the crown lands 
would produce a very large sum of money, which, if applied to 
the payment of the public debts, would deliver from mortgage a 
much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever 
afforded to the crown ... when the crown lands had become 
private property, they would, in the course of a few years, 
become well improved and well cultivated (Smith, 1904:348). 
This positive slant on private ownership and the view of privatisation has not gone 
uncontested by Marxist critiques of private ownership. However, in the main, and in 
many contexts, the basic aims are claimed to be the promotion of competition and 
increase of efficiency. To achieve these goals, Iran's former Deputy Minister of 
Economy, Dr Mohammad Khazaee (2003), stated that maximum efficiency would be 
achieved if the decision-making politicians and public servants were replaced by market 
mechanisms, and that the philosophy and practice of the private sector should be 
injected into the public sector. 
The strategy to privatise will require the size of the public sector organisation to be 
reduced, and public sector borrowing to be controlled and reduced in order to leave 
room for unfettered private sector borrowing. Privatisation is commonly believed by its 
proponents to produce transparency of decision-making. Furthermore, because the 
capital markets are likely to be a surer source of funding than the politically controlled 
capital markets, over a period of time privatised companies should be able to raise funds 
to finance efficiency or expansion in a more flexible manner, to meet their special 
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needs. Financial markets, in tum, bring their own scrutiny by analysts and bankers, a 
scrutiny and discipline not available in government (Pesaran, 2003). 
Keynesian economists would criticise the argument that the assets of enterprises are 
undervalued because of government fears that sales will not be finalised. Potential 
conflict of interest with the appointed consultants in the programme is cited as another 
difficult aspect (Wiltshire, 1987). The main criticisms of the British privatisation 
programme, for instance, have been in five major spheres (Wiltshire, 1987): 
1) the failure of the government to ensure competition in industries where 
privatisation occurs, thereby appearing to convert public monopolies 1 into 
private monopolies; 
2) the creation of inadequate regulatory frameworks in such monopolistic or 
oligopolistic industries, especially in relation to the fulfilment of social 
obligations on the part of privatised industries; 
3) failure on the part of the government to adequately safeguard national interests 
from foreign influences in the privatisation drive; 
4) selling the 'family silver' -the argument that revenue from sales of public assets 
should not be apportioned to consolidated revenue but should be earmarked for 
future generations and future public uses; and 
5) the standard of services after sale or contracting out. 
The question arises of whether the government of Iran would find the courage to divest 
itself of the control it now exercises over the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). 
One might also refer to them as 'regulated monopolies', such as the utility companies in the U.S. 
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Furthermore, can it successfully re-allocate excess human resources when it is 
downsized? 
Differences in behaviour under state and private ownership may be compounded by 
differences in objectives. In the private sector, although profit may not always be 
rigorously and consistently pursued, there is, nevertheless, a clear bottom line. If losses 
continue to be made, the firm will ultimately fail. In the state sector, however, 
objectives are vague and tend to change according to the political climate, leading to 
uncertainty about long-term strategies within industries (Martin and Parker, 1997). 
In conclusion, it is widely believed that public ownership reduces the incentive to secure 
profits and removes the threat of bankruptcy. Private ownership would undoubtedly 
provide a significant spur to managerial efficiency. Capital would be allocated 
according to the market, rather than politics, and considerations and interventions would 
largely cease. To secure such advantages, Enoch Powell and Milton Friedman 
advocated immediate and wholesale denationalisation (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989). 
1.2.2 Background 
To analyse the relevance of the privatisation of the National Iranian Oil Company, and 
to understand the idiosyncrasies and hesitation of the Iranian policy-makers, one must 
look into its immediate background. The following section briefly illustrates this 
background. 
Most oil-rich Third World economies have had difficulty in evolving into true liberal 
societies. By owning or controlling revenues generated by oil, the state is able to 
dominate society, making all classes and groups economically dependent on their 'black 
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gold'. Oil tends to centralise state power in the Middle East, as this commodity forms 
anywhere from 80% to 93% of their foreign exchange earnings (USEIA, 1998, 2005). 
When the US-backed Pahlavi regime began to fall apart, problems within Iranian 
society began to compound with the diplomatic pressures being applied by the US, its 
main ally. To make matters worse, the decline of oil prices in 1974 sharply curtailed its 
economic ambitions (Kamrava, 1990). 
A quarter of a century after the fall of the Shah of Iran and the establishment of an 
Islamic regime, Iran is re-examining its revolution. The 1979 revolt was originally 
grounded in a fight for democracy, civil rights and freedom from foreign interference. 
But the revolutionary process was soon dominated by Ayatollah Khomeini and a coterie 
of clerical activists, who imposed strict Islamic dress on women and banned alcohol and 
music. The seizure of the American Embassy and extremely brutal repression of 
opponents turned Iran into a pariah state. 
President Mohammad Khatami tried to restore normality, both in Iran and in its 
relationships with foreign countries. Elected with 69% of the vote in the May 1997 
elections, and again, with some 60% of the vote, in the 2001 elections, he certainly had 
the mandate of Iran's youthful population. More than 40% of the country's 65 million 
citizens are under the age of 15. 
The job market is tight and, with the introduction of the United Nations' second set of 
sanctions which is now being considered, trading and imports of desperately needed 
spares for the ageing oil and gas industry will become much harder. Having the second 
largest bank in Iran, Bank Sepah, now on the sanctions list, will compound the problems 
of transacting with the sources of supply in U.S. dollars. Even if the tightening of the 
noose around the financial institutions does not make it impossible to secure the 
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requirements of the country from abroad, it certainly makes it uneconomic to buy goods 
and services from the traditional sources of supply. 
The economy is in serious crisis. Iran's population has doubled since the revolution, 
dramatically increasing consumption. With no growth in the output of the economy 
(GDP), the standard of living has halved. Half the population, including 70% of 
government employees, live below the official poverty line. Many have more than one 
job just to make ends meet. Unemployment is estimated to be 25% and the future seems 
bleak. Every year, 800,000 young people enter the job market. It is estimated that more 
than $100 billion needs to be invested to maintain current employment levels, but only 
$2.3 billion is currently allocated to job creation (Reuters, 1998a). 
In 1998, fuel subsidies alone reached $11 billion per year - double the country's 
development budget. Food subsidies on basic commodities such as bread, rice and sugar 
consume another $2.2 billion per year. Together, these subsidies used up virtually all of 
the country's $16 billion oil income for the year (Reuters, 1998b ). President Khatami 
accepted market reform and, with no other source of capital available to the country, 
advocated attracting foreign investments. The President skilfully combined cuts with 
subsidies, the privatisation of state firms and changes to labour laws - in short, 'shock 
therapy' to the market, with calls for the liberalisation of social and political rules to 
allow freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the establishment of a 'civil 
society'. 
President Khatami became fully committed to restructuring the economy. His 
government approved the privatisation of 538 state-owned companies through auctions 
and stock sales, with plans to privatise another 2,000 (Reuters, 1999). The Iranian 
Parliament (Majlis) approved plans to overhaul the oil industry and boost Iran's sagging 
oil production from 3.5 million bpd (barrels per day) to 6 million bpd over the next 10 
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years (USEIA, 1998). This will require at least $120 billion in capital, which has to 
come from private investors and foreign sources. 
Through a strategic development plan and the implementation of various petrochemical 
projects, efforts were underway to raise the production level of Iran's petrochemical 
industry. Begun in 1997, the plan was divided into five phases, lasting until 2013. By 
the end of this period, the total volume of final products is estimated to be 16.8 million 
metric tons per year. The value of investment will amount to $20.6 billion, with total 
sales topping $11.8 billion (PIIC, 2000). 
Participation by the private sector, whether in the form of investment or in launching 
new projects, can have a considerable impact, and it was for this purpose that the 
Petrochemical Industries Investment Company (PIIC) was established. As privatisation 
became one of the main policies of the government, it led to the restructuring of the 
National Petrochemical Company (NPC), with plants having a capacity of less than 
100,000 tons per annum being subject to transfer to the private sector (PIIC, 2000). The 
private sector was also allowed to invest in medium-sized petrochemical plants. NPC 
offered bonds for the construction of petrochemical plants, and also supplied raw 
materials to the private sector at a 30% discount compared with world prices. 
Sustainability of macro-economic stability and progress in the key area of economic 
policy reform is critical for placing Iran on a maintainable growth path, announced HE 
Tahmaseb Mazaheri, the former Minister of Economy, after a meeting with his UK 
counterpart, Gordon Brown, at the end of June 2003. To obtain an improved private 
sector environment, financial sector and pricing system reforms, Iran must rid itself of 
the notion that foreign investors are imperialistic. Although the Ministry of Energy 
authorised the sale of 14% of the capacity of its state-owned power plants (Utilipoint, 
2004), NIOC remains off-limits. This study investigates whether Iran has any choice but 
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to privatise NIOC, whilst taking into account reasons for the reluctance on the part of 
the people and the government of Iran. 
Since the announcement of the privatisation programme in the Five-Year Development 
Plan (FYDP) in 2000 (Privatisation Organisation, 2002), significant progress has been 
made and a new agency set up by the Ministry of Finance. The Majlis has promulgated 
regulations governing privatisation. The Privatisation Committee, under the supervision 
of the President, reviewed 1,039 public sector enterprises for privatisation: 217 are to 
remain public, 87 will be liquidated and 735 destined for privatisation. During 2000-
2001, the government sold Rls2,040 billion (Rials) (about 0.5% of GDP) worth of 
shares in public enterprises on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). It ceded Rls 100 
billion worth of shares to workers. Rls 1 ,800 billion worth of shares are being placed for 
sale in the current year. In the oil sector, the Oil Ministry announced that it will cede 23 
subsidiary firms to the private sector over the FYDP, including the National Iranian 
Tanker Company (NITC) and the Liquefied Gas Distribution Centres (LGDC) (World 
Bank, 2001). 
The critical issue facing Iran today is its nuclear stand-off with the international 
community. While this point is self-evident, what is not so obvious is that the eventual 
resolution of this crisis is likely to profoundly affect Iran in the future, not just in terms 
of its economy and within that its privatisation policies, but also in terms of its foreign 
policy, domestic politics and, potentially, even the nature of the state itself. 
Iran's economy is in desperate need of reform. When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was 
elected President of the Islamic Republic of Iran in June 2005, he came to power on the 
back of an anti-corruption campaign and his promise to reform the economy, 
proclaiming that he would bring the oil money to each Iranian's table. In November 
2005, President Ahmadinejad announced that the government would begin to distribute 
shares of Iranian publicly-held industries to the entire populous. Rumours quickly 
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spread that this was a preliminary step to the seizure and redistribution of many private 
industries and other assets, and the result was a vast, sudden flight of capital out of Iran, 
possibly in the order of US$200 billion. This, together with Ahmadinejad's call to wipe 
Israel off the map, caused the Tehran stock market to collapse. 
Almost 40% of the Iranian GDP is accounted for by the Bonyads, who are nominally 
charitable foundations established to administer the Pahlavi regime's assets on behalf of 
the Iranian people, but in actuality are massive corrupt machines that bankroll the senior 
leadership. The problems with corruption have reduced liquidity, frightened off 
investment, boosted inflation, spurred widespread unemployment, diminished non-oil 
exports, impoverished the middle class, and created a very serious gap between the rich 
and poor. Iran's latest five year plan (Privatisation Organisation, 2004) calls for US$20 
billion investment each and every year, in addition to the US$70 billion to recapitalise 
Iran's decrepit oil industry. 
According to Amini (2004) and expounded further by Nili et al. (2004), Iran's problem 
is that there are only three capital markets in the world capable of generating such levels 
of investment within Iran over the next five to ten years - these being the US, Europe 
and Japan. Much as Iranian hardliners would like to believe that the Russians, Chinese 
and Indians could substitute for the West, the fact of the matter is that they will not be in 
a position to do so for about a decade. In addition, there is the issue of superior Western 
technology: the Iranians would much prefer to have Exxon or Shell repairing the oil 
infrastructure, rather than Lukoil or Sinopec (Pollack, 2006). 
Iran has recently issued an executive order for the privatisation of 80% of several state-
owned companies, but retained firm control over the upstream oil sector and key banks 
(Roshanzamir, 2006). Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, said in his order that: 
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... ceding 80 per cent of the shares of large companies will 
serve to bring about economic development, social justice and 
the elimination of poverty (Roshanzarnir, 2006). 
This decree is in an effort to revive Iran's stalled privatisation programme and kick-start 
the country's many uncompetitive industries of the Bonyad Mostazafan, which are 
heavily protected and are the root cause of corruption and ill-feeling among the various 
sectors of society. 
By putting this action plan (Privatisation Organisation, 2004) into practice, the 
government's role will change from direct involvement in ownership and running the 
large companies to supervising and guiding different sectors of the economy to meet the 
regulations of the World Trade Organisation. Ayatollah Khamenei has said that the 
privatisation process will help reinforce the private sector in the national economy and 
encourage companies to compete in international markets. He continued that the 
downstream oil and gas sectors would be privatised, but excluded the upstream oil and 
gas industry, NIOC, the state companies involved in exploration and the production of 
crude oil and gas. 
The former head of Tehran's Chamber of Commerce, Mohamad Reza Behzadian, notes 
that the move amounts to a major change in the old constitutional attitude toward the 
economy as the absolute property of the government, stating that this order means a 
change in the government's role from an owner into a guide (AFP, 2006). 
In early March 2007, the bitter rivalry between Iran's President, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, and the country's leading elder statesman, Ayatolah Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
erupted into a public struggle for control over economic policies. Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
the President's most influential opponent, set the scene for a power struggle by telling 
Iranian journalists on 7 March 2007 that Mr Ahmadinejad's "trial period is over". He 
said he would use his position as head of the Expediency Council (a state body 
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empowered to set the Islamic regime's long-term goals) to reshape the government's 
economic policies.2 It is rather obvious that whilst there is unanimity and abundance of 
political will in carrying out the plans on economic reforms, particularly the 
privatisation programme, there are no signs of universal acceptance on how the political 
reforms should be in step with the economic liberalisation plans. I will end this section 
by simply quoting what Mr. Rafsanjani mentioned in his declarations to the press on 7 
March 2007. 
Now the trial period is over and the supervising role of the 
expediency council should be enacted more seriously. Under 
the 20-year outlook plan the country's reliance on oil should be 
reduced by more than 10% each year but during the last two 
years this process has been reversed. Next year's budget 
depends on oil to an even greater extent than those of the last 
two years. 
1.3 Research Question 
The previous section has illustrated the impetus for this study, the background and 
history leading up to it, and the aims and objectives of the study. As we have seen, 
given the need for a study such as this, to date, no published research on the 
privatisation of the oil and gas industry has been conducted outside Iran. This study 
aims to fill this gap and provide future researchers with the empirical data collected by 
the author during personal interviews and by reviewing existing archives in Iran. 
We are now in a position to outline the question which this study will specifically 
address. This study examines what the determinants of the Iranian policy of 
privatisation are, in order to answer the question of whether there is the political will to 
Robert Tait in Tehran, Wednesday 7 March 2007, The Guardian. 
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privatise the Iranian oil and gas industry. In order to answer this question, it is necessary 
to address certain sub-questions. These include: 
• The context of theoretical and preceding privatisation policies, including: 
o contemporary privatisation theory; 
o other similar attempts at privatisation, i.e. privatisation in comparable 
political, economic and social environments. 
• How the historical evolution of Iranian politics and economics affected the 
current policy-making environment. 
• What the structural features of importance are, including previous privatisation 
deals; legal framework; political, social and economic environment; regional and 
global geopolitical and economic factors. 
Furthermore, certain areas of knowledge will have to be addressed in relation to the 
answer to this thesis question. These areas include: 
• The Iranian domestic environment, including: 
o past policy evolution; 
• domestic policy 
• economic policy 
• oil policy. 
o the social psychology of Iranian the government and society; 
• the role of revolutionary ideology 
• the role of religion. 
• The external/international environment, including: 
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o relations with Middle Eastern states; 
o relations with the West; 
o relations with international organisations. 
These sub-questions and issues will all be addressed in this study. The following section 
will illustrate the argument that will be used to answer the thesis question and address 
these issues. It will summarise the chapters, as well as the research methodology to be 
used. From it, the reader will see the framework which will be carried out in this study. 
1.4 Summary of Methodology and Argument 
This study will take a three-pronged approach, which relies on multiple methodologies. 
It will use an historical view of Iran since World War II to build a context for the 
determinants of privatisation policy in Iran. In particular, this analysis will be based on a 
political economy framework for analysis. A theoretical basis for the determination of 
privatisation policy will be developed and the precedents which bind the possibilities of 
privatisation policy will be explored. Finally, the specific background, legal and 
institutional framework and policy-maker perspectives will be incorporated. Together, 
these three approaches will provide a cumulative understanding of the determinants of 
privatisation policy in Iran. The following section will introduce and examine each 
approach in more detail. 
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1.4.1 Part Two - Theoretical and Precedent-Based Context and Determinants 
Along with these historical and political economic determinants, there are some 
theoretical determinants of Iranian privatisation policy. Part Two (from section 1.5) 
presents an overview of the theoretical basis behind privatisation in general. It details 
the various schools of thought concerned with privatisation. In this way, the central 
question of this study is addressed in that we detail the realm of possibility that 
privatisation can be conceived for Iran. 
Furthermore, in order to illustrate this realm of possibility, these sections then look at 
some other examples of privatisation. In particular, they address privatisation in 
countries surrounding Iran including Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and India. They 
also look at the non-neighbouring states of Egypt and China which have a major effect 
on the Iranian economy and the realm of privatisation in general. This helps to refine 
this study's question by developing our understanding of what the realm of possibilities 
are for Iranian privatisation. 
In other words, Part Two examines the possible privatisation decisions which can be 
made by the Iranian policy-makers. This is the case because we must assume that as 
rational actors, Iranian policy-makers and the world's policy-makers who interact with 
Iranian privatisation policy-makers, can only make decisions based on historical or 
comparative precedents. Thus, this sets the stage for all possibilities of privatisation and 
in that sense provides a determinant of privatisation. 
1.4.2 Chapters 2, 3 and 4- Historical, Political Economy Context and Determinants 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 employ a political economy approach to analyse the history leading 
up to present discussions of Iranian oil and gas privatisation. Each chapter explores an 
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era of Iran, beginning in Chapter 2 with the post-war period, dominated by the Shah, 
which led to the 1979 revolution. Chapter 3 then addresses the period roughly equal to 
Khomeini 's rule from 1979 to 1989. Lastly, Chapter 4 addresses the contemporary 
Iranian situation, beginning in 1989 and leading up to the present. 
Each of these chapters explores political issues, including domestic and international 
politics. They also explore economic issues, including changes in the economic outlook 
of each era, issues affecting privatisation and the international economic situation. The 
chapters then analyse the interplay between these factors. 
Throughout this study, the political economy methodology is utilised. This 
methodology admits the causality of economic change by political change and vice 
versa. Thus, it involves examining political issues and noting their economic 
consequences, then examining economic issues and noting their political consequences. 
This study also incorporates domestic and international politics, assuming that domestic 
factors will have international consequences and that international factors will have 
domestic consequences. In the case of Iran, we have seen that as the price of oil 
increases, due to international events and demands, the privatisation fever is dampened, 
but as the prices drop the popularity of privatisation increases in the country among the 
political elite. 
The culmination of these chapters presents us with a single, evolutionary history of Iran. 
It brings us to a level of understanding in which economic and political issues can be 
seen in relation to each other. This will allow us to couch our answer to the central 
question of this study - i.e. what are the determinants of the Iranian policy of 
privatisation (with a particular emphasis on the oil sector)? 
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Furthermore, these chapters partially answer the thesis question. It will be demonstrated 
that an interplay of domestic and international political and economic factors have been 
determinants of the Iranian policy of privatisation. Each of these four factors is then 
explored separately. 
The first factor is the disjunction between Iran's government and society. This issue is 
theorised as what Katouzian (2000; 2003) has called the 'theory of arbitrary rule'. This 
disjunction between society and the state is illustrated as a factor in pre-revolution Iran. 
It is then shown to continue into post-revolution Iran, though in a different form, up 
until the present. Such disjunction between the state and society is the first determinate 
of policy, and privatisation policy more specifically. 
The second factor is the disjunction between economic and political/social 
modernisation. This disjunction is also examined in relation to the Shah's attempts at 
economic and political reform. This factor also continued past the revolution and the 
issue is explored the section on post-revolution Iran. 
The third factor in determining policy is Iran's dependence on oil. Oil played a major 
factor in the Shah's Iran and has continued to do so since the revolution. It has skewed 
and biased both domestic and international policy in the state and, as will be 
demonstrated, still plays a huge role in determining privatisation policy. 
The fourth factor to consider is the relationship of Iran with the West (the US in 
particular) and Iranian society's perception of these relations. In particular, its 
perception of the West's imperialistic attitude towards Iran had significant effects on the 
nature of Iran's policy before the revolution and has continued to do so after the 
revolution. 
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These four factors have all helped to determine the nature of Iranian policy with regard 
to privatisation throughout the history of Iran, going back at least to the Shah. These 
factors continued into post-revolution Iran due, in part, to the brevity of the Iranian 
revolution. Beyond these factors, there are two supplementary factors which have had a 
significant influence since the revolution. These factors are related to earlier factors, and 
in some sense existed before the revolution, but became much more important after the 
revolution. 
One supplementary post-revolution factor is the role of the Islamic Republic's 
revolutionary ideology. After the revolution, politics and economics in Iran had some 
continuities with pre-revolution Iran, which will be discussed, but also there were huge 
changes. The revolutionary ideology led to changes in the government, including 
factionalisation, as well as changes in foreign policy. These included, specifically, the 
Iran hostage crisis, and Iran's handling of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. Another 
key issue has been the Iranian relationship with nuclear power and nuclear weapons. 
Together, these factors have, broadly speaking, contributed to policy in Iran and, more 
specifically, to privatisation policy. 
The other post-revolution factor is the role of religion in Iran. In particular, religion has 
had a complex and very direct relationship with privatisation in Iran, and this is 
explored in some detail. However, it has also had other effects on politics and 
economics in Iran, such as the complex relationship of Khomeini' s views on the 
revolution with his views on fundamentalist Islam, which also have had indirect, though 
no less wide-ranging, effects on Iranian privatisation policy. 
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1.4.3 Chapter 5 - Specific Determinants of Iranian Privatisation Policy 
With a theoretical and historical context in place, it is then possible to specifically 
address the thesis question, being in a position to directly address the specific 
determinants of Iranian privatisation policy. Chapter 5 focuses on the four primary 
factors which directly affect privatisation policy. These are the specific background of 
privatisation thought in Iran; the legal and institutional framework; the nature of oil and 
gas relative to privatisation in Iran; and the thoughts of relevant policy-makers. These 
sections pull together all of the historical and theoretical contexts and determinants of 
Iranian privatisation policy. 
The first point to be addressed is the specific background of privatisation in Iran. This 
section builds on the historical, political economy sections previous to this chapter. It 
focuses upon the specific issues affecting privatisation with a focus not seen in earlier 
chapters. The concepts it explores are taken for granted, based on the background of the 
earlier history chapters as well as the theoretical chapters. 
The second point is the legal and institutional framework. This section is based on a 
close reading of the relevant legal documents concerning privatisation post-1990 in Iran. 
It will also explore the institutional issues which have arisen since that time and which 
constrain policy decisions. This section brings together both the theoretical factors of 
privatisation, discussed in Part Two of Chapter 1, as well as the legal and political 
evolution discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. The third point is that the oil and gas sector 
is unique in Iran and needs to be addressed separately from different types of 
privatisation. This section directly addresses the contemporary determinants of Iranian 
oil and gas privatisation. It is based on the political economic issues concerning oil and 
gas in Iran which are covered in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. It also brings into play 
supplementary information towards understanding this sector. Together, this provides a 
specific understanding of oil and gas sector privatisation in Iran. 
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Finally, this chapter also presents primary research on the personal views of relevant 
decision-makers in Iran who are concerned with privatisation. This primary research is 
based on extensive interviewing with relevant sources. Firstly, the interview questions 
have been methodologically explored in order to provide a perspective on what kind of 
information is relevant and what sort of biases can be expected, in order to provide us 
with a view of what to expect. The results of the interviews are then described and 
examined. 
1.4.4 Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Implications 
Chapter 6 summarises the conclusions of each chapter and brings out the implications of 
the study. The factors determining privatisation policy, particularly those with regard to 
the oil and gas sector in Iran, are then illustrated in Chapter 6 (Table 6.1). These factors 
all interact to determine the privatisation policy in Iran. Each plays its own role and 
must be taken into account separately. As seen in Chapter 5, the contextual factors all 
contribute to the specific factors which will determine privatisation. 
Thus, we are able to conclude that the answer to the thesis question posed is this: 
privatisation policy in Iran will be determined by several interacting factors including 
the disjunction between state and society, the disjunction between economic and 
political/social modernisation, Iran's economic dependence on oil, relations and 
perceptions of relations between Iran and the West (in particular the US), the Islamic 
revolutionary ideology and religion, as well as through theories of privatisation and 
international precedents of privatisation. 
This conclusion allows us to take away some implications from the study. Specifically, 
we are able to make some hypotheses concerning the political, economic, oil and gas 
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privatisation prospects for Iran. The framework developed in this study allows us to do 
more than simply make guesses at these prospects. It enables us to operationalise 
specifically defined determinants of policy in Iran. 
1.4.5 Note on Research Methodology 
This study uses a dual methodology, based on primary and secondary sources. As 
illustrated in the summary of chapters above, secondary sources have been combined 
with publicly available primary source information in order to provide a context for 
answering the thesis question. This has been combined with new, primary source data 
collection filtered into the third section of Chapter 5, which focuses upon the personal 
views of policy actors who are related to the privatisation process. The primary and 
secondary sources analysed include: 
• relevant legal texts; 
• government documentation; 
• regulatory documentation; 
• banking and other business documentation and data; 
• government speeches; and 
• theoretical and other academic texts and journal articles. 
The new, primary source methodology, in essence, uses qualitative methods and 
'snowball' sampling. The sample is relatively small in size and confined to key 
personnel of the Ministry of Power and affiliated companies within the oil and gas 
sector, including the NIOC, NPC, NITC and Helicopter Services Organisation (HSO). 
Qualitative research methods allow the reader to better understand the nuances involved 
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in this study and constitute the main difference with studies that have taken place 
elsewhere. 
A questionnaire was designed with national objectives in mind and formed part of the 
researcher's method of collecting data. Case studies of the concept in other countries 
were brought to the attention of interviewees, during discussion of the questionnaire. 
Data collection can best be dealt with by personal visits and interviews. Having worked 
as a consultant and provider of services to the sector, the author has had access to 
decision-makers for personal interviews. The interviews, collection and collating of data 
for this research facilitated the completion of this study. Analysis of the collected 
samples and questionnaire used qualitative methods, with the technique for analysis 
taking the profile of the interviewees into account. 
PART TWO: Privatisation Theory and Comparison of Precedents 
1.5 Introduction 
Part One has given an historical, fact-based background to this study, detailing the 
political and economic changes in Iran since World War II and through to the 
contemporary period. It has, in particular, illustrated the interplay of politics and 
economics at both a domestic and international level in Iran. This was achieved using a 
political economy methodology which specifically admits the mutual causality of 
politics and economics. 
The following sections will take a wholly different perspective on answering the central 
question of this thesis. Rather than looking at the background of decision-making, this 
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chapter will look at the realm of possibility and the precedents to decision-making 
which are out of the control of Iranian policy-makers. Indeed, this theoretical and 
precedent base to possible decisions is not determined by any individual actor, but is 
rather a structural feature of the international system which is determined by the 
interplay of different actors and by the evolution of ideas, or what Dawkins (1991) has 
called memes, something which cannot be determined by any given thinker. 
Thus, the realm of possibility is that which determines and constrains policy-makers in 
making and implementing decisions. It includes, specifically, those theoretical 
possibilities for privatisation. These are determined by the specific theories about 
privatisation which have been considered by analysts and practitioners, and which could 
be used as a framework for privatisation in Iran. It is also made up by the precedents set 
by other states which have attempted to privatise in the past. These states were also 
constrained by theories about privatisation which existed at the time, precedents 
available to them while making decisions, along with the circumstances and resource 
base available. 
At the same time, there is an interplay between the possible decisions which Iran can 
make concerning privatisation and their actual decisions over time. This is a process 
called structuration, developed by Giddens (1984) to serve as a means of solving the so-
called 'agent-structure' problem. The 'problem' is that it is not clear whether structures 
or systems cause agents to act as they do, or if agents create the structure. Giddens' 
solution is to say that there is an interplay over time between the structure and agent 
where each contributes to the formation of the other. In the case of Iranian privatisation, 
the structuration solution is that theory and precedents (the structure) are informing the 
decisions of policy-makers in Iran (the agents), and that at the same time their decisions 
are contributing to the nature of the structure, i.e. by becoming another precedent. The 
implication is that it is clear that the theory and precedents of privatisation must be 
studied. In other words, Iranian privatisation is not taking place in a vacuum. 
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Part Two begins by addressing the theory of privatisation. It starts with a very general 
overview of the issue, including definitions of important concepts. It then moves on to 
illustrate and examine the different possible forms of privatisation. From this, the stage 
is set to take a more in-depth look at some specific issues that arise in privatisation and 
which have important implications in Iran; in particular, the issue of rights to property 
are then explored. 
In the second section of this study, some relevant privatisations are examined. The 
section addresses relevant states which surround Iran and ones which are further off but 
still have a large impact on Iranian privatisation. The countries which are addressed and 
that are surrounding Iran include: Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and India. The non-
neighbouring states which still have a major effect on the Iranian economy and the 
realm of privatisation in general, are Egypt and China (see section 1.6). The 
examination of these states begins with an historical look at their privatisation attempts 
over the last decades. It then moves on to analyse these attempts with regard to the 
structural constraints they put on other states in their attempts to privatise. 
The conclusion summarises the findings. It then provides an analysis of how these 
theoretical constraints affected Iran and how knowledge of these precedents affected 
decision-making in Iran. The implications of this analysis are then examined in regard 
to the central question of this study. 
1.5.1 Privatisation and Related Concepts 
The term 'privatisation' implies a wide range of meanings, which transpires in the large 
number of theoretical and empirical analyses on the subject (Demsetz, 1967; Backhaus, 
1989; Barzel, 1989; Bouin, 1992). One particular study, for example, has enumerated as 
many as fifteen understandings of the concept of privatisation (Gormley, 1991). In more 
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specific and fundamental terms, it is understood as the transfer of property and control 
rights over given enterprises, infrastructures and other economic establishments from 
the state to the private sector. In a wider sense, privatisation is conceptualised as the 
process of enhancing the effectiveness of the non-state economic sector. Obviously, the 
latter can both incorporate and exclude the former, and as such could open up 
possibilities for rhetoric commitment to privatisation on the part of political and 
economic elites. 
On an even wider footing, privatisation can be interpreted as a process which 
incorporates broad measures of economic liberalisation, such as reducing state 
paternalism, the removal of bureaucratic obstacles for economic agents and the 
improvement of the functioning of state-owned enterprises. In this sense, even if 
privatisation is being implemented in the economic milieu, it represents a bona fide 
political process which requires the researcher to delve deeply into its political 
determinants and consequences. As such, privatisation clearly differs from other 
phenomena, signifying a withdrawal of state influence and control over the economy, 
such as commercialisation, decentralisation and deregulation. They can all exist 
independently, but can also join into a coherent governmental privatisation strategy. 
Commercialisation implies the extraction of state-owned enterprises from the 
framework of state-planning, i.e. they become independent, economic agents with their 
own capital and juridical standing that function according to the logic of the market. 
Decentralisation is defined as the process of transferring ownership and control rights 
from central to local structures of state authority, whereby state planning acquires a 
dimension of a mere summary of local economic planning. Finally, deregulation implies 
the withdrawal of the state from many aspects of the country's economic life through, 
inter alia, the liberalisation of prices, the liberalisation of the trade regime, 
demonopolisation, etc. 
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The notion of privatisation should also be distinguished from the closely related, but 
narrower, concept of divestiture. It presupposes the spin-off of filials, branches or units 
of a given enterprise, either because of hardship or economic necessity. In the first case, 
the revenues from the sale would help maintain the rest of the activities; in the second, 
there is a restructuring or re-orientation predominantly towards other areas of the 
business. Divestiture can be effected through the transfer of shares or material assets 
and is often a method of exiting a position of market monopoly, voluntarily or not. 
Another associated mechanism, which is also short of the transfer of property and 
control rights over a given enterprise, is that of contracting service providers, such as 
managerial or consultancy services, and outsourcing certain of its less profitable 
activities to third parties (Gormley, 1991). 
1.5.2 Fonns of Privatisation 
The process of privatisation, broadly defined above as the transfer of property and 
control rights over state-owned enterprises, can take multiple forms. They are all part of 
this definition and operationalise it from different perspectives and according to 
different criteria, including scope and method, parties involved, type, size and sector of 
the privatised enterprise, market share, etc. Table 1.1 provides a concise presentation of 
the various forms, which are further elaborated below. 
The different forms shown in Table 1.1 generate a different focus on the determinants 
and consequences of privatisation. Each implies a specific configuration of relevant 
actors, interests and institutional frameworks, which define a particular approach 
towards its analysis. In terms of its scope, privatisation can be full or partial. The former 
implies the complete withdrawal of the state from the privatised enterprise, while the 
latter presupposes the preservation of a certain level of state ownership (usually a 
minority stake). The latter option is preferred when the industry within which the 
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enterprise operates is placed under sustained governmental control, as the new 
enterprise owners are able to ensure a continued interest on the part of the state in its 
progress. This comes with the price of having to take into account certain economic and 
social policies that the government undertakes to fulfil. 
Table 1.1: Forms of Privatisation 
Scope of privatisation Full Partial·· 
Investor Foreign _ ·; Domestic 
~. 
Combined 
~~J~Jf JJ_]f~~J~~:]r;:t~t]f~0~;~e~~4j~~1~~J~'~ l 
Type of state Restructtitedenterpri_se Non-restructured enterprise (no 
ownership (ownership bfshares) division in shares) 
f~~~~f_}~. _tr_1:~~~;~lGE~~:{~Hi~6§e~~;;][]:~{t~·~~;t~~j~~11?itlJ 
Volume of the 
Market share of the 
enterprise 
Large 
Source: Based upon Pirie (1988) and Vuylsteke (1988). 
. Medium Small 
Non-monopoly 
According to the privatisation method, there are generally three ways of transferring 
state ownership into private hands. These are the public offering of shares, through 
27 
which ownership is dispersed as widely as possible, and tender and negotiation, which 
suppose a single buyer. This method of negotiation offers most flexibility in terms of 
being able to field additional proposals following the initial presentation of the 
standpoints of both the investor and the seller. In terms of investor orientation, 
privatisation can be aimed at attracting foreign buyers or at stimulating the acquisition 
of economic assets by domestic companies. Depending on the specific privatisation 
policy, a combination of these two types of investors in a single joint venture company 
can also be acceptable to the seller. 
With regard to the seller itself, privatisation can be implemented by a specialised state 
organisation, a governmental ministry, an intermediary or by the Enterprise Board. 
Among these (in cases of ownership by the central government, and not municipalities), 
in all three cases, apart from the ministry, there is a lack of overlap between the seller 
and the new owner which introduces further and interesting dimensions in the analysis 
of any particular contract. In terms of the type of ownership, broadly, most companies 
can be owned through their shares; where the state possesses the shares of a company 
whose structure requires their existence, or it can be owned, as a material object, 
through their production assets, buildings, etc. Both types imply different privatisation 
strategies. 
The rest of the forms of privatisation are more or less self-explanatory, distinguishing 
between ownership by the central government and municipal authorities, among large, 
medium and small privatisations (in cases of large-scale privatisation across the 
country), among different economic sectors and between a monopoly and non-
monopoly market share of the privatised enterprise. An interesting element of 
privatisation, in cases where the state has acquired property over enterprises through 
nationalisation without due compensation, is the so-called restitution. If undertaken at 
all, a policy of restitution has the potential to permeate all of the above forms of 
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privatisation and generate policy proposals that need to be accounted for in a 
comprehensive way (Ohashi, 1980). 
1.5.3 Right to Property 
The right to property, and its conceptualisation and implementation within any given 
society, is fundamental to understanding the potential content and orientation of the 
policy of privatisation pursued by its political and economic elite. It relates to the 
fundamental dilemma of privatisation which suggests that there is an inherent conflict 
between the possibility for a state to transfer economic ownership to private companies 
and the possibility of guaranteeing the continuity of those economic and social policies 
that it has been implementing, or would like to implement, in the particular sector of 
privatisation. In a way this is logical (being guided by the stimulus of revenue and 
profit) as private agents usually give less consideration to the wider economic and social 
implications of their managerial practice than governments do (Mihaly, 1992). 
The different dimensions of the right to property, and their combination and utilisation 
in privatisation policy, contribute to both exacerbating and alleviating this conflict and 
the following paragraphs demonstrate how (see also Table 1.2). The basis of property 
rights was laid down by Roman law. In its understanding they consist of a) the right to 
use and manage (usus); b) the right to revenue (usus fructus) and c) the right to sell or 
exchange; i.e. fully or partially release oneself from property rights against a certain 
price (abusus). In addition to these, a fourth element has also been seen as relevant, 
particularly with regard to privatisation, and this is the right of residual control over the 
property. This right is different to the right to use and manage and the right to sell and 
exchange, and implies control over all decisions regarding the use of the property, 
which are not explicitly regulated by law or contract (Munzen, 1990). 
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This fourth dimension of property rights offers a key analytical space for a new way of 
determining which agent (economic or political) is the owner of a given enterprise. A 
creditor to a company acquires short-term rights to revenue arising out of their 
contractual relation to its owners. Since this forms part of property rights, the argument 
could be advanced that the creditor is thus an owner as well. Indeed, privatisation 
through the purchase of company loans has been utilised by interested investors. 
However, considering the dimension of residual control, a creditor has no comparable 
standing to that of the proper owner. In any given political and social context, this right 
is regulated by the Constitution, respective laws (trade, commerce, etc.) and (where 
applicable) decrees by the country's rulers. In their totality they form the property 
regime in that particular setting and are an important focus of study and analysis. 
The various forms of privatisation cover all four elements of the right to property, either 
together or separately. An example of the latter is a contract for management with a 
purchasing clause (a concept close to that of financial leasing), which implies an initial 
transferral of the right to use and manage and the right to revenue with a subsequent 
transferral of the right to control and (possibly) sell or exchange. It is conceivable that 
privatisation policies only envisage a partial transfer of property rights or impose certain 
limitations on the new owner, particularly when this is seen as more politically 
acceptable than full and unrestricted transferral by those taking the decision. Table 1.3 
summarises some of the common limitations employed when privatising state-owned 
enterprises. 
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Table 1.2: Definitions of Basic Islamic Concepts 
...... -,:~NptiQn~:. ;,::· ··~. 
The relationships of 
human beings with God 
Pursuit of Wealth 
Class Structure 
Social Justice 
Spiritual Uplift 
Concept of Development 
Ownership 
• Everything belongs to God, even human beings themselves. 
• Man is the vicegerent of God on this earth. 
• The key to Islamic philosophy lies in man's relationship with 
God. 
• Man holds property in trust for which he is accountable to 
God. 
• Different aspects of the Islamic social framework are united 
by one principle of Tawhid (the oneness of God). 
• With regards to the relationship of man and society to God, 
emphasis is laid on both purification and growth (tazkiyah). 
• In Islamic philosophy, there is no limit in the earning of 
wealth within the boundaries of Islamic principles. 
• Emphasis on justly distribution of wealth and welfare. 
• Emphasis on fair distribution of wealth. 
• Emphasis on human welfare and security. 
• Predominant stress on moral values. 
• The fulfilment of spiritual and material need of individuals 
and society necessitate a vital role of the state. 
• The spiritual and material goals of a Muslim society can only 
be achieved if all the people in the society utilise their God-
given talent with full efficiency and honesty. 
• Development includes moral, spiritual and material aspects. 
• Absolute ownership of man is a concept alien to Islam as it 
belongs to God. There are definite obligations towards others 
attendant upon the individual rights of ownership. The Iranian 
Constitution, claimed to be based on Shari' a, states that there 
are no prohibitions against wealth as long as long as it is 
legitimately acquired (Article 49). 
Source: Ahmad (1980), Siddiqi (1988), Naqvi (1989), Mannan (1989), Ahmad (1991), Ahsan (1991), 
Chapra (1992), Ahmed (1996), Rima (1996), Choudhury (1998). 
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Table 1.3: Limitation of Property Rights During Privatisation 
Right to use and 
manage 
Right to sell or 
exchange 
a) obligations to 
preserve the area of 
activity 
b) limitations on 
relations with third 
parties 
c) .limitations on the 
percentage of 
owned shares 
a) limitation on the volume bf 
assets that can be sold 'on to' 
third parties 
b) limitation on the volume of 
shares th~t can be sold on to 
third parties 
Source: Vickers and Yarrow (1989). 
Most often, the above limitations are the result of a professed governmental policy 
regarding the future of the privatised enterprise. Usually it is the privatisation of 
enterprises of high significance for the economy of the country that is amenable to their 
exercise. There could be cases as well where limitations are imposed with more ulterior 
motives, in order to privilege a certain buyer or to frustrate the attempts to privatise a 
certain enterprise. In the analysis of the imposition of restrictions on the transfer of 
property rights, it is often hard to distinguish rhetoric from interest. While taking 
account of this difficulty, the following paragraphs outline the more obvious functions 
that each of the limitations above is meant to serve. 
The obligation to preserve the area of activity is prompted by the lack of sufficient 
number of similar businesses or by the wish to prevent the diversion of assets created 
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with a particular purpose to other activities. The limitation regarding the relations with 
third parties is aimed at limiting the access of certain companies or individuals into the 
particular sector of the economy where privatisation occurs. The limitation on the 
percentage of owned shares by a single investor corresponds to the possible wish by the 
seller to avoid a high concentration of ownership within the domestic economy and 
hence prevent monopolies from forming. 
The obligation to commit to an agreed investment programme is often prompted by the 
development strategies of the government aimed at boosting a certain sector of the 
economy or a certain enterprise that is technologically lagging behind its competitors or 
is important for the overall economy of the country. The requirement to 
preserve/enhance the employment level is usually imposed on investors for enterprises 
that are either major employers or operate in regions where employment is an important 
element of the governmental social policy. The obligation to pay off the debts of the 
privatised company is logically imposed for those enterprises that have accumulated 
large debt portfolios, particularly if those are towards state owned agencies, which the 
government is not prepared to transfer to the state budget. 
As has been illustrated in this section, the history of ownership goes back a long way. 
Human beings have aspired to increase and expand the spectrum of their dominance on 
planet Earth by extending and enhancing their domain of proprietorship. As compared 
to the secular systems, Islam has varying philosophies and views about the extent and 
nature of the right of an individual to ownership. It is mentioned in the Qur'an that: 
You who believe, do not use up one another's wealth to no 
good purpose, unless it is for some business based on mutual 
consent among you. Do not kill one another: God has been 
Merciful towards you (4:29). 
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On another occasion it is said: 
You who believe, do not enter any houses except your own 
homes unless you are sure of their occupant's consent, and 
greet them politely (24:27). 
Rafi' b. Khadij reported that the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon Him) said: 
One who cultivates on the land of other people without their 
permission, has no right on the yield except to the extent of his 
expenses (Siddiqi, 1988). 
Whilst the Qur'an makes it explicitly clear that the ultimate owner is God and only God, 
the right of the individual to hold property is accepted and respected. The dichotomy of 
this God-Man relationship in tenns of ownership is reconciled by the notion of 
trusteeship of man, and man's accountability to Him. Therefore, a state representing the 
will of God - an Islamic state such as Iran - may impose limits on individual property 
rights. According to the distinguished Iranian jurist Ayatollah Taleghani, the Islamic 
economy: 
... bears distinguishing features, as it generally recognizes 
individuals as owners of the fruits of their labour and free 
agents in transactions, within the framework of the relevant 
ordinances (Taleghani, 1983:34). 
Beyond these limits, it is the ruler (Islamic State) which functions as the owner or 
supervisor in regard to the public capital and exchange regulations within the public 
sphere. To this end, an Islamic-oriented economy: 
.. .is not based on an unlimited freedoms to ownership, nor is it 
based on the public ownership that results in the total denial of 
individual ownership and freedoms... Property ties and 
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economic relationships are bound with human sentiments and 
instincts, and the social milieu reflects the totality of these ties. 
Islam envisions distribution, like production, as the natural and 
innate right of the one whose labour is involved, such that the 
individual is free to choose his labour, and labour is the source 
of the right of ownership (Taleghani, 1983:34). 
Table 1.4: Overview of Wealth and Ownership 
Pre-classical 
Plato & Aristotle • They believed that a minimum amount of wealth is essential to the 
good life. The household exists for the purpose of satisfying natural 
wants by producing useful commodities or acquiring them by 
exchange for consumption. 
Classical: 
Adam Smith 
(1723- 1790) 
• Plato's view: 
1. A systematic expansion of the principles of society and the origin 
of the city state and the division of labour, and; 
2. The city arises because of the division of labour which itself is 
the result of natural inequalities in human skill and the 
multiplicity of human wants. 
• Aristotle's view: 
1. More private property with its liberal uses. 
2. In favour of money rather than barter or exchange. 
3. Against usury. 
4. His attack on the community of property is almost entirely based 
on the incentive argument; communal property will not be looked 
after as carefully as private property. 
• The last quarter of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the 
industrial revolution opened up vast possibilities of expansion to the 
recently established mode of industrial capitalism. 
• England was the most advanced capitalist country and its political 
structure had begun to change in accordance with the ideas of 
liberalism long before the French Revolution released its stimulus 
for the forces of liberalism everywhere. 
• The champion of the Laissez Faire approach. 
• He was under no illusion about the desire of individuals, including 
businessmen, to create a privileged position for themselves. But he 
nevertheless believed in the harmony of interest, because he thought 
that these privileged positions could only be maintained with state 
support without the intervention of government. 
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Ricardo 
(1772 - 1823) 
Edmund Burke 
Gentz 
(1764- 1832) 
• He believed in natural order; however, he did not doubt the 
compatibility of social harmony with the institution of private 
property. He also believed in the defence of the rich against the poor 
by the government and thought that property was the chief cause of 
authority and subordination. 
• Claimed that inherent natural order is superior to any order 
artificially created by mankind and the wise social organisation 
needs to act in harmony with the dictates of the natural order. 
• He stressed the point that the benefit of one should not conflict with 
the good of others. 
• He believed that labour is the main source of the wealth of the 
nation and it depends on the degree of productivity of the labour and 
the amount of useful labour. 
• Theory of value and distribution: the whole produce is divided 
among the three classes of the community, that the proportions of 
this division vary in different stages of society, that to determine the 
laws which regulate this distribution is the principal problem in 
political economy, and that hitherto there has been very little 
satisfactory information respecting the natural course of rent, profit 
and wages. 
• Analysis of the causes of the value: the discovery of the origin of the 
surplus product and consequent classification of different activities 
and classes of society and of various policies in relation to the 
production, accumulation and distribution of surplus. 
• He was in favour of non-interventionism, except for state finance. 
• He favoured a wealthy and financially independent Church. 
• He was also in favour of rights of property. 
• In his philosophy, working classes are capable of governing. 
• He thought that self-interest was the main motive of human conduct 
for the individual and society. 
• Regarded the development of trade, industry and scientific 
agriculture as unnatural, though he could not deny their usefulness. 
• Tried to compromise by stressing the power of public finance in 
moulding the economic activities of the community as a whole. 
• In favour of indirect taxation as an instrument of state policy. 
• Excessive power assigned to the state is much in evidence in his 
theory of money. 
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Marxism 
Karl Marx • Man is a social producer of his means of livelihood . 
1818- 1883) • Labour, viewed as a producer of use-value, is not the source of 
value; for this labour cannot be exercised without some natural 
material. 
• The form in which the proportional division of labour operates in a 
society where the inter-connection of social labour is manifested in 
the private exchange of the individual products of labour, is 
precisely the exchange value of these products. 
• Social production involves certain social relations, the quality of 
which depends upon the degree of development of the social 
productive powers. 
• In order to allow the expanding productive process, the social 
change is essential. Therefore, political and legal institutions have to 
change and so will ideas. 
• Society can be classified on the basis of the factor of ownership of 
the material means of production. This division is the basis of the 
process of production and all other economic phenomena. Once 
economic relations have been established, the process of production 
itself makes them subject to change. 
Modern 
Alfred Marshall • In Marshall's view, the forces behind supply and demand are: 
(1842-1924) 1. Behind demand is marginal utility - reflected in demand prices of 
buyers. 
2. Behind supply is marginal effort and sacrifice - reflected in the 
supply price. 
• The equilibrium between supply and demand can be considered as: 
1. the market value equity of supply and demand, when the supply is 
assumed to be fixed. 
2. the nominal values, which relate to short or long periods. 
Keynes • Keynes was concerned with aggregate income consumption, savings 
(1883- 1946) and investment, rather than with the determination of individual 
prices which formed the core of the economic theory. 
• Regarding the supply and demand functions: 
1. Effective demand is defined as the aggregate income which the 
entrepreneurs expect to receive, inclusive of the income which 
they will hand on to other factors of production, from the amount 
of current employment which they decide to give. 
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Chicago School 
of Thought: 
Frank Knight 
(1885- 1946) 
George Stigler 
(1910- 1991) 
Milton Friedman 
(1912- 2006) 
James Buchanan 
(1918-) 
2. A supply function can be established, relating the aggregate 
supply price of the output obtained by employing a variable 
number of men with that number. 
• The level of income determines the volume of employment. 
Furthermore, it is determined jointly by the level of consumption 
and by the level of investment. 
• Functional relation of the employment, consumption and investment 
gives a certain marginal propensity to consume. 
• The psychological attitude to liquidity and the psychological 
expectation of future yield from capital assets. 
• Determinants of the volume of investment: when someone invests 
they purchase the rights to the series of perspective net returns, 
which they expect to obtain from selling, the output of the capital 
asset in which they have invested during the life of the asset 
(marginal efficiency of capital). 
• Emphasis of government intervention when aggregate demand is 
inadequate to create full employment. 
• The essentials of the capitalist system could be preserved without 
sacrificing full employment if government exercises proper control. 
• There are certain areas that should not be left to individual initiative. 
• State has to exercise a guiding influence on the propensity to 
consume partly through the taxation schemes and partly by fixing 
the rate of interest. 
• He proposed a mixed economy in which investment is socialised but 
in which private self-interest will continue to function in all areas in 
which it is compatible with full employment. He regarded this as 
"the only practicable means of avoiding the destruction of existing 
economic forms in their entirety and as the condition of the 
successful functioning of individual initiative". 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Frank Knight is considered the leader of this school, who 
emphasised the theory of individual choice based on the households 
as the production units that seek to maximise utility much as firms 
seek to maximise profit. 
They were pioneers in promoting law and economics as the chief 
interdisciplinary field of the social sciences by studying the effects 
of the assignment of property rights. 
This school was interested towards the analysis of growth in 
underdeveloped countries via market mechanisms. 
They were pro-liberalisation and economic freedom as a means to 
achieve higher efficiency of the market. 
They emphasised the usefulness of sovereignty of consumers for 
maximising behaviour in their economic activity. 
They stressed the point that in addition to the stock of physical 
capital and increasing the labour force, the technical progress and 
human capital are also important. 
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• They believed in the philosophy of profit maximisation as a 
response to the incentives given to them (labour force) in 
underdeveloped countries. 
• The market mechanism can stimulate efficiency and growth in an 
underdeveloped economy more effectively than the alternative 
policy of governmental planning as an instrument of economic 
development. 
• The necessity for encouraging the emergence of 'entrepreneurial 
personalities' in underdeveloped countries is a matter of special 
concern. 
• They urged government to facilitate private investment by supplying 
data not generally available to individuals. Education, free elections 
and nationwide media were regarded as being useful in opening up 
an otherwise closed society. 
Source: Keynes (1936), Knight (1950), Polanyi et at. (1957), Walsh and Gram (1980), Lowry (1987), 
Betz (1988), Rima (1988; 1996). 
I have summarised the history of Western economic thinking here for two main reasons. 
Firstly, it can be seen that there is not, any more than there is in Islam, one simple 
consensus view. Instead, there is a series of complex and continuing debate. Although it 
is sometimes fashionable to agree that there is a telos, a tendency for a single meaning 
to emerge in these debates, this is not really the case. Nor is it the case in Islamic 
economic argument. Secondly, as this thesis will explore with respect to privatisation, 
these debates have interacted. It is perhaps going too far to say that there is a 
'conversation' between Western and Islamic debates on privatisation, but there have at 
least been elements of a dialogue. This thesis tries to promote that conversation. The 
discussion of Western economic thinking, necessarily brief, is a basic building block in 
understanding the shape or boundaries of that conversation. 
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1.5.4 Alternatives to Privatisation 
Privatisation is not the only way in which a state can divest itself of economic 
industries. Another method is corporatisation. This serves as an alternative to either full 
nationalisation or full privatisation, with features in common to both. It is in many ways 
the road that Iran has taken in the past, an issue which will be discussed in later 
sections. However, it is important to deal with the possibility here for the sake of 
thoroughness in our analysis. 
Corporatisation is, at its most basic level, the process of moving the control of industries 
from direct control by the government to control by government-owned corporations 
(Personal Communication).3 Within this definition there is room to manoeuvre. The 
government's control may be by specific bureaucracy with sovereign power or a 
bureaucracy itself controlled by other officials. The corporation may be manned by 
government officials or have private citizens in charge. The government may retain 
some control over the corporation or divest it all. In some cases, corporatisation may 
simply be another way for the government to maintain control. However, in general 
corporatisation is usually a method of economic reform and it will generally occur 
either as an alternative to full privatisation, as a middle ground, or as a stepping stone to 
full privatisation. 
The process of corporatisation involves converting the government bureaucratic 
departments which are in charge of the industry into public companies. Commercial 
boards of directors are then inserted in between the ministers of the government in 
charge of the industry and the managers of the corporation (Personal Communication).4 
In this way, there is a mixture of the government still having strategic control of the 
4 
Personal Communication - various discussions with Abdullah P. Hosseini, Head of Iran's 
Privatisation Organisation (IPO), during August 2004. 
Personal Communication - discussions with Seyed Ahmad Mir Motahari, Head of Iran's 
Privatisation Organisation (lPO), December 2003. 
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organisation, but the efficiencies of private industry can be taken advantage of and some 
of the inefficiencies of government oversight can be controlled for. However, this 
process of corporatisation does not generally create the level of efficiency necessary to 
compete with truly private corporations, without government subsidisation. 
1.6 Privatisation From a Comparative Perspective 
This section considers privatisation relative to the geographical area in which they 
occurred in the neighbouring countries of Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and India, 
and then in the sectorally related countries of Egypt and China. India, Pakistan, Egypt 
and China, with a large population and very old public sector enterprises, have all 
followed import-substituting industrialisation, in which state enterprise has played a 
leading role, whilst Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan were liberated from a command 
economy with a totalitarian regime, after the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 1982, 
Kirkpatrick (1982) claimed that the difference between totalitarian and authoritarian 
states is precisely that authoritarian regimes may become more democratic and 
pluralistic because they leave civil society intact. Totalitarian regimes, in contrast, 
cannot be expected to relax control and evolve into freer societies. Egypt is grouped in 
this study as one of the authoritarian regimes in the region. 
Privatisation of the Russian comparator experience, in the northern borders to the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, whilst appearing to be an obvious case for a comparative study 
in this undertaking, was left out of this thesis simply because of the nature of its 
attempts and methodology in 'corporatisation'. The Russian model adopted a national 
voucher system, carrying out the first phase of the programme with 750 bid reception 
centres in more than 85 regions, in anticipation of giving 144 million participating 
Russians a chance to become, along with insiders, owners of enterprises (World Bank, 
1995). Commencing in November 1991, by June 1994 some 12,000- 14,000 medium-
sized and large enterprises had been transferred to private ownership. The national 
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voucher auction system was disbanded in 1994, due to the many objections leading to 
what was to become known as the 'piratisation of Russia' (Goldman, 2003). 
1.6.1 Geographically Related Cases 
Iran's privatisation programme does not occur as an isolated incident in the region. 
There are numerous examples among its neighbours (closer or more distant) of policies, 
strategies, institutional settings, legal frameworks and implementation mechanisms. 
Relevant to consider in order to contextualise to a certain extent the Iranian experience 
are the cases of Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and India. One has to acknowledge of 
course the limitations of the comparative approach and account for the likely possibility 
that the privatisation policy of the Islamic Republic could be exclusively home-grown. 
The spiritual leader's pronouncement of 3 June 2006 on the general policies Article 44 
of the Constitutional Laws of June 2004, pertaining to the specifics of divestitures of 
state owned entities illuminates the specificity of the Iranian privatisation policy. 
Currently, Pakistan and India are negotiating with Iran on the transfer of gas through a 
pipeline which has now been termed the 'peace pipeline', while Azerbaijan and 
Kyrgyzstan are interested in oil swap contracts through the Caspian Sea, for delivery to 
the Persian Gulf. Hence the selection of these countries for a case study in the following 
section. 
1.6.1.1 Pakistan 
In Pakistan, the impetus for privatisation has derived largely from the negative 
experience of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Pakistani Privatisation Commission, 
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2004 ). 5 Since the early 1970s, as in most developing countries, Pakistan has relied on 
the public sector to operate virtually all infrastructure and financial services and many 
industrial units. The government nationalised many businesses and enlarged the areas 
where the private sector was prevented from competing. In addition to a number of 
important industrial enterprises, the government owned and operated services in 
banking, energy, communications, infrastructure and transport. The following problems 
persisted and created an incentive to privatise state-owned companies: a) 
mismanagement and overstaffing; b) inappropriate and costly investments; c) poor 
quality and coverage of services; d) high debt and fiscal losses; e) production and profits 
well below potential. 
The actual privatisation policy of Pakistan commenced with the creation of the 
Privatisation Commission on 22 January 1991. Although the Privatisation Committee 
mandate was initially restricted to industrial transactions, by 1993 it had expanded to 
include power, oil and gas, transport (aviation, railways, ports and shipping), 
telecommunications, banking and insurance. Between January 1991 and June 2003, the 
Commission completed 132 transactions totalling Pakistani Rsl01.027 billion 
(£940.455 billion at current exchange rates). The first figure (i.e. the number of 
transactions) strikes as very low (slightly more than ten transactions per year on 
average), while the second is very high (i.e. revenues of around £78.300 billion pounds 
per year). Obviously the companies sold have been of high calibre. The distribution 
among sectors is as follows: a) 43% from sales in the banking and capital markets; b) 
24% from sales in the energy sector; c) 18% from sales in the telecom industry and d) 
15% from other sectors of the economy. 
In terms of organisation, the Privatisation Commission has the right of initiative for the 
sale of any given enterprise. It approaches the owner ministry with the so-called 
This section is based on official information published by the Pakistani Privatisation Commission 
(2004). Information on privatisation available on-line at www.privatisation.gov.pk 
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summary of why divestiture is desirable and could also seek guidance on issues relating 
to such matters as pricing, restructuring, legal considerations and regulatory framework. 
Following this, the proposal is submitted to the Cabinet or its subcommittee on 
privatisation for approval. If the latter is granted, the Privatisation Commission has the 
option of hiring external advisors to evaluate the value of the company and prepare for 
its restructuring and divestiture. During the whole process it remains in control and 
approves each of the steps. The most often used privatisation method is bidding, 
whereby the highest bidder is selected and the contract is submitted for approval by the 
Commission's board. Practice shows, however, that the privatisation process is lengthy, 
mainly in order to ensure its transparency. On average, it has taken about eighteen 
months to close a major transaction, even when no major restructuring of the company 
is required, which explains the above statistics. 
1.6.1.2 Azerbaijan 
Privatisation in Azerbaijan has taken a somewhat different path (IMF, 1995). The policy 
was initiated in the mid-1990s with the following objectives: a) the establishment of a 
self-regulated market economy space for economic entities based on private ownership 
and free competition; b) the restructuring of the national economy in accordance with 
market-economy requirements; c) the involvement of all unused resources into an 
economic process (unfinished and decommissioned industrial objects, real estate, 
population's free resources, entrepreneurial potential etc.); d) the mobilisation of 
investments, in particular foreign funds, to the national economy; and e) the 
improvement of social conditions and the population's living standards. Right from the 
start, the Azeri policy-makers indicated their wish to open the economy to foreign 
capital, perhaps correctly assessing the inadequacy of domestic resources, and to allow 
property acquisition by overseas legal and physical persons. 
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The central privatisation organ is the Azeri State Property Committee, which has no 
right of initiative for divestiture. It is the seller, not the owner of state enterprises. 
Initiative belongs to the respective ministries, which are required to submit to the State 
Property Committee recommendations relating to privatisation. Only then is the 
Committee enabled to work out the particular details in preparation for the deal with due 
account to the opinion of the State Committee of Antimonopoly Policy. From the date 
on which the privatisation deal is concluded, all powers delegated by the state to any 
ministry, body, association, local executive authority, etc. cease to exist and the State 
Property Committee is charged with overseeing the implementation of all post-
privatisation commitments by the new owner, if such have been introduced in the 
contract.. 
1.6.1.3 Kyrgyzstan 
Similar is the case in Kyrgyzstan, which launched its privatisation programme in 1991 
(World Bank, 1998). Since then there have been three distinct phases to the process. 
Phase I lasted from 1991 to 1993. It focused on the establishment of the legal 
framework and institutional infrastructure required to enable ownership of private 
property (other than land) and private enterprise. This period saw two principal 
approaches to the privatisation of companies: a) small-scale privatisation of more than 
3,400 enterprises in retail trade, catering and services that have been sold via cash 
auctions and b) a mass privatisation programme, whose purpose was to transfer a 
portion of state property to the citizens of Kyrgyzstan free of charge in order to 
compensate them for their life-time contribution to the economy. Phase II lasted from 
1993 to 1996 and began with the adoption of a new privatisation strategy, bringing 
about one important change. This was the creation in May 1994 of the Enterprise 
Restructuring and Resolution Agency under the World Bank-supported Privatisation 
and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Credit. The agency started to deal with large state-
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owned loss-making enterprises, which needed either radical restructuring to enable their 
sale or, failing this, liquidation. 
Phase III was inaugurated in February 1996 through a governmental decree. It allowed 
the usage of previous privatisation mechanisms, such as coupon auctions, cash auctions 
and competitive tendering for large investment projects. It is, however, distinguished 
from the previous periods by the nature of the companies involved - predominantly 
large-scale enterprises in mining, construction, transport and tourism, public utilities 
and infrastructure projects. It also included a number of companies that had already 
been partially privatised but in which the government continued to retain significant 
shareholdings. It was decided that those holdings would be reviewed individually and, 
where possible, offered for sale by the State Property Fund. In Kyrgyzstan, the State 
Property Fund was not the only the seller of state-owned companies but also their owner 
through a transfer of shares from the respective ministries, which presumably generated 
a higher level of independence for its operation. 
1.6.1.4 India 
Finally, the privatisation process in India has been driven by the need to meet the 
increasing domestic demand in the economy and of mobilising additional capital to set 
up the necessary infrastructure to support it (Mishra and Navin, 2002).6 The 
privatisation environment is assessed as lacking in attributes that are fundamental to 
market economy, such as open access, fair play and competition, as well as attributes 
that are essential for protecting the interests of the consumers. The attempts to create an 
environment suitable for private investment have triggered the process of reform, 
restructuring and deregulation. In the wake of economic liberalisation in 1991, the 
6 See also www.indiacore.com. 
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response from the private sector in India had initially been overwhelming. However, the 
government's policy towards the participation of non-state entrepreneurship 
participation in its infrastructure development had been assessed as fundamentally 
flawed. For example, in the power sector the government opened up the energy 
production for private investment, while it has been argued that privatisation should 
have started with the energy distribution network. 
In these conditions, amendments to the policies have became a routine exercise rather 
than an exception, introducing a high level of uncertainty for potential buyers (Mishra 
and Navin, 2002).7 Typical for India is also the institutional breakdown of the 
privatisation task. Rather than having a central authority, either independent or 
subordinated to the government, a number of agencies have been created dealing with 
the different sectors of the economy. Over the past years have emerged the Central 
Electricity Regulatory Commission, the Telecom Regulatory Authority, the Insurance 
Regulatory Authority, the National Highway Authority, the Inland Waterways 
Authority, the Airport Authority, etc. Besides their normal functions of advising 
respective ministries on policy-making, they have also been discharging many 
regulatory functions and functions with respect to the transferral of certain state 
economic responsibilities and assets to the private sector. 
1.6.2 Sectorally Related Cases 
Privatisation in the oil and gas industry is a topical issue, and not only for the countries 
where it represents a sizable chunk of the national economy. Where revenues from the 
exploitation of oil and gas reserves represent a significant contribution to the budget, the 
pressure on governments to modernise extraction facilities and streamline production 
See also www.indiacore.com. 
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are increasingly higher. Also, where capacity to keep up with technological 
developments around the world is lacking, the case is strong for enlisting the 
participation and support of foreign investors (Personal Communication).8 This has 
most generally happened under the mechanism of concessions or guaranteed 
exploitation periods/quotas, but has also been subject to a discourse (whether intended 
or rhetorical) of privatisation. A number of cases are relevant in this respect and are 
considered below. 
1.6.2.1 Egypt 
Egypt's petroleum industry plays a key role in the economy. The country is an oil 
exporter, so the industry is one of the main sources of foreign exchange. The upstream 
oil and gas industry generates 10% of the GDP, with oil accounting for about 40% of 
total export revenues. Egypt's 1999 proven oil reserves estimates are given at about 3.5 
billion barrels (Mbendy, 2005). The main areas of exploration for oil and gas are the 
Gulf of Suez, the Nile Delta, the Western Desert, the Sinai Peninsula and the Eastern 
Desert. The Gulf of Suez, although mature with decreasing production levels, remains 
the major source of oil. The decrease in production levels together with the increase in 
domestic oil consumption (associated with gradual industrial growth in Egypt) has 
generated fears that by 2010 Egypt could become a net importer of oil. 
This has generated policies of attracting foreign investors with know-how and 
technology to participate in the upgrading of the country's oil and gas industry. The 
government, through the state-controlled Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation 
(EGPC), has offered attractive exploration terms to overseas companies and this has 
helped to dramatically increase oil and gas exploration and discoveries in the past 
Personal Communication. Discussion with Mohammad Alipour-Jeddi, Head of Petroleum Market 
Analysis Department, OPEC, NIOC Headquarters, Tehran, December 2005. 
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decade. For example, the production volumes of 1999 had doubled by 2003. Following 
the introduction of an IMF stabilisation programme in 1991, the Egyptian government 
began a reform of its fiscal policy and announced attractive incentives for foreign 
investment and exploration, and a commitment to a policy of privatisation. The 
improved incentives for exploration have included the provision of larger exploration 
blocks, increased cost recovery allowances and increased agreement periods (Personal 
Communication).9 
There has been significant progress in privatisation, trade liberalisation and deregulation 
during the 1990s. However, it has concerned mostly pervasive state-ownership in areas 
such as telecommunications and utilities (e.g. the Egyptian Electricity Authority). The 
General Petroleum Corporation and Egypt Gas (the natural gas administration) have not 
been considered, apart from contracts of limited exploration, similar to the buy-back 
agreements employed in Iran. Traditionally in Egypt this has taken the form of joint 
ventures with multinational companies, without a transfer of property rights. After 1973, 
the joint venture scheme was replaced by production sharing agreements, again with no 
transfer of property rights from the state to private companies. Whereas privatisation in 
the other sectors of the economy has been slowed down due to the large debts of state-
owned enterprises, privatisation in the oil industry is not on the table due to its strategic 
importance (World Bank, 1997; Ibrahim and Ibrahim, 2003). 
1.6.2.2 China 
In China, the importance of the oil sector is not as much in terms of export revenues as 
in terms of meeting domestic demand. In late 2003, China surpassed Japan to become 
the world's second largest petroleum consumer after the USA. Associated with rapid 
Personal Communication - discussions with Seyed Ahmad Mir Motahari, Head of Iran's 
Privatisation Organisation (IPO), February 2004. 
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economic growth, as argued by Logan (2005), internal Chinese demand grew 15% to 
6.37 million barrels per day during 2004, about one-third the level in the US. In 
comparison, domestic oil output in China has grown only very slowly over the past five 
years. As a result imports of crude oil grew rapidly in 2003 and 2004, increasing by 
nearly 75% over the course of the two years. This has generated a push towards 
modernising the oil and gas sectors by governmental investment, but also through the 
involvement of overseas companies. 
With China's accession to the World Trade Organisation, the government made several 
important commitments regarding the energy and oil industry. It agreed to gradually 
open the crude and refined oil sectors to private traders and to cut its state monopoly on 
oil trading by giving up 4 million tons of oil products and 10% of crude imports to the 
private sector. After three years of accession, China would also deregulate retail oil 
distribution by enabling foreign investors to have at least thirty privately-owned petrol 
stations each. It pledged to open its wholesale market five years after accession. By 
December 2004, China has removed import quota management for the three state-
owned oil companies China National Petroleum (CNPC), China Petroleum Company 
(Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil (Anon, 2004a). In October, French oil giant 
Total was allowed into a joint venture with Sinopec to develop petrol stations in China, 
and in November, British Petroleum signed with Sinopec and CNPC to build petrol 
stations. 
In terms of privatisation (Majumder, 2003), a broad sectoral policy was announced at 
the 15th Central Committee meeting of the Chinese Communist Party in 1999. Its 
leadership reaffirmed the earlier stance of Jiang Zemin and approved the programme, 
thus eliminating the political constraints over the issue. The concrete policy on 
privatisation was announced in the 3rct Five Year Plan in 2001. According to it, the 
economy was divided into three: a) areas of highest national priority, which could not 
be relinquished from full governmental control; b) areas which need joint participation 
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and would remain partially controlled; c) areas in which complete privatisation would 
be allowed. Defence, for example, fell in the first group, while public services and 
national priority sectors, such as power, waterworks, gas, onshore oil and transport fell 
in the second group of state-controlled development with private participation. 
At the initial stage, China faced internal squabbling over privatisation. After the 
Congress meeting in 1999, there were disputes between the reformists and 
conservatives. With the former winning the upper hand, local governments started to 
sell small and medium sized state-owned enterprises. The adopted privatisation strategy 
for the large companies was two pronged. In the first phase, they would be converted 
into joint stock companies/cooperatives and, in the second, the government-held shares 
would be partially divested to private enterprises, including managers and employees 
(Personal Communication).10 Most probably as a result of its privatisation programme, 
in 2002 China was the world's biggest beneficiary of foreign direct investment. In the 
oil sector, however, governmental control has remained the norm rather than the 
exception, owing to its overwhelming importance for the future economic growth in the 
country. 
Rather than looking to sell assets of the domestic oil industry, the Chinese government 
has instead sought to diversify its supply portfolio by acquiring them overseas. Over the 
past decade, Chinese oil imports have come from an increasingly wider net of suppliers. 
In 1993, for example, almost all of them came from Indonesia, Oman and Yemen. By 
2004, Saudi Arabia was China's largest supplier accounting for 14% of imports, with 
Oman, Angola, Iran, Russia, Vietnam and Yemen together supplying another 60% 
(Personal Communication). 11 The current (3rct) Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) calls for the 
construction and use of strategic petroleum reserves by the year 2005. Construction has 
10 
II 
Personal Communication - discussions with Seyed Ahmad Mir Motahari, former Head of Iran's 
Privatisation Organisation (IPO), February 2004. 
Ibid. 
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begun at one of four sites destined to store government-owned supplies and Chinese 
officials plan to gradually fill up to 100 million barrels of storage by 2008 (equivalent to 
roughly 35 days of import). 
Within this strategy, Chinese state-owned oil companies have accelerated their hunt for 
overseas oil assets. Until recently, they had been most comfortable operating in 
locations not dominated by the world major oil giants. Sudan, Angola and Iran are 
pertinent examples. Currently, over half of the Chinese overseas oil production comes 
from Sudan. Most recently, outward activity has also gathered speed in other areas, 
including Russia, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Australia, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. The 
impressions shared by Logan (2005) is that Chinese companies seem to be improving 
their ability to purchase assets without overpaying, as earlier reports have suggested and 
to develop more effective business skills. 
Leading the drive among Chinese state-owned companies, the CNPC claims to have 
petroleum assets in 30 countries. It plans to spend $18 billion in overseas oil and gas 
development between now and 2020 (Anon, 2005a). Most of CNPC's overseas 
production currently comes from Sudan, Kazakhstan and Indonesia. Many speculated 
that CNPC would take a share in the restructured assets of Yukos, while rumours in late 
January 2005 foresaw a $6 billion 'loan' by CNPC to Rosneft for long-term oil 
purchases, but no equity investment. By comparison, Sinopec is newer to the 
international investment in the oil sector than CNPC. It has recently started pumping 
smaller quantities of equity oil from operations in Yemen and Azerbaijan. The largest of 
Sinopec's overseas contracts was signed with the Iranian government in 2004 and 
envisaged an investment of $70 billion over 25 years to purchase cargoes and to 
participate in upstream oil activities. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the theoretical background to privatisation, providing the 
theoretical framework within which any privatisation takes place, regardless of the state, 
culture or economic situation in question. It is the context that Iranian privatisation of 
the oil and gas industry must take into account regardless of other factors that have been 
or will be discussed in this thesis. 
Similarly, the precedents set by other historical examples of privatisation in the region 
and outside the region also form the context in which Iranian privatisation of the oil and 
gas industry will take place. Although the constraints of comparative precedents are less 
severe than those imposed by theoretical possibility, they nevertheless constitute 
limitations which must be taken into account. They have the effect of creating and 
providing a) precedents, which formed the impetus for privatisation in different 
countries and therefore affect decision-making in Iran; b) specific models for an Iranian 
privatisation of the oil and gas industry; and c) lessons learned from these precedents, 
which will help deciding what not to do in any Iranian privatisation. 
Thus, the chapter has provided the realms of possibility which determine and constrain 
policy-makers in making and implementing decisions. These conclusions will therefore 
address the particular constraining factors as a means of providing the 'take away' 
context for the rest of the thesis. It will illustrate the necessary boundaries of any future 
Iranian privatisation, as well as the probable constraints. 
1.7.1 Theoretical Boundaries 
At the most fundamental level, privatisation in Iran will be determined by how we 
define privatisation. The specific sense in which we tend to use the term here is that 
privatisation entails the transfer of property and control rights over given enterprises, 
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infrastructure and other economic establishments from the state to the private sector. 
However, there is a wider sense in which the term can be approached, which refers to 
enhancing the effectiveness of the non-state economic sector. These two understandings 
of privatisation do not necessarily fully overlap. 
Therefore, this thesis argues for a broader, more inclusive understanding. That is a 
process, which incorporates broad measures of economic liberalisation, such as 
reducing state paternalism, the removal of bureaucratic obstacles for economic agents 
and the improvement of the functioning of state-owned enterprises. This broader 
understanding of privatisation ensures the incorporation of meanings that the Iranian 
government will tend to use, and also allows for comparisons with other state's 
perspectives on privatisation. 
We have also excluded some related concepts. These include commercialisation, which 
implies the extraction of state-owned enterprises from the framework of state-planning; 
decentralisation, which is defined as the process of transferring ownership and control 
rights from central to local structures of state authority, whereby state planning acquires 
a dimension of a mere summary of local economic planning; deregulation, which 
implies the withdrawal of the state from many aspects of the country's economic life 
through, inter alia, the liberalisation of prices, etc.; and the concept of divestiture, which 
presupposes the spin-off of filials, branches or units of a given enterprise. 
In accordance with this theoretical understanding of privatisation, the chapter has also 
drawn the boundaries of the different possible types of privatisation. These include: 
• the scope of privatisation, from the complete withdrawal of the state versus the 
preservation of a certain level of state ownership; 
• the means of privatisation, from public offering of shares, which can be aimed at 
attracting foreign buyers or at stimulating the acquisition of economic assets by 
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domestic companies, or a combination of these two types of investors in a single 
joint venture company; 
• privatisation which can be implemented by a specialised state organ, a 
governmental ministry, an intermediary or by the enterprise board; 
• ownership which can be by the central government and/or municipal authorities; 
• different levels of privatisation; 
• privatisation which can take place in different economic sectors; and 
• there is a distinction between a monopoly and non-monopoly market share of the 
privatised enterprise. 
Any analysis of Iranian privatisation will have to take into account these factors in 
determining the type, scope and means of privatisation. 
The most fundamental, underlying issue of privatisation is the nature of the right to 
property in the state in question. This chapter has pointed to the fundamental dilemma 
that potentially underpins privatisation, that is, that there is an inherent conflict between 
the possibility for a state to transfer economic ownership to private companies, and the 
possibility for it to guarantee the continuity of the economic and social policies it has 
been implementing, or would like to implement, in the specific sector subject to 
privatisation. Iran, like any other state, must overcome this dilemma. Therefore, in any 
potential move to privatisation, there are certain limitations that ought to be considered. 
These include: 
• obligations to preserving the area of activity; 
• limitations of the relations with third parties; 
• limitations on the percentage of owned shares; 
• obligations for committing to an agreed investment programme; 
• obligations for maintaining agreed levels of employment; 
• obligations to pay off existing debt; 
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• limitations to the volume of assets that can be sold to third parties; and 
• limitations to the volume of shares that can be sold on to third parties. 
Finally, though not necessarily a theoretical boundary, the notion of privatisation is to 
some degree circumscribed by the possibility of using other methods that bring about 
similar results. This chapter pointed to the notion of coqJOratisation which is, at its most 
basic level, the process of moving the control of industries from direct control by the 
government to control by government-owned corporations. It was also pointed out that 
within this definition there is room to manoeuvre. Therefore, an analysis of privatisation 
in Iran must make sure not to confuse the two possibilities, as well as the effects that the 
choice of one possibility over the other will have on the future economic situation. 
To summarise, there are four theoretical factors that need to be taken into consideration 
in our analysis of Iranian privatisation of the oil and gas sector. These are: 
• the definition and understanding of what privatisation actually entails; 
• the boundaries set by other forms of economic change and alternatives to 
privatisation; 
• the different possible types and levels of privatisation; and 
• the limits and obligations within any privatisation deal, as set by the basic 
concept of the right to property. 
1.7.2 Constraints 
This chapter has looked at the precedents of privatisation in terms of two different sets 
of comparative case studies. The first set included those cases which are relevant to Iran 
in that they are geographically close to the country. Thus, the neighbouring states of 
Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and India were considered. Although these states are 
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not necessarily similar to Iran in political, economic and, specifically, privatisation 
terms they are nonetheless pertinent and need to be looked at. While assuming their 
differences, there is also good reason to believe that the common historical and 
geographical features of the region have produced certain common denominators in this 
group of countries. The second set of case studies looked at states which, while not 
geographically close to Iran, are nevertheless relevant to the Iranian case, because they 
share similarities with regard to the sector of potential privatisation, the oil and gas 
sector. These states include Egypt and China. This is not to say that the oil and gas 
industry is the same in these countries, or even the main focus of interest for the 
purposes of this study. It is rather the importance of the sector for their national 
economies which makes these cases interesting. It is suggested that Egypt and China are 
cases where the revenues from the exploitation of oil and gas reserves represent a 
significant contribution to the budget, which explains the increasing pressure on their 
governments to modernise extraction facilities and streamline production. However, if 
the capacity to keep up with technological developments around the world is lacking, 
there is a strong case for enlisting the participation and support of foreign investors. 
This has often led to the use of the mechanism of concessions or guaranteed exploitation 
periods/quotas. 
Within both of these sets of case studies, it is possible to point out three important 
factors for this analysis. The first one is the need of an impetus for privatisation. The 
second is that there are a number of different models for the actual implementation of 
privatisation that recur across different countries. The third is that there are certain 
lessons to be learned from the existing precedents of privatisation. 
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1.7.2.1 Impetus 
One of the relevant findings in the comparative section, noted in regard to the case of 
Pakistan, is that in some so-called developing states one of the primary factors leading 
to privatisation has been the impetus for privatisation, largely derived from the negative 
experience of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Such negative experiences include the 
following elements: 
• mismanagement and overstaffing; 
• inappropriate and costly investments; 
• poor quality and coverage of services; 
• high debt and fiscal losses; and 
• production and profits well below potentiaL 
These elements have affected, and continue to affect, Iran as well and serve as an 
impetus for its move towards privatisation. 
Another similar set of elements have to do with the nature of the market in question. As 
noted in the case study on India, there are issues of inefficient markets which can lead to 
a need to privatise. These include: 
• lack of open access; 
• limits on 'fair play' and competition; and 
• attributes that are essential for protecting the interests of the consumers. 
In India, as in other developing economies, the attempts to create an environment more 
suitable for competition in the world market needed to address these issues. One of the 
means to do this has been the privatisation of a number of industries. 
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Related to this is the fear that the relative competitiveness of states may sink to such an 
extent as to completely tum around. For instance, it was noted in the case of Egypt that 
the decrease in production levels together with the increase in domestic oil consumption 
has generated fears that Egypt could become a net importer of oil. Such hard, cold fears 
of dependence strongly drive the need to become more completive. 
This is opposed to China, where the importance of the oil sector is not so much in terms 
of export revenues as in terms of meeting domestic demand. It was noted, for instance, 
that in late 2003 China surpassed Japan in becoming the world's second largest 
petroleum consumer after the USA. Yet, in comparison, domestic oil output in China 
has grown only very slowly over the past five years. As a result, imports of crude oil 
grew rapidly in 2003 and 2004. In tum, this generated a push towards modernising the 
oil and gas sectors not only by governmental investment, but also through the 
involvement of overseas companies. While Iran is not necessarily at this stage with 
regard to its oil sector, the argument is valid in that Iran is a net importer of gas (Anon, 
2005a). 
1.7.2.2 Models 
This chapter has illustrated a number of different models of privatisation. It is perhaps 
worth reviewing them in that they delineate the scenario for the possibility of a new 
Iranian model. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, agents affect structure as 
much as structure affects agents - through the process of structuration - and therefore 
while the Iranian model may differ it will 'feed off other models. Subsequently, in the 
future, the Iranian model will also form the structure upon which other models emerge. 
The Pakistani model of privatisation involved, at its heart, a privatisation commission 
which has the right of initiative for the sale of any given enterprise. It must go through 
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the owner ministry and also seek guidance on issues relating to such matters as pricing, 
restructuring, legal considerations and the regulatory framework. The proposal is 
submitted to the Cabinet or its subcommittee on privatisation for approval. During the 
whole process it remains in control and approves each of its steps. The most often used 
privatisation method is bidding. 
The model used in Azerbaijan differs from that applied in Pakistan. In Azerbaijan, the 
central privatisation organ is the Azeri State Property Committee, which has no right of 
initiative for divestiture. It is the seller, not the owner of state enterprises. As opposed to 
the Pakistani model, the initiative for privatisation belongs to the respective ministries. 
These ministries are then required to submit to the Azeri State Property Committee 
recommendations relating to privatisation. Only then is the committee enabled to work 
out the particular details in preparation for the deal. Kyrgyzstan has used a similar 
model. 
The Egyptian model differs yet again. Without getting into the full model, it is notable 
that a particular practice in the Egyptian system has been to attract foreign investors 
with know-how and technology to participate in the upgrading of the country's oil and 
gas industry by offering them attractive exploration terms, through the state-controlled 
EGPC. The improved incentives for exploration have included the provision of larger 
exploration blocks, increased cost recovery allowances and increased agreement 
periods. This has helped to dramatically increase oil and gas exploration and discoveries 
over the past decade. 
Finally, the Chinese model also differs, though mainly because of the different situation 
experienced in China, which is demand driven. While the entire process of Chinese 
privatisation is not reviewed here, one interesting aspect is that the economy is divided 
into three: a) areas of highest national priority, which could not be relinquished from 
full governmental control; b) areas which need joint participation and would remain 
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partially controlled; and c) areas in which complete privatisation is allowed. Similarly, 
in other states, it is likely that privatisation will take different forms in different 
industries. 
1.7.3 Constraints- Lessons Learned 
Lastly, there are some lessons to be learned from the different models and historical 
precedents of privatisation. 
One notable lesson learned is that the timing of pri vatisation will depend on the model 
used. For instance, based on the Pakistani model, it was noted that the privatisation 
process is lengthy. This has been undertaken mainly to ensure its transparency. 
However, on average it has taken about eighteen months to close major transactions. 
This is a long period of time considering that it applies even when no major 
restructuring of the company is required. The lesson learned for Iran is that even though 
privatisation may be agreed upon, the nature of the method of privatisation will have a 
huge effect on the timeframe within which privatisation is actually carried out. The time 
factor must therefore also be considered in any analysis and predictions of future 
investment. 
Another lesson learned is that the government in question may simply be incorrect in its 
assessment of the privatisation context and the changes proposed and/or made in the 
economic system. For instance, in the Indian case study, it was noted that the 
government's policy towards non-state entrepreneurship participation in its 
infrastructure development has been assessed as fundamentally flawed. One example 
that was noted, although not the only one, was that of the power sector where the 
government opened up the energy production for private investment, while it was 
argued that privatisation should have started with the energy distribution network. An 
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result of this flaw was that amendments to the policies have become a routine exercise 
rather than an exception, introducing a high level of uncertainty for potential buyers. 
This is relevant for Iran in that it is often assumed that, in theory, the government will 
carry out a fairly correct analysis of the situation and that its policy will conform to this. 
However, we must keep open the possibility that such an assumption may be wrong and 
that the government may simply make a mistake. 
Another lesson is that different industries may or may not privatise depending on their 
type. In particular, those industries which are considered to be 'strategic' are generally 
less open to privatisation. In the case of China, it has been argued that this has led to a 
three level set of potential privatisation deals. In the Egyptian case study it was noted 
that the General Petroleum Corporation and Egypt Gas (the natural gas administration) 
have not been considered, apart from contracts of limited exploration. The reason was 
that the oil industry is considered to have a strategic importance, which other industries, 
such as the telecommunications industry, allegedly lack. Similarly, it was noted that in 
the oil sector in China, governmental control has remained the norm rather than the 
exception, due to its overwhelming importance for the future economic growth in the 
country. 
Thus, the nature of the industry in question must be considered in any privatisation deal. 
Notably, the experiences of other states have already set the precedent for the oil 
industry which, being a strategic industry, cannot be treated as other less strategic 
sectors. It is important to keep this in mind, since in the Iranian case the oil and gas 
industry have been traditionally considered as strategic industries. 
However, we should not take this to mean that, because there is a strategic rationale for 
a particular industry and therefore less possibility for privatisation, there is no potential 
for change. The Chinese case is a good example of this. Despite the fact that the 
government has retained more control over the oil industry than over other industries, 
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transformations have occurred. While, as noted earlier, the example of China is in some 
ways very different from the Iranian case, it shows that there is always the possibility 
for other models of economic change in order to make an industry more competitive. 
Another lesson learned is that political confrontation over privatisation is the norm, not 
the exception to the rule. Even in China, which has a centralised government structure 
and an extremely centralised economic system (although on the way to becoming less 
centralised), there were disputes after the Congress meeting in 1999 between reformists 
and conservatives. With the former winning the upper hand, local governments started 
to sell small and medium state-owned enterprises. 
The lesson to be learnt here is that regardless of the level of centralisation of a 
government, privatisation has an innate controversial nature. There is always an 
inherent conflict between the possibility for a state to transfer economic ownership to 
private companies, and the possibility for it to guarantee the continuity of specific 
economic and social policies. Controversy has already dogged Iranian attempts at 
privatisation, and the recent presidential election made the process increasingly 
controversial. Yet, there is a bright side to this in that controversy and debate also mean 
that the issue is discussed and evaluated. Therefore, even in the case that the core of the 
Iranian government decided not to privatise the industry, there would still be hope for a 
debate and, out of this debate, a possibility of compromise may emerge. The result 
could be that potential for parts of the industry are considered for privatisation or, more 
generally, the prospects for privatisation simply change. In summary, there are four 
lessons to be learnt from historical precedents, which should be taken into account when 
looking at privatisation of the oil and gas industry in Iran. Firstly, the timeframe of 
privatisation will be driven in part by the nature of the model of privatisation chosen. 
Secondly, perfect rationality cannot be assumed; the government may simply misjudge 
the context for privatisation and this may have effects on both the nature and outcome 
of the process. Thirdly, the nature of the industry in question matters; in particular, 
strategic industries, such as oil and gas, will tend to be privatised differently than other 
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industries, if at all. Finally, debate and controversy will surround privatisation 
regardless of the political and legal nature of a particular government. This is a double 
edged sword, since it tends to slow down the process towards privatisation, making 
compromises necessary but, at the same time, it also lends hope in instances where the 
core of the government does not seem to want to privatise. 
1.8 A Final Note 
This chapter has examined the theoretical and precedent-based boundaries which form 
the realm of possibility in Iranian privatisation policy-making. As previous sections 
have demonstrated, these issues will come into play in determining the nature of 
privatisation policy in Iran and therefore, indirectly, determine, or help determine, the 
political will of Iranian policy-makers who are responsible for privatisation policy. 
The following chapters will attempt to incorporate the empirical information as well as 
the historical background of privatisation in Iran within these theoretical boundaries. At 
the same time, it is suggested that this chapter has provided some valuable insight into 
the overarching question of this thesis, i.e. 'what are the determinants of privatisation of 
the oil and gas industry in Iran?'. 
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CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OIL 
NATIONALISATION AND PRIV ATISATION 
IN PRE-REVOLUTION IRAN 
2.1 Introduction 
Most studies of the pre-revolution period focus on theories of the Iranian revolution. 
They outline the evolution of Iran's political environment during the twentieth century, 
including its early attempts at constitutional government and subsequent experiences of 
absolutism under the Pahlavi dynasty ( 1926-79) (Katouzian, 1981 ). 
Many authors have also analysed the role of key agents, particularly the Shah and 
Ayatollah Khomeini, in creating the conditions for revolution in the late 1970s. Others 
have assessed the more structural factors that contributed to the Shah's overthrow, 
questioned to what extent the nature and experience of the revolution conditioned 
subsequent political developments, and asked what lessons the revolution holds for the 
present regime (Katouzian, 1981). 
This chapter uses published literature to reflect upon the question of this research, which 
refers to the willingness of the present Iranian government to privatise its oil and gas 
industry. In other words, an analysis of Iran's past history will be put to work to outline 
the most important trends and features of Iranian political and social life, and relate 
them with the specific oil policies of Iranian governments on privatisation and 
nationalisation. The chapter also analyses the roles played by the internal and external 
political and economic actors and events which have affected change in Iran in the past 
and thereby led to the evolution of today' s government. 
The question raised in this chapter refers to the reasons behind the Iranian government's 
decision to nationalise then partially privatise the oil industry. This question will be 
placed within a broader discussion about the role of internal and external factors 
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(economic, political, social and cultural) that determined the evolution of the Iranian 
state. The discussion will thus serve to contextualise the analysis of post-revolution 
Iranian politics and economics. This chapter explores these issues from World War II, 
which may be seen as the beginning of modern Iranian history, through to the Iranian 
revolution in 1979, which may be regarded as formulating the features of Iranian 
government up to the present. 
It will argue that the pre-revolution period is characterised by centralisation of power, 
nationalistic discourse reflected in the policies towards the oil industry and clientelistic 
relationships between the main authorities and the business environment. A failed 
constitutional reform, due to both internal political factionalism and centralisation of 
power in the hands of the Shah, hindered political and socio-economic reform in Iran. A 
contradictory relationship with the Western countries (dependence and independence) 
played an important role in the Iranian political and decision-making process. The 
relationship was marred by misperceptions (Jervis, 1976), but also nurtured by the 
inadequate fit between the economic and political interests of the West (specifically of 
the US) and of Iranian society and government. 
2.2 Politics Leading up to the Shah 
The aspirations of the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Shah, were focused on the 
development of the infrastructure of the country. This involved the creation of a viable 
railway system connecting the north to the southern ports, as well as a network of roads 
across the Iranian plateau in anticipation of making the country independent of foreign 
power politics. Along with this endeavour, the politics of the country leading up to the 
time of Mohammad Reza Shah consisted of modernising the military and financial 
institutions, and the creation of a functioning civil service to cope with the anticipated 
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income derived from the export of oil. This section will now examine the role of 
Mohammad Reza Shah and his plans, which aimed to firstly achieve rapid growth and 
high employment, and secondly to achieve a degree of economic diversification which 
would result in the more equal distribution of wealth and the creation of a newly 
awakened middle class. 
2.2.1 Key Features of Iran's Political Economy During the First Stages of 
Economic and Political Modernisation- up to 1953 
From the onset of its modem history, Iran has experienced a desire to politically and 
economically modernise. These processes were accompanied by an important 
nationalist discourse, which fitted well with the European discourse on the rights of self-
determination (Katouzian, 1981: 130-132). 
The first stage of the modernisation process can be traced back to the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1905-06, which brought about an elected assembly. But it was the second 
stage - initiated in 1925 with the seizing of the throne by Reza Shah Pahlavi, a "ruthless 
nationalist" (Milani, 1997:80) - that set the foundations of the Iranian oil industry. It 
was during his rule that Iran became a key oil exporter. 
Politically, Iran experienced decentralised political power that was split between a 
multitude of political actors between 1941 and 1953 (Katouzian, 1981: 130-132). 
Mohammed Reza Shah's court12 was only one centre of power amongst many, with the 
Shah himself having little power. This was one of the few periods in Iranian history 
with many political actors, from political parties to student associations and labour 
unions, and one promising political freedom. 
12 Mohammed Reza Shah was the son of Reza Shah, who was installed into power in 1941. 
67 
The level of political participation reached a new zenith. New 
ideological parties were formed, recruiting people from all 
social classes. Activists published new newspapers, 
professionals and students formed associations, labour 
organisers revitalised their unions, and political debate became 
fashionable and free (Milani, 1997:80). 
Besides pluralism of politically engaged actors, factionalism was also a feature of the 
Iranian political scene. Political factionalism is characterised as the inability of political 
actors to form coherent and long-lasting coalitions in order to implement policy 
platforms. It emerges when political parties offering properly articulated positions are 
suppressed, so that rather than forming a broad coalition to attract mass support, 
competing economic and political interests pursue power in a clandestine fashion, often 
by forging unstable alliances between themselves or by attempting to gain influence or 
favour with the executive power. This kind of political suppression characterised the 
period leading up to the Islamic Revolution. 
Factionalism is reflected in hundreds of fragmented and fragmenting parties (Shafaq, 
cited in Abrahamian, 1982)Y Individualism seemed to guide the behaviour of political 
actors in such a way that made Shafaq notice that deputies behaved as if they were the 
sworn enemies of the ministers. A major consequence was an unstable political 
environment. 14 
Abrahamian points out, however, that despite the variety of actors, one can safely argue 
that overall, a relatively small elite still retained effective control over the political 
measures to be adopted, due to the lack of an educated middle class politically 
independent from the palace. 
13 
14 
A British government source from the same period claimed that "No two Persians can ever work 
together for any length of time, even if it is jointly to extract money from the third party" 
(Abrahamian, 1982). Stripping away the patronising Foreign Office hauteur and orientalist tone, 
this may still be an accurate portrait of Iranian political life at the time, although more because of 
legitimate and rational ideological divisions rather than some endemic fault in the national 
character. 
For example, some twelve Prime Ministers have been installed in the course of thirteen years. 
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Of the 148 ministers, only fifteen were salaried personnel and 
modern educated professionals with roots in the middle classes 
and without links to the palace (Abrahamian, 1982: 170). 
When a political actor could rally the support of the middle class and the support of the 
Ulamas, 15 power could be obtained and exercised. This was the case for Mohammed 
Mossadeq, who was elected Prime Minister in May 1951. 
Although he and his cohorts constituted a very small faction in 
the Majles, they relied on public pressure, mass demonstrations 
by their supporters, and an alliance with several leading ulama 
to pressure the landlord-dominated Majles to approve their 
innovative nationalisation plan (Milani, 1997 :80). 
In spite of his own personal background, which placed him amongst the landowning 
conservative elite, Mossadeq and his National Front Party put forward a progressive 
programme (Abrahamian, 1982:189, 269-273) elaborating the 1943 Majlis elections. It 
was aimed at politically further democratising the country, as it proposed removing the 
Shah's control of the military to prevent a re-run of Reza Shah's dictatorship. It also 
supported electoral reform to increase the voice of the professional middle class at the 
expense of the landed families. In terms of foreign policy, he believed that Iran should 
have avoided granting exclusive economic concessions to individual powers in an effort 
to buy favours. Politically, Iran should have pursued a non-aligned course. The measure 
that directly concerns the economic sphere in this study refers to the nationalisation of 
the main economic sectors. 
By 1950, the pre-eminence of the oil industry within the Iranian economy meant that oil 
nationalisation was a major target. In the same year as his election, Mossadeq 
15 According to the Encyclopaedia of the Orient, ulama is used for "a group of men with religious 
education and religiously related professions. Ulama is the group of men expressing the true 
content of Islam towards both the people and the rulers" (Encyclopaedia of the Orient, available 
on-line at www.Lexicorient.com). See also http://i-cias.com/cgi-bin/eo-direct.pl?ulama.htm. 
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nationalised Iranian oil - at the expense of the British oil giant the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC) (Personal Communication). 16 
The fact that Mossadeq's reforms led to his downfall speaks volumes about the political 
Iranian environment, as well as the role of international actors in Iranian politics at that 
time. Conservative groups, such as the landowners and officers, were still influential 
and the Shah still reluctant towards institutional reform that could result in loss of 
control. 
The Shah's distaste for Mossadeq's reforms coincided with that of major international 
actors, such as the US and the UK (Personal Communication). 17 The latter protested 
about nationalisation by the imposition of an oil embargo on Iranian oil exports. Then, 
with assistance from the US and British secret services, the military organised a 
successful coup against the Prime Minister in August 1953. Mossadeq and other 
National Front leaders were arrested and imprisoned. Mohammed Reza gained full 
control over the government. 
One can conclude that in the first stages of modernisation, Iran had made beneficial 
attempts to democratise through creating a favourable environment for the political 
expression of various groups. These measures were, however, countered by the 
existence of a powerful conservative elite (landowners, military), loyal to the monarchy 
(i.e. to Mohamed Reza). This translated in resistance to institutional change and 
political reform. In other words, pluralism was allowed so long as it did no~ dramatically 
change the socio-economic and political status quo. Factionalism, as a feature of Iranian 
political life, contributed to the failure of the progressive programmes put forward by 
16 
17 
Personal communication, discussions with Mr. Hossein Kazempour Ardebili, member of the 
Board of Governors, OPEC, and Head of the Iran delegation to OPEC, December 2005. 
Ibid. 
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Massadeq. Just as important, international actors had effective constraining mechanisms 
to influence Iranian domestic political life. 
The analysis so far has pointed to some important factors that influenced Iranian 
decision-making and the design of economic polices with respect to the status of the oil 
and gas industry in particular. An analysis of the Shah's absolutist rule would suggest 
that some of the already existing tendencies or features would be consolidated. 
2.2.2 External Relations: Building the Perception of the West 
When discussing the determinants of Iran's economic policies with respect to 
privatisation, one needs to understand the perceptions of the Iranian politicians and 
wider public towards foreign actors, as privatisation and opening of the Iranian 
economy creates opportunities for the involvement of the latter. Thus, Iran's external 
relations, as well as the discourse related to this aspect, become essential to the overall 
research endeavour. Their emergence and evolution will be built upon throughout this 
thesis. 
Iran's relations with its neighbours and powerful Western nations have always been 
difficult, resulting from Iran's strategic geographical location, its significant oil wealth 
and its weakness in comparison to the major Western powers. Although Iran was never 
directly colonised in the modem era, the extent of Western interference has been 
significant. Moreover, as Halliday (2003) argues, this atypical "semi-colonisation" 
experience means that Iran lacks a clear break separating a dependent past from an 
independent present and future. 
The patterns of semi-colonial control used by Britain, Tsarist 
Russia and later the US - influencing ministers, fostering 
dissension in the provinces and suborning the military - were 
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precisely those most likely to engender a conspiracy mentality 
among Iranians (Halliday, 2003:65). 
There is also plenty of material that can nurture the public's perception that Iran is open 
to interference from external actors, i.e. such actors can have a considerable impact on 
the country's specific political rule and policies, especially with regard to the oil 
industry. Incidences of British, Russian/Soviet and American interference included the 
secret Anglo-Russian Agreement (a plan to partition the country into zones of influence) 
exposed in 1907, the 1915 agreement between the two countries (known as the 
Constantinople Protocol) that implied the dismemberment of Iran, the 1919 Iran/British 
Agreement that forced Iran to employ British advisors at its own expense, the 
involvement of British military officers in the 1921 coup that installed the Shah's father 
as ruler, the 1933 Oil Agreement which Iran signed up to under British pressure, the 
1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion and, of course, the British/US-sponsored coup against 
Mossadeq in 1953. The above meant, perhaps unsurprisingly, that: 
... there has seldom been any significant (major as well as 
minor) political event, which ... a large section of the Iranian 
public has not believed to have been planned and executed by 
foreign powers through their Iranian agents (Katouzian, 
2003:118). 18 
However, it is interesting to note that the conspiratorial view of outsiders only emerged 
during the modernisation stages. The traditional, historic view of Iranians has certainly 
been different. Katouzian makes the point that: 
18 
Up to a century and a half ago hardly anyone attributed 
perceived injustice to the machinations of western powers or 
Katouzian goes on to note, however, that in most cases substantial involvement by Iranian forces 
or miscalculations on the Iranian side played a significant role. Nevertheless, even the Shah 
eventually came to believe that he was the victim of a malign foreign (CIA) plot: "the Shah ... fell 
back on the old Iranian formula of seeing Iranian politics as some kind of vibration elicited by 
foreign players" (Zonis, 1983). 
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their paid Iranian agents. But since then, because of the 
growing weakness of Iran vis-a-vis imperial powers, almost all 
injustice emanating from arbitrary states was attributed to 
imperialism (Katouzian, 2003:29). 
One could say, however, that besides the actual facts that may justify the belief in the 
negative role of the external actors, misperception also played an important part. In 
other words, this perception goes beyond objectively verifiable facts concerning 
Western involvement and has tended to bias the Iranian perception of the West, 
including both the public and policy-makers, in its relations with the West. 
2.3 Mohammed Reza Shah's Rule 
On 25 August 1941, the 21 year-old son of Reza Shah, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, 
was installed to the Peacock Throne by the Allies (Pollack, 2004). He inherited a 
country which was occupied by British and American forces in the south and Russian 
forces in the north. The German invasion of Russia, in June 1941, brought Stalin closer 
to Churchill, and also coincided with the British Navy starting to convert from coal-
burning engines to fuel-driven propulsion. By this time, Reza Shah's regime had seen 
the completion of the Trans-Iranian Railway linking the ports of the Persian Gulf to the 
Caspian Sea. Consequently, it was not surprising that the Allied forces occupying Iran 
would want to use the networks which were in place to supply the Russian troops in 
their fight against the German army in Russia. 
The new Shah remained mostly in the background at the beginning of his reign. His 
ambition was to consolidate his internal base of support, get closer to the American 
administration, and to start to behave as more than just a figurehead monarch. Perhaps 
his biggest ambition was to build a modem Iran strong enough to compete with and 
stand up against the dictat of European powers which wanted to direct how he should 
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run Iran (which his father had instilled into him). It is perhaps ironic to see that, at the 
end of his rule in 1978, the revolutionary crowds were chanting slogans against him for 
having sold Iran out to these western powers. 
2.3.1 The Features of the Regime: Centralised Power, Clientelism, Factionalism 
and Arbitrary Rule 
The reinstatement of the Shah to the detriment of constitutional rule represented the 
beginning of a strongly centralised military dictatorship (Owen, 2000:92). Any 
opposition foci were annihilated, including the leading leftist, Tudeh and religious 
leaders - the military executed forty of its officials over the next four years 
(Abrahamian, 1982:280). In 1964, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was expelled by the 
government. 
Sensitive to the external forces, such as the US which pressed for liberal reforms, the 
Shah attempted to reform the political system in 1958. The two-party system was 
abandoned in 1964 when the parties were dissolved and the Iran Noveen party was 
created in their place (Milani, 1997:80). In 1975, he created the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) 
Party, "a mass organisation to which all of Iran's bureaucrats and persons of influence 
and importance were first encouraged, and then forced, to belong" (Ibid.). 
However, all parties were "totally subservient to the monarch, and lacking any 
integrity" and, as a result "failed to attract any significant portion of the population" 
(Ibid.). The creation of government-sponsored trade unions by the secret service and 
integrated traditional systems of local governance - such as village headmen (Owen, 
2000:93) were also part of the same attempts to superficially diversify the political 
scene. 
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However, these artificial attempts to create a diverse and independent political life were 
unsuccessful due to the compulsive drive of the Shah to exercise full control of power 
through undemocratic measures. 
Clientelism became a feature of the political system, alongside the centralisation of 
power through violence. This feature, built of course on the existent system of 
privileges 'bestowed' upon the conservative property-owning classes even before the 
Shah's authoritarian rule. 
The state has not been representative of the higher social 
classes; on the contrary, they have been its clients by virtues of 
the privileges it has bestowed upon them (Katouzian, 2003:29). 
To this, one must also add a long standing disjunction between the larger society and the 
state. The relationship between the state and society was considerably different from 
that established in Western states. The idea of a social contract between the state and 
society was never the driving force in the organisation of Iranian society. Thus, the 
Iranian state's legitimacy was not enforced or maintained through the ability to link 
with society. It was rather an 'arbitrary rule' and decision-making process, whose 
authority was not necessarily based on law (see also Ibid., chapter 1). 
The latter features of the relationship between the Iranian state and society can 
successfully account for the type of solidarities that are created in times of social 
upheaval. Katouzian argues that a consistent theme in Iranian revolutions and revolts is 
an attempt to overthrow an unjust ruler and establish non-arbitrary government. Because 
the unjust ruler does not represent any particular social group or groups, when the revolt 
occurs it will unite, rather than split, society. 
The constitutional revolution of 1905-09 and the revolution of 
February 1979 ... shared the basic features of traditional Iranian 
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revolts inasmuch as they were aimed at the overthrow of the 
state - indeed the person of the ruler - at all costs, they had the 
support of the entire political society, and they were not 
resisted by any social class (Katouzian, 2003:31). 
As will be discussed later, the widespread support for the revolt against the Shah during 
1977-79, the inability of the secular leftists and conservative clerics to make a common 
cause, as well as the move towards the appropriation of power through the destruction 
of the opposition after the revolution, can be seen as a reflection of this structural 
problem of Iranian society. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, factionalism was specific to Iranian political life, 
having an even greater impact in post-revolution Iran. Yet, oddly enough, this feature 
emerged to the surface even in the authoritarian regime of the Shah. The Rastakhiz party 
developed into an embryonic pluralist system. There was some ability for 
communication to come from the bottom upwards. The party developed two opposing 
'wings', which offered slightly different slants on the official position. As Zonis (1983) 
documents, the party soon became more than an establishment patsy: 
.. .it began to offer the possibility for communication, not 
merely from the top down, but also from the less to the more 
powerful. 'Wings' of the party were created ... offering slightly 
different and legitimate perspectives. Increasing numbers of the 
politically literate began to believe that the formation of these 
wings offered, finally, hope for political democratization 
(Zonis, 1983:598). 
This trend created some hope for democratisation but the structural authoritarian regime 
dashed it by banning competition between the two wings of the party in the Majlis, 
shutting down the party in 1977. This was a serious mistake: 
By the end of 1977... just when revolutionary fervour 
elsewhere in the society was being translated into revolutionary 
action - the only national organisation capable of providing 
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political support for the regime was undone. . .. The economic 
and political processes which resulted in feelings of betrayal 
and frustration were significant sources of the revolutionary 
energy that culminated in the overthrow of the Shah (Zonis, 
1983:599). 
The repression of all independent sources of power or ideas was the guiding rule of the 
regime (Milani, 1997:80). 
2.4 External Relations 
The terms of the relationship with external actors continued to follow the same 
trajectory during the Shah's time as it did before his authoritarian rule; actual 
interference by the Western governments, or the need to find a scapegoat for the 
structural problems of Iranian economy and political life, further constructed the anti-
Western discourse (Personal Communication). 19 
At crucial moments, foreign intervention interacted with domestic factors to determine 
the scope and direction of Iran's political development. British and US involvement in 
the 1953 coup against the nationalist politician Mohammed Mossadeq (for his 
nationalisation of British oil interests in the country) put an end to an emerging pluralist 
political culture (Zonis, 1983:603; Katouzian, 2003:119). Later, pressure from the 
Kennedy administration to undertake liberalising reforms led the Shah to implement his 
'white revolution', a general programme of policy reforms focusing in particular on 
land redistribution. The policy backfired by alienating the Shah's supporters amongst 
the large landowners and upsetting even those who approved of the direction of policy 
but disliked the foreign interference. Some commentators also argue that the Carter 
19 Personal Communication. Discussions with Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli, fom1er Iran 
Ambassador to the UK and present editor of Economic Trends, Tehran, February 2006. 
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administration's calls for liberalisation undermined the Shah's ability to combat the 
growing insurrection from 1977 onwards (Owen, 2000:92).20 
The Shah's complex relationship with the West in general, and the US in particular, is 
widely perceived as being of central importance in explaining both the evolution of his 
rule and his eventual downfall. It has been argued that "during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
United States - either through direct suggestion or judicious innuendo - could influence 
the Shah's behaviour and make him carry out American-inspired policies in Iran" 
(Zonis, 1983:604). However, the Shah's government also enjoyed close relations with 
non-Western countries. 21 The fact that he had a quite dependent relationship with the 
US, for example, corroborated with the failure of his attempts to reform a repressive 
system, played an important role in constructing the anti-Western discourse within the 
opposition and society. 
Thus, nationalistic, anti-US rhetoric proved a critical ingredient in the appeal of the anti-
Shah forces in the late 1970s. The revolution "was felt to be a nationalist movement 
against the political, economic and cultural influence of the West, and of the United 
States in particular" (Halliday, 2003:64). 
There were certainly imperial ambitions by Western powers concerning Iran and these 
ambitions were played out in the internal politics of Iran. Nonetheless, arbitrary rule 
cannot be blamed completely on imperialists, though the public might like to do so. 
20 
21 
Imperialism was real enough bllt it did not create the arbitrary 
system of government in ltan, although it clearly did what in 
As Zonis discusses, the Shah even believed that the CIA was behind the emerging unrest in the 
1970s, falling back "on the old Iranian formula of seeing Iranian politics as some kind of vibration 
elicited by foreign powers" (Zonis, 1983:595). 
He was also supported by the Soviet Union and China (the Shah's last state visit was to Beijing) 
(Zonis, 1983). However, it was his relationship with the West which had the greatest effect on 
society. 
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the circumstances it thought would serve its interest best 
(Katouzian, 2003:29). 
Nevertheless, whether or not imperialism was real is irrelevant; more important was the 
existence of the perception itself, which influenced Iranian politics and policy-making. 
This factor will repeatedly come up in the analysis of subsequent eras of Iranian 
politics. Therefore, it is to be counted as one of the major determinants of Iranian 
policy-making and, as will be discussed in more detail later, as one of the major 
determinants of Iranian privatisation policy. This perception has not been the same with 
respect to all the other Western powers. It is interesting to note that despite, for 
example, the UK's involvement in Iranian politics along its history, the reluctance 
towards the West was mostly portrayed as originating due to the interactions with the 
US. Consequently, the policies of the Iranian government were targeted in relation to 
the political and economic effects they had on the US (Personal Communication).22 
The history of external interference helped to foster the "conspiracy mentality" which 
Khomeini played upon (Halliday, 2003:63).23 It has influenced not only the overthrow 
of the Shah but also the subsequent policy-making (i.e. the course of possible economic 
and political policies) and the attitude towards foreign investors and privatisation. 
2.5 Economics Under the Shah 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi acceded to the throne in 1941 amidst foreign 
occupation, economic disintegration and multidirectional attacks on his father's 20 year 
rule (Zonis, 1971). His main focus was to consolidate popular support and admiration 
22 
23 
Personal Communication. Discussions with Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli, former Iran 
Ambassador to the UK and present editor of Economic Trends, Tehran, February 2006. 
Abrahamian (1991) quotes a number of Khomeini's anti-Western slogans from the time of the 
revolution. The dictum "the oppressed nations of the world should unite against their imperialist 
oppressors" gives a flavour of their tone and content. 
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by propagating rapid growth, supplemented by high employment and supported by 
comprehensive public welfare services as a means of achieving distributional equity 
(Amuzegar, 1999). The reform and economic programmes throughout his rule were 
aimed at winning the backing of the masses and, to this end, his aspiration was to 
develop the non-oil based industry in the country, whereby Iran would not be so 
dependant upon the revenue generated from the sale of oil and petrochemical products. 
His economic diversification started with his decree for land reforms during 1961-1962. 
The Shah called the programme the 'White Revolution' (Enqelabe-e Sefid), having the 
aim of gaining the support of people in the rural areas and turning the farmers into 
stakeholders within their farming communities. This programme attracted the support of 
the American administration and his American-backed Prime Minister at that time, Ali 
Amini (Saikal, 1980). The plan, which initially looked noble in its intention of closing 
the gap between the land owners, the political elite, the small number of industrialists 
and the mainly agrarian population, turned out to be ill-conceived and short-lived. 
Despite extensive American aid and increasing oil revenue, by the mid-1960s the 
Iranian economy was not in a sound position. The inequality of incomes was increasing 
and the urban population's standard of living, not to mention that of the rural people, 
was not achieving the expected results. Corruption was widespread throughout the 
administration by the mid-1970s and Iran continued to remain one of the world's most 
slowly developing countries, with a illiteracy rate of around 85%. 
The distribution of shares in assembly plants, which were touted to be major production 
units, attracted the farmers from the rural communities into the population centres of the 
country. Inflation, due to shortages, rose to all time highs during the years preceding the 
revolution. The lack of research and development in the production units and industries 
erected by those who were close to the Shah and his immediate family, which were the 
symbols of progress for the Shah and his cronies, meant that they were ill-equipped to 
compete with the vast quantity of imports. 
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In the sections to follow, this study shall examine other aspects of the programmes and 
policies that the Shah adopted to develop the foundations of a sound economy. 
However, as we shall see, they caused yet further alienation for him amongst the very 
people whom he intended to bring prosperity and living standards equal to those in 
Europe. 
2.5.1 Oil- Reversing Nationalisation While Keeping Control 
Oil has been the cornerstone of the Iranian economy and consequently the most 
important economic decisions concerned the regulation of the industry. However, due to 
the importance of the resource for the industrialised world in general and the specific 
linkages developed with British and American companies, these decisions were never 
purely economic. Politics was an important part of the decision-making game (Personal 
Communication). 24 
In the history of the oil industry, the Shah's decision to reverse the nationalisation of the 
oil resources (i.e. the annexation of oil assets), is an important one. His signing of the 
Consortium Agreement - based on a 50-50 profit-sharing principle - which Mossadeq 
had rejected, signified that these decisions were not impossible, but were largely 
dependent on the broader political environment. One must remember that the Shah's 
regime was heavily supported by the US (Nazmi, 1989:43). Iran came to serve as a 
stable source of cheap oil for the West. However, the dependence of the Iranian 
economy on oil exports, especially in the 1970s, led to it becoming a dependent 
capitalist state (Ehteshami, 1995). 
24 Personal Communication. Discussions with Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli, former Iran 
Ambassador to the UK and present editor of Economic Trends, Tehran, February 2006. 
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Oil allowed for significant development within Iran. Increasing global demand for oil 
was the key motivating force behind Iran's economic development, providing both the 
funding and the rationale for much of the country's rapid industrialisation under the 
Shah. Total oil revenues between 1964 and 1974 stood at US$13 billion. Revenues 
between 1975 and 1977 alone were almost triple this figure (Abrahamian, 1982:427). 
This growth in revenue was fuelled by the drastic increase in oil prices in 1973-4. 
2.5.2 Relations Between the State and Capitalists 
It was obvious to the Shah that control of the oil industry was key to controlling the 
country's most important source of revenue. Thus, despite the agreements with the 
Western companies, the Shah tried to use his position of control domestically to further 
consolidate his regime (Personal Communication.). 25 
Clientelism remained a key feature as previously, not only of the political realm but also 
the economic one. The state's control over the oil resources fostered an unhealthy 
relationship of dependency between capitalists and the state (Nazmi, 1989:41-2). The 
Shah instituted an intensive capitalist development in Iran which involved an expanded 
role of the state in the economy through being both interventionist and orchestrating 
(Ehteshami, 1995). Private accumulation was possible and there were entrepreneurs, 
especially in the areas of a few highly profitable industries such as construction. 
However, they were dependent on state "hand outs" (Ibid.:80), since the state which had 
a monopoly control over oil was the "fountainhead of capital accumulation" 
25 Personal Communication. Discussions with Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli, former Iran 
Ambassador to the UK and present editor of Economic Trends, Tehran, February 2006. 
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(Ehteshami, 1995:78). This monopolistic control further contributed to the autonomy 
and supremacy of the state in relation to society.26 
Control over oil revenue allowed the Shah to further distance himself from society. As 
the oil revenue grew from the mid-1970s, the Shah could increase the country's military 
budget and reduce its dependence on foreign assistance. In tum, this permitted further 
centralisation of power and, as mentioned, ultimately distanced his rule from society. 
He began to focus almost exclusively on foreign, economic and military issues, to the 
detriment of internal political issues (Nasri, 1983:623).27 
In particular, much of the state's money went towards military purchases. Under the 
Shah, Iran's armed forces grew exponentially (Nazmi, 1989:52). It has been noted that 
for every $1 earned in oil exports to the US, Iran imported $2 worth of military 
equipment during the 1970s.28 
Moreover, genuine private sector development was undermined because the members of 
the capitalist class, created and nurtured by the Shah's development policies, were able 
to compete unfairly against other, less favoured, entrepreneurs. In Katouzian's words: 
26 
27 
28 
[These] were people who, often with relatively little capital of 
their own, acted as little more than agents of the state 
There were specific changes in the economy during the Shah's rule which reinforced this 
autonomy and supremacy of the state combined with a .capitalist class. In the aftermath of the 
1953 coup, the Shah abandoned import substitution policies, shifting to a less protectionist stance 
that generated a substantial trade deficit and hit domestic producers hard (Nazmi, 1989). As 
domestic producers withered in the face of fierce competition, state investment increasingly 
substituted for private sector development, rather than aiding it. Following a severe recession and 
balance of payments crisis in 1960, import restrictions were imposed as part of an IMF-led 
austerity programme (Ibid.). The government augmented the IMP-imposed measures with 
restrictions of its own that essentially saw Iran returning to the classic import substitution path to 
development. As ever, it was financed through the economic rents earned from oil. 
Ironically, the Shah's military build-up and forays into the foreign policy world "estranged many 
foreign leaders" (Nasri, 1983:624). 
Arms dealers "began to jest that the Shah read their manuals in much the same way as other men 
read Playboy" (Abrahamian, 1982:436). 
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empowered to use public funds, and other privileges, for 
supplying assembled [products] (Katouzian, 1981:278). 
The above phenomena brought "modernisation in form", but it actually "spread ... 
underdevelopment to the very pillars of the economy" (Nazmi, 1989:42). It proved that 
economic measures (despite relaxed relationships with foreign companies) cannot 
determine genuine development due to the continuous political interference from the 
state. Clientelism and authoritarian rule undermined healthy economic relations. They 
eventually led to the state becoming the centre of Iranian economy. This was reflected 
in the fact that, by the 1970s, the state was providing 70% of the total investment funds 
in the economy (Ehteshami, 1995). The 'private' sector was largely under the control of 
only 45 families who commanded 85% of the larger privately held firms (Ehteshami, 
1995:81 ). One could say that the positive aspect of the existence of a 'capitalist' layer in 
society, which was profit-oriented, was overshadowed by the mechanisms that 
determined the relationships between the state and the business community, i.e. 
clientelism and arbitrary rule. Additionally, the focus on military expenditure, 
determined by a desire to assess Iran's power within the international arena as well as 
domestically, drained resources that could have been allocated to other sectors of the 
economy. 
2.5.3 State of the Economy 
This is not to say that the Iranian economy was in a bad state. In fact, judging from 
macroeconomic aggregates, economic policy seemed successful under the Shah. Real 
output grew by around 7.5% per year on average during the 1960s. Between 1965 and 
1973, average real output growth stood at more than 10%. Indicators such as the infant 
mortality rate and life expectancy also improved (Nazmi, 1989:40). The state played an 
active role at every level of economic development- from the construction of massive 
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dams to provide power and feed irrigation schemes to the provision of subsidised 
industrial credit and fertiliser (Abrahamian, 1982). 
Overall, the Shah's economic policies brought little substantial or lasting benefit to 
Iran. 29 The impressive output growth reflected primarily the exponential growth in oil 
revenues, much of which was wasted on military hardware, state bureaucracy, 
corruption and inefficient investment. The channelling of oil revenues into the 
productive sector via state support and subsidised lending policies may have been more 
damaging than simply throwing the money away on military hardware (Nazmi, 1989). 
The investment was clearly unproductive, if we take productivity as being to some 
degree dependent on diversification, as the economy wholly failed to diversify out of 
the oil sector. Inefficient allocation of capital led the economy down a false 
development path, squandering scarce resources and undermining potentially more 
efficient producers. As a result, by the time the Shah was deposed, oil revenues 
accounted for 40% of national income and almost three-quarters of the government's 
revenue (Nazmi, 1989:51). Iran's non-oil income per capita was lower than that of 
many countries generally considered much poorer- "hardly appropriate for an economy 
the Shah named 'the new Japan"' (Ibid.). As with politics, there were some attempted 
economic reforms under the Shah. 
2.5.4 Attempts at Economic Reform 
Rapidly accelerating inflationary pressures, in response to the oil boom, prompted the 
authorities to engage in a disastrous programme of price controls and "anti-profiteering 
29 However, Abrahamian takes a less damning view, arguing that, although "substantial sums were 
squandered on palaces, royal extravagances, bureaucratic consumption, outright corruption, 
nuclear installations and ultrasophisticated weapons too expensive even for many NATO 
countries" (Abrahamian, 1982:427), much of the oil wealth was channelled into more productive 
uses. 
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courts" (Zonis, 1983 :596). 30 These courts in particular cost the Shah the support of the 
business community, and also stoked fears of sectarianism, as many of the businessmen 
accused of price fixing were members of minority communities (Jews and Baha'is) 
rather than Shiite Muslims. 
The Shah's key economic policy initiative was the so-called 'White Revolution'. This 
initiative, launched in 1962 in response to the economic crisis of 1960 and pressure for 
liberalisation from Washington, had at its heart an extensive programme of land 
redistribution (Owen, 2000:92-93). This reform programme was symptomatic of the 
Shah's broad-brush approach to economic development. Motivated by a mixture of 
good intentions, hubris and an obsession with modernisation, and suffering from a total 
lack of attention to detail, the reform eventually alienated both the traditional 
landowners and the peasants who were supposed to be its main beneficiaries.31 
The anti-inflation policies were also wholly ineffective, since the only long-term 
remedy to the accelerating inflation of the period - proper monetary discipline - was 
ignored. "The price controls ... only led to shortages and the creation of black markets" 
(Nazmi, 1989:50). These failed economic reforms, like the failed political reforms, only 
contributed further to the fall of the Shah in 1979. However, behind these failed reforms 
were deeper tensions concerning Iran and development that can be traced up from the 
Shah through the revolution. 
30 
31 
Some 8,000 businessmen served prison sentences of up to three years, and 250,000 fines were 
issued (Abrahamian, 1982:498). 
As Owen observes, the reform tried to force peasants into collective farms, creating a "legacy of 
bitterness that. .. meant that the regime lost all possibility of obtaining political support from the 
direct beneficiaries of the reform" (Owen, 2000:93). The White Revolution also alienated the 
clergy, who were significant landholders (Nazmi, 1989). This group also objected to the extension 
of women's rights and literacy projects that were included in the reform programme. 
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2.5.5 Social Tensions Caused by Development 
The social tensions faced by the Shah in his attempt to reconcile the competing demands 
of the dire need for economic development, the drive to create broad-based 
development and the need to reconcile development with a socially conservative 
climate, are discussed in several studies of the Iranian revolution (N asri, 1983). These 
tensions continued in the following decades. The politics in the revolution periods 
would be marked by them. 
The Shah's authoritarian policies focused heavily on economic development, neglecting 
- according to most observers - political reforms that would have promoted a more 
equitable development path and reconciled competing social and economic imperatives. 
Saikal, for instance, argues that the Shah's development programme lacked: 
a governmental system that would allow increasing political 
and economic decentralization, public participation, and 
individual initiative, and thus put more stress on social 
development and progressive redistribution of wealth (Saikal, 
1980:203-204). 
Nasri points to the growing social dislocation caused by the rapid pace of economic 
development in the 1970s. However, he argues that it was this friction between 
economic and social/cultural imperatives (which affected all classes in Iranian society), 
rather than the disjunction between growth and broad-based development (which 
primarily affected the poor), that created the widespread hostility to the Shah's rule: 
It was ... not the lack of emphasis on economic 'development' 
as against economic 'growth' that was the source of the 
problem ... ; rather, it was the rapid and uncontrolled rate of 
development that not only made Iranians feel like aliens in their 
own country, but also increased their expectations to such 
levels that the government could not have satisfied them even 
under normal circumstances (Nasri, 1983:619). 
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Zonis (1983) cites evidence that the perceived inequity of the Shah's development 
programme was critical in creating opposition to his regime. He follows Walton (1986) 
in citing Hirschman's (1973) analysis of the effect of development and inequality on the 
political process. Walton (1986) argues that expectations of ever -rising material wealth 
were becoming increasingly frustrated and the people's tolerance for the continually 
rising social and economic inequities was becoming rapidly exhausted. 
Zonis argues that the "politicization of income inequality" was a key development of 
the second half of the 1970s, driven by a "panic over what were seen as disappearing 
opportunities for riches, and bitter envy directed at those who had already succeeded" 
(Zonis, 1983:597). Halliday (2003:50-53) shares this perspective, citing the significant 
increase in income inequality, which saw the urban poor in particular fare badly, as a 
key factor behind growing opposition to the Shah's regime. 
2.6 What the Fall of the Shah says about Iranian Society, Political Life and how 
it Impacted on Economic Policy 
The dramatic collapse of the Shah's regime in 1979 appeared to catch most observers 
off-guard. Zonis notes that: 
The breathtaking speed of the final denouement caught not 
merely the Shah and the Americans off-guard; Ayatollah 
Khomeini himself had no idea of the speed with which the 
Pahlavi system would collapse in those final weeks (Zonis, 
1983:602). 
However, the inconsistencies and weaknesses undermining the Shah's autocratic regime 
had been apparent for some time. 
88 
For the purposes of this study, the historical events are relevant in so much as they 
inform our analysis on what are the determinants of Iranian policy with respect to its oil 
and gas industry. In other words, what is the dynamic within Iranian political life and 
society that brought revolutionary change? Additionally, what are the economic factors 
relevant to the revolution and vice-versa, and how would the revolution and the 
revolutionary discourse impact on the economic policies? 
Fred Halliday, one of the most reputed specialists on the Iranian revolution, identifies 
several key reasons that led to the Shah's overthrow (2003:50-67). Firstly, the rapid and 
uneven pattern of economic development increased inequality and left many bewildered 
at the rapid pace of change. This is also a point made earlier by Nasri (1983:619) about 
the alienation of Iranians due to rapid growth and their dissatisfaction due to increased 
expectations. Worse, the drop-off in economic performance at the end of the 1970s and 
the growing evidence of waste and corruption cemented peoples' impression that they 
had missed their chance for individual material progress. 
When it became obvious in mid-1975 that the boom was 
slowing down, there was panic over what were seen as 
disappearing opportunities for riches, and bitter envy directed 
at those who had already succeeded (Zonis, 1983:597). 
It was a tension determined by uneven development and an unfair one due to 
clientelistic relationships. Furthermore, there was the tension between the mechanisms 
of the authoritarian regime and a modernisation process in the economy. 
The Shah was pursuing a capitalist-oriented process of socio-
economic development [that] ... unleashed forces opposite to 
those the throne required for its centrality in politics (Saikal, 
1980:203). 
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As early as 1960, a US government report on Iran, prepared for the newly-elected 
President Kennedy, identified the Shah's core problem: 
Under the Shah, Iran has made considerable progress in 
economic development, in social welfare, and in internal 
security and administrative efficiency. The progress has, 
however, taken place without participation in the government 
by the main opposition groups. To some extent, the Shah's 
isolation from these groups has been due to his unwillingness 
to ride demagogic issues appealing to the lower popular 
passions .... To an equal extent however, it has been due to his 
unwillingness to listen to critical advice, to his unwillingness to 
share power, and to his near-obsession with military affairs 
(Zonis, 1983:587)?2 
These conclusions are just as true when discussing the fall of the Shah's regime in 
1979.33 
While there was considerable economic development under the Shah and there were 
even attempts at political and economic reform, the Shah's ability to rely on oil money 
and external backing allowed him to ignore domestic issues and dismiss the views of the 
opposition. The lack of involvement of other parties in government eventually led to the 
Shah's downfall. Halliday (2003) identifies the broad nature of the political coalition 
ranged against the Shah as a key cause of his overthrow. This point is reinforced by 
Katouzian, who argues that the 1979 revolution: 
32 
33 
... shared the basic features of traditional Iranian revolts [in 
being] aimed at the overthrow of the state - indeed the person 
of the ruler - at all costs, [having] the support of the entire 
Quoted from report by John W. Bowling, Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and 
Iranian Affairs. 
In fact, most commentators on the Shah have echoed these comments, even up to the present day. 
Milani (1997), for instance, argues that the Shah "wished to be the king of a modem country, but 
he was determined to rule using a medieval system of governance. That is why he modernised the 
economy but failed to do the same for the political realm". Essentially, the Shah's political failure 
lay in his inconsistent visions of his own role and his country's. As a result, he was unable to 
appreciate that the economic and social reforms he sought rendered his own role as a 'medieval'-
style autocrat untenable. 
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political society [and] not [being] resisted by any social class 
(Katouzian, 2003:31). 
To an extent, the breadth of the coalition illustrated the naivety of some of those 
involved- particularly secular and liberal forces, who underestimated the power of the 
clergy. Thus, despite a mismatch of objectives, the liberal and secular forces had hoped 
to steer the unfolding of the revolution towards their own objectives. 
Among the secular and middle-class forces many hoped that. .. 
they could deflect the movement away from its clerical patrons. 
This enabled such people to support the movement with 
appropriate optimism, but it represented an underestimation of 
the strength of the religious forces (Halliday, 2003:56). 
The mobilising role of Islam and its personification in the charismatic persona of the 
Ayatollah Khomeini himself was also critical to the revolution's success. "Khomeini 
was in many respects the epitome of a charismatic leader" (Halliday, 2003:61). He was 
also a skilful political operator - able to play to different audiences and broaden his 
message- which explains in part why the broad anti-Shah coalition was maintained as 
long as it was.34 
Finally, Halliday cites the ambivalent international context which allowed Khomeini to 
portray the Islamic Revolution as a nationalist movement in opposition to the West and 
the US (the Shah's patrons). The history of external interference - detailed in the 
previous section - helped to foster the "conspiracy mentality" which Khomeini played 
upon (Halliday, 2003:63-67).35 The US' change in tone and direction under Carter's 
34 
35 
Khomeini succeeded in mastering populist rhetoric that helped to soften his Islamist message. As 
Owen notes, he was: " ... a master of a type of populist rhetoric, with its emphasis on such central 
themes as anti-imperialism, democracy and social justice, that seemed to provide a consensus 
around which all opponents of the Shah could come together" (Owen, 2000:94). This point is 
made more forcefully by Abrahamian (1991:106), who argues that "we should recognise 
Khomeini-ism as a specifically religious variant of populism". 
Abrahamian quotes a number of Khomeini's anti-Western slogans from the time of the revolution. 
The dictum "the oppressed nations of the world should unite against their imperialist oppressors" 
gives a flavour to their tone and content (Abrahamian, 1991:114 ). 
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presidency - pressurising the Shah to liberalise when his regime faced its greatest threat 
-was perhaps the final straw, particularly taken in tandem with the economic downturn 
which hindered the state's distribution of oil revenue to buy political favour. 36 
The Shah's fall outlined several important aspects of Iranian politics and social 
dynamics. Firstly, it showed that development does not necessarily create beneficial 
effects when not accompanied by democratic political reform. Clientelism and 
authoritarian rule impede fair and even accumulation of wealth, as well as 
implementation of consistent economic measures. Thus, while Massadeq's reforms to 
nationalise the oil industry, for example, alienated some groups of the society, the more 
relaxed economic agreements with respect to the oil industry did not create a more 
favourable environment. This was due to the fact that the administration of the country's 
revenue from oil was undertaken by an elite who, when they did not use it for the 
growth of their own businesses, invested in military hardware and used it to consolidate 
their political power. 
Other specific reforms, such as the land reform, failed due to a combination of 
discretionary measures (e.g. to put farmers into collective farms against their will) and 
opposition from the conservative groups within society (landowners, clergy) (Personal 
Communication)?7 The conservative elements proved to be important in voicing the 
discontent with the regime. The fact that the revolution could rally considerable support 
through use of a nationalistic and anti-Western tone is essential in understanding the 
shifts in the economic policies with respect to privatisation in Iran. It is also salient for 
understanding the type of political culture present at the time in Iran. It actually points 
out that Iran was at that stage a largely 'traditional society', where politics was 
36 
37 
Nasri (1983) comments on this issue in more depth, quoting a number of authors in arguing that 
Carter's policy towards Iran confused the Shah, held up the sale of riot control equipment and 
gave succour to the opposition. 
Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr. Manouchelir Lighrani, M.D., former landowner, 
Tehran, December 2004. 
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dependent on the skills and charisma of the ruler/leader rather than on the effectiveness 
of the institutional framework. 
However, it must also be taken into account that the revolution fundamentally changed 
the political and economic functioning in Iranian society and therefore the determinants 
of policy, including the policy concerning privatisation. Therefore, the next chapter will 
address the changes in Iranian politics and economics. 
2. 7 Conclusion 
There are several issues which this chapter has discussed that are essential to 
understanding the interactions between the political, economic and social structures in 
Iran. This chapter identified authoritarian rule based on discretionary measures as one of 
the features of Iranian political life. From this, clientelism and uneven development due 
to a disinterest in society, characterised the economic interactions within the state and 
the distribution of wealth. 
The troubled relationships with Western actors, as well as the need to find a scapegoat 
for structural economic problems, nurtured an anti-Western and anti-American feeling 
and discourse, combined with a nationalistic tone, within society and some of the 
political sphere. This particular attitude will prove to be extremely relevant to the policy 
design of post-revolution Iran. 
The fact that oil was the cornerstone of the Iranian economy transformed its control into 
a political tool used not only by the Shah but also by the revolutionary regime. In the 
case of the former, by centralising power, the Shah became the only individual who 
could possibly make decisions concerning oil and gas privatisation. Since control over 
oil profits and pleasing foreign backers was necessary, there was little chance of a 
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change in attitude towards privatisation. In other words, while the Shah partially 
privatised oil, he retained control of its profits (minus those going abroad) and due to 
the Iranian economy's dependence on oil, this allowed the Shah to effectively control 
the economy and bolster his political power. His need for self-affirmation in the 
international realm as well as domestically, determined an overspending in the military 
sector to the detriment of other sectors of the economy. Broader international economic 
developments, i.e. the oil crisis and then the subsequent drop in oil prices, affected the 
economic development at home. It deepened the discontent within Iran and created an 
environment for the revolution movement. 
The next chapter will move on to address the immediate post-revolution period. It will 
pay special attention to the continuing factors which have determined policy in Iran. 
These factors include the relations with and perceptions of the West and the US, the 
tension between economic and social development and modernisation; and the relations 
between the Iranian government and the people, specifically in the form of arbitrary 
rule. The chapter will also begin to address new issues which were factors in the cause 
of the revolution, but which came to be major determinants for the direction of Iranian 
society and political and economic policy. Specifically, these have been the role of 
religion in Iranian society, especially in relation to economics, and the role of the 
revolutionary ideology in determining domestic and international policy and relations. 
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CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OIL POLICY: 
1979 TO 1989 
3.1 Introduction 
The analysis so far has shown that there are several relevant issues needing to be 
considered in order to understand the interactions between the political, economic and 
social structures in Iran. These include the existence of an authoritarian regime, based 
on violence and clientelism to support itself, reduced interaction with society and the 
just mentioned clientelistic relations, which favoured particular groups and affected 
economic interactions within the state and the distribution of wealth. 
The focus on economic modernisation without deep political reform alienated even 
more different sections of Iranian society. At the same time, good intentions (such as 
land reform) failed due to undemocratic impositions and opposition from the 
conservative forces within society. The conservative elements (clergy and landowners) 
proved to be important in voicing discontent with the regime. They also rallied against 
the regime's societal groups (such as students) which had quite different priorities. The 
unifying element was the nationalistic and anti-American tone, and a type of deeper 
tradition of contestation within Iranian society of groups in power (see section 3.2.2.3 
for further discussion on factionalism). The fact that society responded to the 
charismatic figure of the Ayatollah Khomeini points to the existence of a largely 
'traditional society', where politics is dependent on personalistic qualities rather than on 
the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms. 
As to the oil industry, it must be said that it had been largely politicised. Oil was used as 
a political tool by both the Shah and the coming revolutionary regime. Being the main 
source of revenue, it became obvious that its control enhanced political control at home, 
as well as possibilities of self-affirmation internationally. International factors, actors 
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and events, were also important in creating the overall picture within which Iranian 
decision-making took place. 
This chapter analyses the post-revolution period between 1979 and 1989, along the 
same coordinates as the previous chapter. During this period, we see the major post-
revolution changes in Iran, specifically in its economic system, taking shape. It seeks to 
answer the question of why the oil and gas industry was nationalised in Iran after the 
revolution and how the nature of privatisation in Iran evolved and changed over time. It 
focuses on the political forces which determined economic policy and vice versa in 
order to answer this question. Firstly, it details the nature of political change in Iran. In 
addition, Khomeini' s political views will be examined in some detail, as will the 
competing political constituencies. These factors, combined with a look at the major 
foreign policy issues faced by Iran, give the contextual background for Iran's economic 
decision-making. The second section of this chapter will examine the economic policies 
of the post-revolution government and developments within the economic system. 
The Iranian revolution was not just a political revolution, it was an economic one as 
well. The revolution heralded an entirely new relationship between society and 
government. In particular, the clergy adopted a much larger social role. Khomeini's 
politics walked the line between fundamentalism and populism. This was also true of 
the economic sphere, where traditional Islamic economic ideals were mixed with 
populist ideas about the redistribution of wealth. While the concept of private property 
was never really questioned, much of Iran's industry was nationalised after the 
revolution. 
Studies of the early post-revolution period focus on the creation of the Islamic Republic 
under Khomeini's charismatic leadership (Ehteshami, 1995). They analyse the role of 
the various political forces allied (sometimes loosely) to Khomeini's leadership and 
outline the emergence of the key ideological fractures that emerged within the new 
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political establishment, divisions that remain to this day. While seemingly obvious, we 
must ask to what degree the Iranian revolution really changed the political system in 
Iran. Clearly those in high political stations changed and the influence of the clergy was 
much more pronounced. But, did the revolution change the relationship between the 
government and society, and thereby between the government and the economy, or was 
it more a question of changing rhetoric and institutions? 
3.2 The Novelty of the Revolution 
The reality of the Iranian revolution contrasted markedly with the conception of 
revolution that had prevailed since the late eighteenth century. It rejected historical 
progress, material improvement, national assertion, historical legitimatisation and 
democratic sovereignty- five themes which, however violated in practice, were at least 
invoked formally by modem revolutions from 1789 onward (Halliday, 2003:45). It was 
in this sense a novel revolution . 
. . .in the proper sense of the word, what happened in Iran was a 
comprehensively reactionary revolution, restoring to the term 
its original, astronomical, meaning of return to a previous order 
(Halliday, 2003:43). 
The revolution in Iran during 1979 shared many of the features of other third world 
uprisings. It drew support from sections of the civil service and trading communities, 
and from the poor urban population. The revolution mobilised against a dictatorial 
regime. This mobilisation was centred around a charismatic leader and an ideology of 
revolutionary legitimacy. 
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3.2.1 Brevity of the Revolution and Continuity of Thought 
Unlike many other revolutions that took years to complete in full, the Iranian revolution 
happened at high speed. Within less than a year and a half, the revolution went from 
protests to the declaration of the Islamic republic. The timeline of the changes in the 
structure of the regime suggests that all the contradictions remained to be worked out 
after the revolution. In fact, many can still be traced to the present. Briefly: 
• January 1978: the street protests begin. They are organised by religious students 
in Qom who are protesting at an anti-Khomeini newspaper article. 
• Strikes and protests in Iranian cities occur over the next few months. They are 
organised by the clergy and supported by the bazaars. 
• September 1978: the religious processions after Ramadan become large political 
protests. 
• 8 September 1978: martial law is imposed and shooting of demonstrators by the 
government follows. 
• October 1978: the wave of strikes begin. The strikes become a nationwide 
political general strike. The general strike begins in late November 1978. 
Importantly, the oil fields, which are at the heart of the Iranian economy, are 
shut down. 
• 5 November 1978: the Shah is under pressure from the military. Eventually he 
appoints a military government. The military government which he appoints is 
unable to end the strikes. In December, the government is forced to allow new 
street demonstrations. This is during the Shi-ite festival of Ashura. 
• Throughout this period, Khomeini leads the protests from his exile in Paris. 
• 15 January 1979: the Shah leaves Iran. The former opposition leader and 
secularist, Shahpour Bakhtiar, becomes head of the government. 
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• 1 February 1979: Khomeini returns to Iran from Paris. He refuses to negotiate 
with the Bakhtiar government. Khomeini pronounces Mehdi Bazargan head of a 
rival government. 
• 10/11 February 1979: there are pro-Khomeini mutinies by the armed forces. The 
army declares itself neutral. The Bakhtiar government collapses. 
• 30 March 1979: the Islamic Republic is declared after a referendum. 
• November 1979: an Islamic constitution is passed by referendum. Khomeini is 
officially accepted 'supreme leader', not only faqih but valy-e faqih. 
• January 1980: Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr is elected President. Following its election 
the Majlis (which is dominated by the Islamic Republican Party) selects 
Mohammad Ali Rajai as the Prime Minister. 
The brevity of the revolution indicates that Iranian society did not have much time to 
evolve between the secular, arbitrary rule of the Shah and the new Islamic rule. This 
meant that many of the same factors determining politics and economics in Iran 
continued into the post-revolution period (Personal Communication).38 These 
continuities included the same factors discussed in the previous chapter, including 
arbitrary rule, the perceptions of the West, and the relations of economic versus political 
development. However, the combination of these determinants of policy with other 
specific factors make them appear different. At the same time, religion and 
revolutionary politics took on increasingly important roles as determinants of policy. 
38 Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director of 
Foreign Exchange Research Department of Central Bank of Iran, Tehran, December 2005. 
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3.2.2 The New Political System: Continuity and Change 
Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran at the start of February 1979, refusing to negotiate 
with the provisional government headed by the secularist Shahpour Bakhtiar. Khomeini 
pronounced Mehdi Bazargan, the Liberal Islamist, head of a rival provisional 
government. Within ten days, following a series of pro-Khomeini mutinies by the armed 
forces, the Bakhtiar government had collapsed. The end of March saw the Islamic 
Republic proclaimed following a referendum. A further referendum passed the new 
Islamic constitution in November 1979, and Khomeini was officially accepted as valy-e 
faqih. In January 1980, Abol-Hasan Bani-Sadr - an Islamic socialist - was elected 
President, and the first Majlis (dominated by Khomeini's Islamic Republican Party) 
selected Mohammad Ali Rajai as Prime Minister (Halliday, 2003:48-49). 
As mentioned earlier, the main elements of change introduced to the form of 
government, which aimed to reflect as well upon the relationship between the state and 
society, referred to the blend between the principle of popular sovereignty and that of 
theocratic rule. Thus, the 1979 constitution was an amalgam of the 1906 Iranian 
constitution and the French Fifth Republic, with further amendments to incorporate 
Khomeini' s interpretation of Islamic government. 
However, these precise changes created contradictions and ambiguities. As a number of 
commentators have noted, the constitution represented an uneasy compromise between 
secularist notions, such as the separation of powers and Islamic principles. 39 For 
instance, the constitution created a (relatively democratic) parliament with roles for a 
Prime Minister and President. However, these democratic and essentially secular 
features were counteracted by the creation of the Council of Guardians - a twelve-
member body composed of clerics and Islamic jurists with veto power over the Majlis 
39 Abrahamian (1991) notes that the constitution contains significant populist elements, yet also 
undertakes to safeguard private property; while Owen (2000) draws attention to the disjoint 
between its secular and Islamic features. 
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(Owen, 2000:95). This power of veto would provide the key point of conflict between 
radicals and conservatives within the Fundamentalist Islamist grouping once its grip on 
power was cemented in 1981. The other essentially non-democratic feature of Iran's 
1979 Islamic constitution was the creation of the post of faqih in line with Khomeini' s 
notion of velayat-e faqih - a post which Khomeini himself held until his death in 1989. 
The post-1979 political system can be characterised as "limited popular sovereignty" 
(Milani, 1997:82), in that it had significant democratic elements (particularly in relation 
to the regional and historical norm), but this nascent popular sovereignty was 
"disfigured" by five key constitutional features (Milani, 1997:82): 
• the constitution put God, not the people, as the ultimate authority; 
• it provided a hierarchy of power with God at the top, the people at the bottom, 
and (crucially) the clerical establishment in the middle; 
• it granted unelected bodies (the Council of Guardians andfaqih) powers of veto 
and appointment over democratically-elected politicians; 
• it limited the power of the President (the only nationally elected figure) by 
granting the faqih powers to sack him and to command the armed forces; and 
finally 
• the constitution curtailed freedoms (of the press and of assembly) if deemed 
inimical to Islam. 
This 'limited popular sovereignty' is in line with traditional Shia ideology in that it 
states that only the highest clergy can deduce the Qur'an's secret meaning (batan) from 
its apparent meaning (zaher).40 
4D This emphasis on clerical interpretation is also present in the Shia subsystems associated with 
Shariati, Motahhari and Navab-Safavi (as discussed in Shahriari-Rad, 2002). 
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The above blend generated not only a specific ideological makeup in Iran, but also 
favoured increased factionalism within the government and created political deadlocks 
between the radicals and the conservatives. The creation of parallel institutions signalled 
that the structural features of the previous (i.e. repression of dissonant voices) regime 
still persisted, despite the difference in the political institutions. However, unlike the 
pre-revolution period, now the Islamic and populist/socialist rhetoric was deeply felt 
and impacted upon the Iranian economic decision-making process (Personal 
Communication). 41 
3.2.2.1 Ideological Makeup 
The ideological makeup of Iran reflects the mixed tendencies to create a state based on 
popular sovereignty and theocratic institutions. Shi'ism, due to its ideological variety, 
allowed for this blend to be further emphasised in the political ideology of various 
groups. Thus, the post-revolution clerical establishment (including Khomeini himself) 
should be understood as borrowing elements from the various ideological 'subsystems' 
within Shi'ism in order to enhance its position of power, rather than individually and 
consistently subscribing to any particular subsystem. Furthermore, 
Failure to grasp the flexibility which the adoption of different 
aspects of various subsystems offers to the clerical leadership 
leads to erroneous categorisations such as Islamic modernists, 
traditionalists, fundamentalists, moderates, extremists, etc. 
(Milani, 1997:82). 
Thus, the clerical leadership can be seen as having a range of tools to draw on. In 
particular, there were four distinct ideological strands within Iranian Shi'ism that have 
41 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr. Manouchelir Lighrani, M.D., former landowner, 
Tehran, December 2004. 
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informed the establishment's governing programme since 1979. The first strand, linked 
to Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, is an essentially conservative interpretation of Shi'ism 
that rejects the Marxist elements incorporated into Islam by the Maktabis. Motahhari 
was a leading cleric, a member of the influential Revolutionary Council and a close 
confidante of Khomeini (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990:39-40).42 His key motivation was 
to counter the anti-clerical currents common among young Islamic revolutionaries; he 
also had a "deep respect for the market system based on private property ... [which] 
removed the anxieties of property-owning classes" (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990:42). 
This defence of private property placed him in the Hojatieh tradition, although his 
emphasis on the political role of the clergy- embodied in Khomeini's notion of velayat-
e faqih- was not universally popular with conservatives (Ehteshami, 1995:9). 
Rahnema and Nomani outline a second strand of Iranian Shi'ism at the time, which they 
link with the work of the intellectual Ali Shariati, a nationalist supporter of Mossadeq in 
the 1950s. Shariati' s Shi' ism borrowed extensively from the Marxism-Leninism 
promulgated by the pro-Moscow Tudeh party. The authors go as far as to argue that 
"Shariati' s achievement was the utilisation of Islam as a socially applicable ... form of 
presenting a content which could be considered as essentially Leninist" (Rahnema and 
Nomani, 1990:53). Hence, Shariati emphasised the division between the oppressors and 
the oppressed. This was an essential part of Khomeini's own pre-revolution rhetoric 
(Abrahamian, 1991). However, Shariati differed from Khomeini in arguing for an 
Islamic state without clerical leadership (Rahnmena and Nomani, 1990:62). 
The Islamic Republic's leadership arguably borrowed from Shariati's rhetoric, 
particularly in building support for the revolution during the final years of the Shah. 
Shariati' s belief in a "totalitarian transitional government"- derived from an "elitist and 
paternalistic position in relation to the people" - can also be interpreted as "very similar 
42 He was assassinated in May 1979 during the bloody early months of the Islamic Republic. 
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to Khomeini's concept of an Islamic government" (Rahnmena and Nomani, 1990:67). 
However, Khomeini was also careful to uphold property rights in order to avoid 
alienating his conservative business constituency (Ibid.:61). 
A third, essentially conservative reading of Shi'ism is embodied in the career of Sayyed 
Mujtaba Mir-lowhi (known as Navab-Safavi), the founder of the radical Islamic group 
Fadaian-e Islam that violently opposed the Shah. As the authors argue: 
Navab-Safavi' s subsystem represents a violent and reactionary 
Islam which contains many of the necessary attributes of a 
totalitarian system (Rahnmena and Nomani, 1990:78). 
This reactionary reading of Islam - a demand for the strict implementation of the 
shari'a under a theocratic government- proved popular amongst the huge numbers of 
rural migrants to Tehran and other cities, the groups most alienated by the rapid cultural 
and economic change instigated by the Shah's development policies. Migrant workers 
reacted to this "alien cultural environment" by forming hey' ats (informal religious 
groups), which went on to form important powerbases for the Islamic Republic's rising 
political stars (Ibid.:90). This "vast source of bigoted militancy" would become the 
"vengeful executive arm of the clergy" (Ibid.:88) - the komites (vigilante police) and 
Pasdaran (revolutionary guards) who participated so effectively in the post-revolution 
terror (Milani, 1997:84). 
Finally, there is a more liberal reading of Islam, associated with veteran nationalist (and 
first Prime Minister under the Islamic Republic) Mehdi Bazargan. Bazargan tried to 
blend Islam and liberal democracy. Essentially, he argued for a constitutional theocracy 
in which religious observance was a matter of individual conscience and the clergy has 
little or no political role (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990:99-116). Although Khomeini had 
links with Bazargan - as testified to by the latter's appointment as Prime Minister in 
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February 1979 (Halliday, 2003:48-49) - little of Bazargan's liberalism found its way 
into the Islamic Republic's political direction after the more conservative clerical 
establishment cemented its grip on power in subsequent years. However, elements of 
Bazargan's more liberal reading of Shi'ism can arguably be identified in the philosophy 
of President Mohammed Kbatami, and the views of his brother and key advisor, Reza 
Kbatami. 
Against this background, therefore, it becomes all the more important to rethink the 
concept of development, to imagine development in the context of the particular society 
and its culture, its religious aspirations and values, and its rapidly changing social 
fabric. 
3.2.2.2 Parallel Institutions 
The specificity of the institutions created by the revolutionary regime does not 
necessarily imply a break with the practices of the previous regime. On the contrary, the 
emergence of parallel institutions under the leadership of Khomeini and the Islamic 
Republican Party (dubbed Khomeini's 'mini-state') (Milani, 1997) was motivated by 
the same drive to consolidate and preserve power. Repression was the means to achieve 
it. 
Khomeini's 'mini-state' drew much of its support from the culturally alienated rural-
urban migrants (the "vast source of bigoted militancy" [Rahnema and Nomani, 
1990:88]) and was funded by Khomeini via the Mostazefan (Oppressed) Foundation, 
which had expropriated the assets of the royal family and their associates. The 'mini-
state' adopted a range of unofficial organisations, including the Komites, the Pasdaran 
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and the Revolutionary Courts, who dispensed brutal summary justice to those deemed 
opposed to the pro-Khomeini forces (Milani, 1997:84-85). 
Khomeini's 'mini-state' had effectively neutered all opposition by 1983, moving against 
the secularists and Islamic Liberals associated with Mehdi Bazargan' s interim 
government, and then forcefully ejecting the Islamic Socialist Bani-Sadr (whom 
Khomeini had chosen as the Islamic Republic's first President) from office in 1981. 
Even senior clerics were not immune. Ayatollah Seeyed Kazem Shariatmadari, who had 
opposed the velayat-e faqih provision of the constitution, was "virtually put under house 
arrest until his death in 1986" (Milani, 1997:85). 
After the dismissal of Bani-Sadr in 1981, the clergy's control over the Islamic 
Republican Party, and therefore the government, was almost total (Rahnema and 
Nomani, 1990:255). This ushered in a period of "pragmatic clerical rule", with forces 
close to the spiritual leader forcing the more militant members of the clerical coalition 
to tone down their revolutionary rhetoric and bring an end to the "semi-anarchy" of the 
"mini-state's parallel institutions" (Ibid. :256). 
3.2.2.3 Factionalism and its Consequences for Political and Economic Policies 
Factionalism did not simply act as a determinant of policy-making in Iran. It was related 
to Khomeini' s own ambiguous political views, which drew on different trends within 
Shi'ism. The swing between popular sovereignty and theocratic rule represented an 
additional factor (Milani, 1997). 
During the revolution period (1977-79) and in the early years of the Islamic Republic, 
political participation was at its peak (Ibid.:77). The revolutionary movement itself was 
initially extremely wide-ranging, with factionalism temporarily in abeyance. As 
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Katouzian argues, the Islamic Revolution (in common with the 1905-09 Constitutional 
Revolution) had "the support of the entire political society" (Katouzian, 2003:31). 
Milani characterises the 1977-79 period as "the golden age of Iran's mass politics" 
(Milani, 1997:83). However, he goes on to catalogue how Khomeini created a political 
'mini-state' within the broad coalition of anti-Shah forces, which then went on to 
destroy its revolutionary comrades one by one.43 With political participation outside the 
establishment outlawed, it took "the form of involvement in factional politics" (Milani, 
1997:85).44 
Factionalism within the Islamic Republican Party resulted in part from the dominant 
role in government of Khomeini himself - as faqih. As Milani ( 1997) observes, 
Khomeini kept the party's various factions competing with each other in order to 
maintain his own position at the top of the republic's power structure. Khomeini 
eventually tired of the infighting, which had resulted in a damaging legislative gridlock, 
and disbanded the Islamic Republican Party. 
However, the end of the party did not bring an end to factionalism, which continued to 
hamper the implementation of the radical legislative agenda of the left-leaning faction 
that considered itself closest to Khomeini. To this extent, factionalism under Khomeini 
reflected the fact that, despite being the Islamic Republic's figurehead and most gifted 
political operator, he was unable to maintain total control over the regime (Owen, 
2000:181). In particular, he remained constrained by powerful conservative elements 
43 
44 
Unlike Milani, Owen argues that the elimination of opposition forces and alternative centres of 
power was undertaken by the Islamic Republican Party leadership rather than by Khomeini 
directly, as "the role of the Ayatollah Khomeini in [the process of the Islamic Republican Party's 
post -revolution 'takeover'] ... was not at all clear cut" (Owen, 2000: 180). 
Milani argues that factionalism was a new development under the Islamic Republic. However, the 
Shah's attempts at creating civil society institutions in the second half of the 1970s, discussed in 
the previous section, constitute the first flowerings of factionalism. Milani is undoubtedly right, 
though, to contend that: " .. .it is because of factionalism that some primitive kind of pluralism 
among the governing elites is developing in Islamic Iran .... The supporters of the Islamic 
Republic enjoy more freedom to debate important issues than the shah's supporters had under the 
monarchy" (Milani, 1997:86). 
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within the clerical establishment who were opposed to the more radical 'Islamic 
Socialist' proposals that initially attracted so many Iranians to the Islamic Republic's 
banner (Milani, 1997:87).45 
There was also a deeper issue that contributed to the factionalism, which has been 
analysed under the ideological makeup of the political system, which was Shi'ism. One 
can assert that it has not only provided a variety of tendencies within Iranian society 
with respect to different issues (the role of the state, propriety, etc.) but also determined 
or envisioned the type and possibilities of political action, depending on the vision 
supported by Khomeini. It nurtured, in other words, a variety of potential policies on 
private property, for example, but also accounted for the failure of the system to 
function by nurturing factionalism and political deadlocks. Shi'ism has traditionally 
been a "polycephalic faith" (Milani, 1997:86). Shi'ism, unlike some other religions, and 
to a degree unlike Sunniism, has neither a church nor accepted power hierarchy. The 
Islamic constitution of Iran originally stipulated that the faqih must be a marjaetaqlid, as 
well as be accepted by the majority of the people. This was an attempt to create a 
hierarchy of religious as well as political powers - i.e. something which had never 
existed before. But even under Khomeini, other grand ayatollahs (Seyyed Kazem 
Shariatmadari and Mohammad Reza Golypayegani) had large mass followings. While 
there is not the space nor need to cover the revision of the constitution in 1989, it also 
played a role. The revision meant that the faqih was no longer required to be a 
marjaetaqlid, nor accepted by the majority of the people. 
45 The conservatives also tended to be less inclined towards Khomeini's thesis of 'velayat-efaqih', 
or Jurist's guardianship, his conception of Islamic government that placed the clergy at the centre 
of power and allowed them to interpret Islamic law indirectly rather than impose sharia directly 
(Wells, 1999). As Roy argues, "Khomeini always imposed revolutionary logic, represented in the 
guide's will, if need be over the shari" (Roy, 1994: 176). Conservatives, by contrast, tended to 
favour direct implementation of sharia rather than the essentially secular legal framework, 
combined with velayat-e faqih, created by the framers of the 1979 constitution. This conception of 
Islamic governance was actually the mainstream view amongst the upper echelons of the clergy, 
even in the early 1980s (Ibid.:l73). The succession of Khamenei, a relatively junior cleric and 
hardly the senior jurist demanded by the logic of Khomeini's philosophy, to the faqih-ship 
significantly undermined the system's authority. 
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Hence, in 1989, the Assembly of Experts were able to select Seeyed Ali Khamenei as 
the new faqih, even though hojatolislam was ranked below ayatollah. At the same time, 
Khamenei had declared that he was not seeking religious leadership in Iran. Milani 
notes that: 
... this fact is testimony to the Islamic Republic's failure to 
render Shi'ism monolithic, as there are many people who 
follow not Khamenei but other ayatollahs in Iran and Iraq. 
Therefore, factions and Shiism are inseparable, like two sides 
of the same coin (Milani, 1997:86). 
Grounded in the "diversity of [the Islamic Revolutionaries'] socio-economic 
interpretations and subsequently programmes" (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990:37), 
chronic factionalisation characterised the first decade of the Islamic Republic. During 
the immediate post-revolution period, three distinct factions of 'republican contenders' 
emerged and competed intensely for power. Of these groups, the Fundamentalist 
Islamic Republicans and Liberal Islamic Republicans quickly neutralised the Secular 
Republicans. By 1981, the Fundamentalist Islamic Republicans had also successfully 
eclipsed the Liberal Islamic Republicans (Ehteshami, 1995:8). 
The Fundamentalist Islamic Republican group itself consisted of several competing 
factions, ranging from the 'Maktabis' (radicals who combined elements of Marxism 
with traditional Shi'ism) to conservatives centred on the Hojatieh society (more 
traditionalist clerics allied to business interests). Between these competing extremes 
were more pragmatic, career-oriented politicians, many of whom rose to prominence 
following Khomeini's death in 1989 (Personal Communication).46 
46 Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director of 
Foreign Exchange Research Department of Central Bank of Iran, Tehran, December 2005. 
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The explosion of factionalism within the ruling coalition made policy implantation 
(particularly with regard to economic policy) virtually impossible.47 As discussed 
above, the critical stalemate was over the issue of private property, where radical groups 
within the Majlis saw their attempts to introduce anti-capitalist policies consistently 
blocked by the conservatives in the Council of Guardians. The policy log-jam period 
was characterised by: 
... the arena of public property that the strict interpretation of 
Islam, in defence of the propertied class and in support of the 
conservative political forces, gains the upper hand over any 
reading of Islam in support of the populist political forces. This 
confrontation is seen in the experience of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, where from the summer of 1980, when the Majles was 
established, to the end of the third Majles in the summer of 
1992, all the main reform laws passed by the populist 
parliament, such as land redistribution, nationalisation of 
foreign trade, and the labour law, were rejected by the Council 
of Guardians as being incompatible with Islamic precepts 
(Rahnema and Behdad, 1995:12-13). 
The 1987 labour law was "the point of greatest intensity in the economic dispute 
between the two factions" within the clerical establishment (Rahnema and Nonani, 
1990:267). The Council of Guardians rejected half of the proposed law's 200 articles as 
un-Islamic. The Council continued to obstruct the law's implementation even following 
interventions by Khomeini in its support. The divisions over land reform were intense, 
and "such was the strength of conservative feeling that a bill proposing only a moderate 
47 However, some analysts put it more strongly. Rahnema and Nomani note that: "Infighting has 
been endemic to the Islamic Republic in the process of its formation and establishment and it has 
its roots in the different politico-economic interests of the clergy and the realities of a crisis-ridden 
Iranian society. Ad hoc decision-making and reaction to short-run economic events, political 
conflicts, rhetoric and phrasemongering, confusion and uncertainty and the existence of semi-
anarchic decision-making centres prevented the implementation of a stable and consistent 
programme of economic reform between 1979 and 1989. Measures that have been implemented 
have not been sufficient or efficient enough to check the disastrous economic downturn which has 
characterised this period. In 1984, a clerical member of the second Islamic parliament summarised 
the fate of the economic institutions and policies of the Islamic Republic: 'Islam has a definite 
economic system [but] since it has not been fully compiled, everyone pulls it in a different 
direction according to taste.' This situation has resulted in a severe and protracted economic crisis 
and a lower standard of living for the Iranian people" (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990:269). 
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act of rural redistribution ... was held up as un-Islamic by the Council of Guardians from 
1980 onwards" (Owen, 2000:95). The cause of this institutional gridlock was the sharp 
division between two competing interpretations of Islam in the area of property rights, 
and the existence of competing power-bases controlled by these different ideological 
factions embodied in the Islamic Republic's 1979 constitution. 
Thus, the implementation of a stable, consistent programme of economic reform under 
Khomeini was prevented by political conflicts "and the existence of semi-anarchic 
decision-making centres" (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990:269). 
3.3 Features of the Iranian State: What Changed in the State-Society 
Disjunction 
As noted in the previous chapter, 'arbitrary rule' characterised Iran's inability to forge a 
stable political system (Katouzian, 2000; 2003). In other words, arbitrary rule signifies a 
disjunction between the state and society in that state; rather than representing the 
interests of one particular class or group, it exercises arbitrary power over all groups in 
that society, outside the confines of an established set of laws (Katouzian, 2003). The 
use of violence and discretionary measures are necessary mechanisms for arbitrary rule. 
Clientelism is a direct consequence of such a state, as it allows benefits to only a small 
group of followers in exchange for their support of the regime. It also conditions the 
business relations with other actors, since the state is not an equal partner but one who 
has the power to impose and change the rules of the game while still playing. 
An interesting element of the post-revolution period, on the other hand, is the attempt to 
combine principles of popular sovereignty with the ones related to clerical rule. It will 
be shown that the constitution of the Islamic Republic had, at its core, a contradiction 
between popular sovereignty and the role of the clerics. The state's theocratic 
111 
foundations were laid and embodied in the concepts of velayat-e faqih and the 
institutions of the jaqih and the Council of Guardians (Rahnema and Behdad, 1995:11 ). 
Thus, although the Islamic Republic provided for limited popular sovereignty - an 
opportunity to change the extant relationship between the state and society - Iran's 
constitution prioritised the power of the clerics over that of democratic institutions, 
stating that the framers of the 1979 document "created a system that is more Islamic 
than republican" (Milani, 1997:82).48 
The existing constitutional arrangement, although no longer representing an arbitrary 
state, at least shares some notable features with one. Firstly, although power is no longer 
exercised indiscriminately, the power of the clerical establishment to override popular 
sovereignty- and the repeated exercising of this power - is indicative of a state with 
arbitrary features. Secondly, although the clerical establishment is not wholly removed 
from wider society, significant factions within it command support from various parts of 
society, and its exercising of almost arbitrary power has the potential to alienate large 
swathes of the population in the manner of previous Iranian rulers. 
Despite the persistence of the above-mentioned features within the Iranian state, one 
may also say that the revolution did make some fundamental changes in the relationship 
between society and government. The next question to ask is what were the new factors 
which affected the government's decision-making process? 
48 Milani also cites Ayatollah Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti, the writer of the velayat-e faqih 
provision of the constitution, who argued that once the Iranian people had freely embraced Islam 
in the April 1979 referendum on the creation of the Islamic Republic, then the limits of popular 
sovereignty must be dictated by the boundaries of Islam, interpreted by the clergy (Milani, 
1997:83). 
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3.3.1 Post-revolution Government 
The post-revolution government needs to be understood along two lines. Firstly, there 
was a fundamental tension between the secular nature of the post-revolution 
government institution and its religious basis. Secondly, the revolution changed the 
political landscape and brought out new constituents which influenced policy. By 
analysing the politics of Iran with these considerations, it is possible to discern the 
effect that politics had on the evolution of oil policies. In particular, how Islam, or rather 
the Iranian take on Islam, affected oil nationalisation, how the various constituencies 
within the Iranian government created the post-revolution economic system, and how 
they contributed to its change over time. 
In post-revolution Iran there was a tension between politics and religion which must be 
explored. This tension was partially attributable to the ambiguity of Khomeini' s 
political views, and may be expressed as being between a fundamentalist form of ru·le 
and a populist one. While Khomeini was not able to overcome this tension, he did 
appreciate it (Personal Communication).49 
3.3.2 The Role of the Leader: Khomeini's Political Views: Populism, Shi'ism and 
Popular Sovereignty 
The role of the leaders in decision-making processes (either with respect to foreign 
policy or the domestic one) has been long emphasised in the literature on foreign policy 
analysis (Jervis et al., 1985; Anon, 1997). This is especially so in more 'traditional 
states' where authority is centralised, the political system is not very diversified and 
49 Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director of 
Foreign Exchange Research Department of Central Bank of Iran, Tehran, December 2005. 
113 
allegiances are based on belonging to the same community of belief; strong and 
charismatic leaders are pivotal in understanding the overall interactions at the political 
and economic levels. 
Ayatollah Khomeini was such a leader. It should be noted that this man was nominally 
in a position of leadership (as faqih and as the revolution's undisputed figurehead) to 
unite the political factions, his own philosophical position was difficult to interpret, and 
his loyalty seemed to switch from one faction to another over time. This reflected into a 
rather unstable political life, since the criteria for 'legitimate' rule changed on the 
humours/whim of one man. 
Unlike the Shah, Khomeini appears to have appreciated the tension between economic 
development on the one hand and cultural and equity questions on the other (Personal 
Communication).50 However, for all his formidable political skills and initial mass 
appeal, he failed to find the means to overcome the tension between the worlds of the 
material, the political, and the cultural or spiritual. 
Khomeini certainly succeeded in giving a political voice to the cultural and political 
tensions raised by the Shah's development policies. As a noted cleric and long-standing 
opponent of the Shah's policies, Khomeini personified the cultural opposition to the 
Shah's programme of economic development. Zonis (1983:591) notes that "Khomeini 
was widely believed to embody many of the central values of Iranian culture, values 
that the Shah was seen as having desecrated". 
He was also, perhaps uniquely, able to create a unified political message that brought 
together a traditional lslamist critique of Western-style capitalism with a radical rhetoric 
50 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr. Manouchelir Lighrani, M.D., former landowner, 
Tehran, December 2004. 
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that was, if not Marxist, then certainly populist. "We should recognise Khomeinism as a 
specifically religious variant of populism" (Abrahamian, 1991:1 06). 
This mix can be seen to have produced a tension between fundamentalism and 
populism. Fundamentalism, which comes from a description of early twentieth-century 
American Protestantism, refers to a conservative orthodoxy concerning religious issues. 
Populism refers to: 
... predominately middle-classed [political] movement[s] that 
mobilise the lower classes, especially the urban poor, with 
radical rhetoric against imperialism, foreign capitalism and the 
political establishment (Ibid.). 
In particular, populism was used as a political ideology in Latin America. One can argue 
that although Iran is generally seen as a fundamentalist state, Khomeini' s political views 
better fit the description of a populist rather than fundamentalist approach (Ibid.). 
The ambiguities of Khomeini's discourse can be explained both through emphasis of the 
role of instrumental rhetoric and through a more fundamental issue, which is religion, 
and more specifically Shi'ism. 
Unlike Sunniism, Shi'ism does not present a consistent theory of the state (Ibid.). The 
Sunnis have traditionally associated religious duty with obedience to the state. Shi'ism, 
on the other hand, has been divided. Some believe that the existing states should be seen 
as usurpers (of the Hidden Imam) and therefore authorities should be shunned, while 
others believe in a range somewhere between grudging acceptance that a state is better 
than no state to a complete acceptance of legitimacy of the state similar to the Sunni 
view. 
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Opinion appears divided as to Khomeini's views (Personal Communication).51 His 
sympathies may have lain more with the radical, Maktabi, tendency of the revolution. 
There was correspondence between Khomeini and Khamenei in 1988 over the role of 
the state. Khamenei, widely viewed as a conservative champion among the clergy, had 
argued for a limitation in the state's role on Islamic grounds. Khomeini overruled him, 
countering that the Islamic Republic's government was "a supreme vice-regency 
bestowed by God" which could interpret Islam and take precedence over "all peripheral 
divine orders" (Halliday, 2003:69). 
Khomeini's earlier writings reflected these oscillations and vagueness. But, by the 
1960s, his views turned towards an anti-monarchist perspective. He began to argue that 
only the ulama and fuqaha (religious jurists specialising in Shari'a law had the 
legitimate right to rule. This shift naturally led to the possibility of populist opinions by 
making revolution an acceptable option. 
In parallel, his views on society began to change. Initially he believed in the more 
traditional notions of society, which agreed with private property and a God-given 
hierarchy within society that should be respected, though not flaunted. After the 1970s 
he took a more egalitarian view, distinguishing the oppressors (rich) from the oppressed 
(poor) (Abrahamian, 1991). His new social views were then applied to the Shah, who he 
accused of widening this divide. These accusations relied on populist rhetoric and can 
be seen as the switch between a more traditional, conservative approach and one which 
more or less explicitly relied on populism. 
During the 1978-79 build-up to the revolution, the political slogans of Khomeini and his 
allies increasingly resembled a rhetoric more closely associated with leftist politics: 
attacking the increase in inequality under the Shah, calling for an end to oppression and 
51 Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director of 
Foreign Exchange Research Department of Central Bank of Iran, Tehran, December 2005. 
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class differences, and broadening the message of the revolution to embrace not only 
Muslims, but the "oppressed nations of the world" generally (Abrahamian, 1991: 112-
115). 
However, as Abrahamian notes, once in office Khomeini was unable, or unwilling, to 
implement the kind of radical economic reform that initially attracted so many leftists 
(Islamic and secular) to his cause. This could have been predicted as, even at its height, 
Khomeini's populist rhetoric was "extremely vague on specifics and silent on the 
question of private property" (Ibid.113). Or when Khomeini's pronouncements on 
private property were uttered, they were far from coherent. The same Khomeini who 
stated that "Islam will eliminate class differences" and "we are for Islam, not for 
capitalism" (Ibid.:114) also argued that "as long as there is Islam there will be free 
enterprise" (Ehteshami, 1995:8). At the same time, in the views of at least one analyst, 
Khomeini' s overall goal was "to invert Islamic authority so as to free the actions of the 
state from any Islamic restrictions, particularly with regard to property" (Halliday, 
2003:70). Abrahamian goes on to note that: 
Also: 
Despite the radical rhetoric, the [Islamic Republic's] 
Constitution undertook to safeguard private property .... What 
is more, it intentionally avoided the socialistic phrase nezam-e 
towhidi (unitary order), a term which the Mojahedin and other 
Islamic radicals - as opposed to populists - wanted enshrined 
into the republic's Constitution (Abrahamian, 1991: 117). 
Khomeinism - like Latin American populism - is mainly a 
middle-class movement that mobilises the masses with radical-
sounding rhetoric against the external powers and entrenched 
classes. But in attacking the establishment, it is careful to 
respect private property and avoid concrete proposals that 
would undermine the petty bourgeoisie (Abrahamian, 
1991:118). 
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These contradictory views on the role of the state and private property may be explained 
through Khomeini's mix of Latin American populist, traditional Islamic and socialist 
ideas. However, Khomeini drew on these different discourses instrumentally. One can 
safely say that Khomeini's principle aim can be interpreted as gaining and maintaining 
political power for the clergy. Therefore, the leftist rhetoric in the run up to the 
revolution was intended to gamer support from the Left. "Religious fundamentalism 
would never have won such support" (Abrahamian, 1991: 118). 
Similarly, Khomeini's oscillations in power can be seen as an attempt (largely 
successful) to manage his broad clerical coalition. For instance, creation of the Islamic 
Republican Party by Khomeini' s clerical allies provided a forum for dissenting opinions 
within the clerical establishment, and the development of competing wings also allowed 
Khomeini to practise divide and rule. This necessitated alternating support for the 
different wings to prevent any single branch of the party becoming dominant (Milani, 
1997:86-87).52 
In government, conservative elements in Iran's clerical establishment, centred around 
the secretive Hojatieh society, used their control of the Council of Guardians to block 
attempts by the Khomeini-inspired Islamic radicals in the Majlis to institute populist 
economic measures. 53 
52 
53 
A bill proposing only a moderate act of rural redistribution 
involving uncultivated land was held up as un-Islamic by the 
Council of Guardians from 1980 onwards (Owen, 2000:95). 
Khomeini eventually tired of the party's squabbling and dissolved it in 1987. 
Ehteshami details the structure and ideological orientation of the various factions making up Iran's 
clerical establishment in the post-revolution period (Ehteshami, 1995). The Hojatieh, initially 
formed in the 1950s as an anti-Bahai organisation, was fiercely anti-communist, socially 
traditional and supportive of free enterprise. 
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Despite widespread participation of secular leftist and 'liberal Islamic Republican' 
groups in the early days of the revolution and in Bani-Sadr's provisional government, 
these groups were ruthlessly suppressed by the dominant conservative groups once the 
latter had consolidated their control over the Islamic Republic's institutions in the early 
1980s (Ehteshami, 1995:10-12). The Tudeh, composed of Moscow-leaning 
communists, was the last secular leftist party to be banned, in 1983. 
The structure of the political system (with the existence of parallel institutions like the 
revolutionary courts) and the tendency towards factionalism (a continuous feature of the 
Iranian establishment) required a strong leader to centralise the decision. This 
conveniently overlapped with Khomeini's tendencies to impose himself as the ruler of 
the Iranian state. His instrumental oscillation between different factions did, however, 
feed back into the system, and favoured instability and political log-jam. 54 
Given the separation of powers and existence of so many 
parallel institutions like the revolutionary courts, cohesion was 
only possible when implemented by Khomeini himself as the 
Faqih and leader of the revolution. . .. [Unfortunately], in 
practice, the ayatollah was slow to come down on one side or 
another in the various factional disputes that ensued (Owen, 
2000:95). 
The log-jam was marked in practice by events such as the ones described above and 
opposition on behalf of the Council of Guardians against laws passed by the Majlis on 
grounds of being un-Islamic. Ayatollah Khomeini continued to oscillate in his support 
of these tendencies until his death in 1989 (Behdad, 2000:104 ). Furthermore, the 
endemic factionalism of the Islamic Republic's leadership and the ambiguity of 
Khomeini' s own position meant that the 'First Republic' leadership (1979-89) failed to 
address the tension between the material, the political and the spiritual. 
54 See section 5.3 for a discussion of the Islamic Republic's political institutions. Also, information 
from Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director 
of Foreign Exchange Research Department of Central Bank of Iran, Tehran, December 2005. 
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The new regime's popular legitimacy, the necessities of war and the charisma of 
Khomeini constituted important factors in the persistence of the regime. Unlike the 
Shah's rule, these factors did not cost the regime its political life. However, it set the 
scene for further failure by its successors in the 'Second Republic'. 
The intention of this section has not only been to identify the ambitious aspirations of 
the Islamic Republic, but also to illuminate the paradoxes in the political and economic 
policies, which have stemmed from the limiting factors placed upon its claimed policies 
by the well-guarded religious beliefs. In the next section, the focus of this study will 
move on to the contradictions between political, cultural and ideological beliefs on the 
one hand and Iran's global outlook, on the other. 
3.4 External Relations 
The complex mix of domestic and foreign policy is evident during Khomeini' s rule 
(Gourevitch, 1978). Iran's position and reputation in the world would be determined by 
two main events: the 1979-81 hostage crisis and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war. These 
events would cause massive economic and social dislocation within Iran, in addition to 
wider international hostility (e.g. soured relations with the US for a generation) and 
economic difficulties resulting from declining oil prices and significant capital flight. 
This chaotic economic and political context made the adoption of a coherent policy 
agenda difficult, even for a skilled political operator like Khomeini (Rahnema and 
Nomani, 1990:269). 
The fact that Iran was now a 'revolutionary' country domestically spread the belief 
amongst Western countries that its 'revolutionary' impetus was aligned to its foreign 
policy. The revolutionary rhetoric of Khomeini shaped relations with the West and it 
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reverberates into the present. In other words, the perceptions about Iran as an 
international actor are to be traced to this particular period. They continue to play an 
important role in shaping the possible options open to Iran internationally, and also 
domestically, in terms of policies. 55 
The hostage crisis (Tehran, November 1979) reflected the different domestic trends with 
respect to foreign relations issues, and how some factions could act irrespective of the 
other views existing in the same political party. It put into practice Khomeini's repeated 
calls for attacks on US and Israeli interests. In Katouzian's words: 
... had been either intended or was quickly recognised as a 
potent weapon for promoting the interests of both the 
ideological (maktabi) Islamists and the Marxist-Leninist left ... 
at the expense of more pluralistic trends within the revolution 
(Katouzian, 1989:57). 
The rift grew with the Iran-Iraq war. 56 Both the war and hostage crisis were linked to 
the political competition within the clerical establishment over the appropriate foreign 
policy stance. For many Maktabis, the export of the revolution and confrontation with 
the West were essential parts of the revolutionary programme. "Within the ruling elite, 
the issue of the war was inextricably linked with the question of the ~xport of the 
revolution" (Ehtesharni, 1995:23). The Iraqi invasion, although unwelcome, provided an 
opportunity to export the revolution to Iraq, whose majority Shia population, according 
to Tehran's thinking, might have been open to Iran's revolutionary agenda. This helped 
to explain Iran's unwillingness to enter into peace negotiations, despite the war's 
mounting economic and human cost. Khomeini was reluctant to accept the UN Security 
55 
56 
For example, see the policies on nuclear energy, section 5.4.1. 
The Iran-Iraq war was precipitated by the Iraqi attack on Iran in September 1980. Iraq was widely 
perceived to have obtained at least tacit approval for its invasion from the West, and from the US 
more specifically. 
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Council Resolution (SCR 598) heralding the end of the war, and eventually only did so 
following mounting pressure from Rafsanjani and other pragmatists. 57 
Similar thinking motivated the arming of Shia guerrillas in Lebanon and Afghanistan, 
the steady criticism of the Saudis' pro-Western policies, and Khomeini's final 
contribution to Iran's foreign policy - the 1989 fatwa calling for the murder of the 
British author Salman Rushdie. 
With respect to the Rushdie affair, the fatwa provided "a means of meeting 
[Khomeini's] two main policy goals - mobilisation at home, confrontation 
internationally" (Halliday, 2003:71). Khomeini's rhetoric in the early days of the 
revolution had been explicitly internationalist.58 This populist and nationalist message, 
casting Khomeini as a "Third World revolutionary" (Roy, 1994: 179), essentially died 
with Khomeini in 1989. 
The trade and economic sanctions, as well as the freezing of Iranian assets imposed by 
the US authorities in response to the hostage taking, combined with the additional 
economic dislocation caused by the Iraqi invasion towards the end of 1980, eventually 
led to the diffusing of the crisis and release of the US hostages. The entire situation 
contributed to the modelling of a negative picture with respect to Iran internationally 
and its diplomatic isolation (Krasner, 1978; 1979). 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the foreign policy area is one where the victory 
of 'realists' or 'pragmatists' (personified by Rafsanjani) since Khomeini's death is 
clearest (Ethteshami, 1995:29). It was embodied in the first five-year development plan, 
57 
58 
Khomeini stated that "the acceptance of the resolution ... was a bitter and tragic issue for everyone 
and particularly for me ... death and martyrdom would have been more bearable to me" 
(Ehteshami, 1995:28). 
"The problems of the East come from the West - especially from American imperialism ... the 
oppressed nations of the world should unite against their imperialist oppressors" (Abrahamian, 
1991:114). 
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covering 1990-5, which centred on attracting investment through liberal economic 
reform. The plan's "emphasis was on economic co-operation with the West and others, 
which in tum depended on correct, if not warm, diplomatic ties" (Ibid.:42). 
3.5 Economic Evolution 
The stress of having lived through a destabilising and debilitating period during the 
eight year war with Iraq was wearing on the psyche of the population at large. The 
rationing of daily requirements was causing unrest amongst the people. Economic 
policy-making during the 1979-89 period has been widely criticised. The stagflation 
(high inflation and low or negative growth) of the period were direct results of the 
authorities' policies, including the 
... nationalisation of the entrepreneurial and the banking 
system, continued uncertainties over property rights and the 
role of the private sector in the economy, centralised and 
inward-looking government policies aimed at maintaining a 
highly over-valued official exchange rate through import 
compression, foreign exchange restrictions and generally 
interventionist economic policies with far reaching implications 
for resource allocation, particularly in the financial and 
industrial sectors (Pesaran, 2000:66). 
Pesaran argues that the result of these policies "had been an economy in a state of acute 
disequilibrium with highly distorted price signals" (2000:66). 
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The economy certainly performed badly over the period.59 Estimates are that real per 
capita output declined by 4% per year between 1978 and 1988 (Pesaran, 2000:64). 
Average inflation over the same period was around 18%, resulting in a similar growth in 
the exchange rate premium (the gap between the currency's official value and its value 
on the free market). Underpinning the economic deterioration was a collapse in 
investment. 60 
There were continuities in the economic policies with the Shah's regime, especially 
with respect to import substitution industrialisation. Thus, while in other developing 
countries, their planned economies adopted export promotion strategies over import 
substitution, "in Iran, by contrast, the old regime's import substitution industrialisation 
policies were retained and intensified into the post-revolutionary period" (Hakimian and 
Karshenas, 2000:37). One element of novelty refers to: 
59 
60 
Pesaran, an analyst, points to why this was probably so: "These adverse economic conditions (an 
acute form of 'stagflation') were due largely to the revolutionary upheavals and their aftermath . 
. . . But they were further exacerbated by the regime's foreign policy adventurism with its adverse 
consequences for Iran's access to international capital markets, extensive nationalisation of the 
entrepreneurial and the banking system, continued uncertainties over property rights and the role 
of the private sector in the economy, centralised and inward-looking government policies aimed at 
maintaining a highly over-valued official exchange rate through import compression, foreign 
exchange restrictions and generally interventionist economic policies with far reaching 
implications for resource allocation, particularly in the financial and industrial sectors. The result 
had been an economy in a state of acute disequilibrium with highly distorted prices signals. It was 
clear that the economic policies of the previous decade could not be continued, and a new 
approach to the management of the economy was needed" (Pesaran, 2000:66). Another analyst 
points to yet more reasons: ''The clerical regime used the war to explain all or most of the 
country's economic problems. In reality, many stemmed from the distorting and destructive 
policies adopted after the revolution. The complex system of multiple exchange rates, price 
controls and rationing, import licenses, and various direct and indirect subsidies distorted resource 
allocation and adversely affected production and productivity .... Moreover, these economic 
policies greatly increased opportunities and inducements for bribery and corruption. Rationed 
goods sold at controlled prices were often 'diverted' by merchants and corrupt officials to the free 
market, where they were readily available at far higher prices. Similarly, when combined with a 
foreign exchange allocation at an artificially cheap exchange rate, an import license amounted to 
'a license to print money'. These kinds of activities were far more lucrative than investment in 
industry or other productive sectors" (Kanovsky (1997b). 
Private investment by 1988 was less than a quarter of the level in 1977 (Kanovsky, 1997a).The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p.53), and much of the investment that did occur was 
driven by cronyism and distorted price signals, and was probably therefore of doubtful economic 
value. 
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... the greater involvement of the public sector in industrial 
production, and the dominance of semi-public organisations in 
the form of various charitable foundations with strong political 
ties to the regime (such as the Foundation of the Oppressed and 
Disabled) .... this ensured the continued subsidization of the old 
manufacturing sector and the allocation of foreign exchange to 
old enterprises at highly undervalued official rates at a time of 
severe foreign exchange shortages(Hakimian and Karshenas, 
2000:37). 
The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, the decline in oil prices over much 
of the 1980s and the massive capital flight and brain drain 
following the revolution also played a significant role. The 
exodus of physical and human capital has been felt particularly 
strongly. Brain drain was also a major problem as around two 
million Iranians, mostly highly skilled, left the country during 
the revolution and its aftermath. This loss is still instantly 
apparent in present-day Iran (Kanovsky, 1997a:6). 
However, policy errors contributed as much to Iran's poor economic performance over 
the period. Not only were they bad for the state of the economy, but they encouraged 
already existing tendencies and activities of corruption and speculation. Kanovsky 
summarises the state of affairs as follows: 
The clerical regime used the [Iran-Iraq] war to explain all or 
most of the country's economic problems. In reality, many 
stemmed from the distorting and destructive policies adopted 
after the revolution. The complex system of multiple exchange 
rates, price controls and rationing, import licenses, and various 
direct and indirect subsidies distorted resource allocation and 
adversely affected production and productivity .... Moreover, 
these economic policies greatly increased opportunities and 
inducements for bribery and corruption. Rationed goods sold at 
controlled prices were often 'diverted' by merchants and 
corrupt officials to the free market, where they were readily 
available at far higher prices. Similarly, when combined with a 
foreign exchange allocation at an artificially cheap exchange 
rate, an import license amounted to 'a license to print money.' 
These kinds of activities were far more lucrative than 
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investment in industry or other productive sectors (Kanovsky, 
1997a: 13).61 
The evolution of a consistent development policy was hamstrung by the ideologically-
driven political log-jam. Nomani and Rahnema posit that: 
... the Islamic government was unable to draft or implement a 
medium- or long-term economic plan in the period 1979-89. 
This was mainly due to factional disputes over the 01ientation 
of the 'Islamic economy' among the rulers of the Islamic 
Republic (1994:182). 
A five-year development plan was put before parliament in 1982, but implacable 
conservative opposition within the clerical establishment saw the plan quietly dropped 
in 1983. In its place, economic policy was driven by short-term and local contingencies 
and, paradoxically, by institutional inertia which saw many of the Shah's much-
criticised development policies maintained, as with the import substitution mentioned 
above. With large-scale state ownership stymied by conservative opposition: 
61 
62 
... the expanded government role ... was thus not solely or even 
primarily through a shift in balance from private to public 
ownership. It was manifested in direct interventions in the 
operation of markets - foreign exchange controls, maintenance 
of a system of multiple exchange rates, control on interest rates 
and bank credits - as well as direct price controls in a large 
number of product markets (Hakimian and Karshenas, 
2000:34-35).62 
Kanovshy's book was published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, whose board 
members included leading 'neo-conservatives' such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz noted 
for their hostility towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, notwithstanding this potential 
source of bias, Kanovsky's criticisms of Iran's economic policies over the period are in keeping 
with those of others. 
Hakimian and Karshenas (2000) provide evidence of the price distortions introduced by these 
policies: the black market exchange rate premium reached more than 2000% by the end of the 
1980s, whilst the prices of energy, bread and other key products had fallen to well below I 0% of 
comparable prices on the international market. 
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3.5.1 Economics and Islam 
As previously mentioned, the issue of private property became an area of particular 
contention for Iran's clerical leadership. Opinion differed significantly, reflecting the 
broad coalition of revolutionary forces assembled by Khomeini prior to 1979 and the 
competing Shia subsystems which provided for widely differing interpretations of 
Islamic law on the issue. There is no conclusive guidance for Islam and economic 
systems and "since it has not been fully compiled, everyone pulls in a different direction 
according to taste" (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990:269). 
This doctrinal vagueness has been widely identified as a core weakness in attempts to 
orchestrate Islamic government generally. 
While Islam promises social justice to the poor and destitute, it 
also makes it clear that the quest for worldly possessions, the 
accumulation of property and profit, is not only accepted but 
highly respected .... The Islamic revivalist movements promise 
the establishment of a social order that will unite conflicting 
aims: the welfare of the poor and the security of property 
(Rahnema and Behdad, 1995:12). 
In fact there is a much deeper contradiction between popular sovereignty and Islamic 
government in general. For example: 
... many Islamic precepts, such as those dealing with the 
position of women in family and public life, the limitation of 
the rights of non-Muslirns, and certain aspects of social life -
for example, Islamic forms of punishments (hodud-shar'ia) -
are explicitly addressed in the Qu'ran or by Mohammad's 
Tradition, and are therefore irrefutable. On these and similar 
matters, there is little room for variation in interpretation 
(Rahnema and Behdad, 1995:11). 
Thus, the Islamic system might prove difficult to change on issues such as the one 
concerning this study (i.e. privatisation), despite the fact that it might be in the interest 
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of the population to pursue such an economic policy or that parts of society support the 
policy. Interpretations having the Qu'ran as a basis might produce several conflicting 
views. Laws that are regarded as necessary by the parliament (despite its populist 
outlook) - such as land redistribution, nationalisation of foreign trade, the labour law -
can be rejected on grounds of incompatibility with the Islamic precepts by the Council 
of Guardians (Rahnema and Behdad, 1995:12-13). 
The failure to achieve a political compromise on the issue reflected the fact that it was 
literally impossible. As detailed above, the factionalisation, irreconcilable aims of the 
conservative and radical wings of the clerical establishment, and vagueness of 
Khomeini's guidance led to a situation in which all promised objectives could not be 
simultaneously fulfilled. This inability to develop a coherent economic programme may 
be described as "the greatest failing of Islamist movements in general" (Halliday, 
2003:67). 
3.5.2 Nationalisation 
An issue intrinsically related to the discussion on property and to the issue of concern 
for this thesis is the balance of national versus private ownership in the economy. While 
the concept of private ownership was not seriously questioned, much of the Iranian 
economy was nationalised after the revolution (Personal Communication).63 This issue 
is, to some extent, an extension of the confusion over the nature of an Islamic economy, 
as illustrated above. Islamic principles recognise private property, but there are certain 
limits on it. In particular, there is a need for some redistribution of wealth. The political 
incantation of this debate was represented by the Hojatieh faction, which leaned 
towards lower taxes and a more free-market approach and the Maktabis, who leaned 
63 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr. Manouchelir Lighrani, M.D., former landowner, 
Tehran, December 2004. 
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towards a centralised planning economic approach. This debate should be seen within 
the context of the previously discussed phenomenon of political factionalisation. 
However, one should be cognisant of the fact that there are many groups within these 
two groups which we have cited here, that are adherents of the mercantile types but do 
not concur with many of the Hojatiyeh doctrinaire. Similarly, not all Maktabis are 
followers of a centralised planning approach to the economy. 
Before looking at nationalisation in general, it should also be noted that there was more 
at stake than just a shift from private to public ownership. The revolution was: 
... manifested in direct interventions in the operation of markets 
- foreign exchange controls, maintenance of a system of 
multiple exchange rates, control on interest rates and bank 
credits - as well as direct price controls in a large number of 
product markets. Over time, substantial and entrenched price 
distortions developed in the economy, with serious 
consequences at all levels of economic activity from 
investment to production, trade, distribution, and consumption 
(Hakirnian and Karshenas, 2000:34). 
The constitution of 1979 divided the economy into three sectors: state, co-operative and 
private. To be included in the state sector were 'strategic' industries, such as mining and 
railways, as well as foreign trade. In particular, as it had been under the Shah, the state 
had full control over oil revenues. The private sector would be secondary to the state 
economy and included industry that complemented the state economy, as well as 
agriculture related business. 
Formally, the areas of nationalisation included those properties owned by the court, of 
owners who had fled the country, and those of firms which owed more than half of their 
assets to banks (Ibid.). The nationalised industries included those controlled by the court 
elite, including Iran's 51 major industrialists. This led to the state's control of over 80-
85% of the country's industry (Ehteshami, 1995). The court's holding company was 
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transferred to a new foundation, the Foundation of the Deprived. Later, more Islamic 
foundations formed to act as additional holding companies. The banking, insurance and 
mining sectors were also fully nationalised. 
Where expropriation of private assets did occur, it generally happened on an ad-hoc 
basis, in response to local imperatives and conditions. Many of the industrial concerns 
nationalised by the Islamic Republic were heavily in debt to state banks, so that "their 
nationalisation was largely a method of cancelling their debts to the state" (Katouzian, 
1989:56). Others were expropriated in spontaneous takeovers by workers' groups (from 
the autumn of 1978 onwards), typically after the business owners had fled Iran (Behdad, 
2000:101-102). The institutions of Khomeini's 'mini-state' were often involved. The 
Revolutionary Courts confiscated assets of 'anti-revolutionaries'; the assets would be 
transferred to the newly-created Islamic foundations, of which the Foundation for the 
Oppressed (Mostazefan Foundation), the Martyr's Foundation and the Fifteenth 
Khordad Foundation became the most significant. This early phase of expropriation was 
endorsed and sometimes promoted by Khomeini' s regime "as a means of mass 
mobilization" (Ibid.: 102). However, once power had been consolidated this was limited 
and the ad-hoc nationalisation programme was largely halted. 
It is possible to discern three broad trends which defined the level of nationalisation 
within the post-revolution economy of Iran. Firstly, the debate over a populist 
redistribution of the economy led to considerable nationalisation. Secondly, the 
mounting failures within Iran's economy resulted in further nationalisation to bail out 
other industries. Finally, nationalisation was, to a certain extent, actually transferring 
previously nationalised property from one government to another. The court's property 
simply became the new government's and that of its Islamic foundation appendages. 
To a certain degree, the populist leanings of the government necessitated some 
redistribution of wealth, i.e. nationalisation. In order to mobilise the people, Khomeini 
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needed to make economic promises and it was necessary to carry out at least some of 
these promises when the revolution finally succeeded. This had been the case in Latin 
American Populist revolutions and was so in Iran. 
Ehteshami makes the case that rather than being an attempt at revolutionising the 
economy, the nationalisation of industry was an attempt to "bring back productivity as 
well as order and management to a large and abandoned section of the economy" 
(Ehteshami, 1995:86). Thus, the reasoning is partially attributable to the personal 
intervention of Khomeini in order to prevent economic collapse (Ibid.). In other words, 
in reality, the state was most concerned with bailing out the failing industrial sector by 
acting as a direct subsidiser, as illustrated by the formal nationalisation of those firms 
with high debts. 
Finally, it is possible to see the nationalisation of the economy in terms of serving a 
similar goal as it did under the Shah (Personal Communication).64 As demonstrated in 
Chapter 2, the Shah used his control over the economy, and especially of oil revenues, 
to increase his power and control over society. In a similar manner, the post-revolution 
government also used its dominance over the economy to further its control over 
society. 
As under the Shah, the post-revolution government was able to maintain its dominant 
position over society partially through its control of the economy. In particular, it is 
important to note that by controlling large industries - points at which it is possible to 
accumulate power - the government was able to limit possible contenders. Especially 
for the early years of the government, this meant being able to limit possible counter-
revolutionary activity. 
64 Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director of 
Foreign Exchange Research Departmentof Central Bank of Iran, Tehran, December 2005. 
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Nationalisation and clientelism relationships guiding behaviour extended into the 
financial sector. Like many developing economies, the financial sector was subject to 
'repression' - government controls and policies, which suppressed market forces and 
directed credit to favoured groups. The provisional government had nationalised some 
banks in 1979 (Behdad, 2000:101-1 02), while the authorities introduced Islamic 
banking through the Law of Usury-Free Banking, approved by parliament in August 
1988 (Nomani and Rahnema, 1994: 178). The financial sector's performance 
deteriorated over the period, a result of uncertainty over the government's regulations, 
from 'rates of profit' (interest rates in an Islamic guise) well below market clearing rates 
(and well below inflation), and from poor management and regulation. 
Monetary policy was subject to "fiscal dominance" as the large government deficit was 
"financed by borrowing from the Central Bank and the banking system" (Ibid.: 181-
182). The inevitable result was accelerating inflation and a plummeting currency. The 
authorities' attempts to offset these effects via direct price controls and multiple 
exchange rates only served to further economic instability. 
3.5.3 Bonyads 
The emergence of the large Islamic foundations (Bonyads) was one of the elements of 
novelty which came from the regime's economic policy, but they reflected long-
established patterns of assigning favours on the basis of political loyalty. These semi-
public bodies under clerical control have come to dominate the Iranian economy, and 
many also have significant asset holdings outside Iran.65 
The Bonyads were the chief recipients of the distorted prices created by the regime, 
gaining access to scarce foreign exchange at subsidised prices. The foundations, 
65 Behdad (2000:113) claims that the Mostazefan Foundation is "the largest economic entity in the 
Middle East". 
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essentially networks of conglomerates, were controlled by an emerging 
"entrepreneurial" class "who were close associates of the regime and benefited from the 
many privileges of this association" (Behdad, 2000: 113).66 Kanovsky is highly critical 
of the Bonyads' role in the Iranian economy, arguing that although their stated purpose 
is: 
... to use profits from [their] enterprises to provide inexpensive 
housing, healthcare, and other social services to the poor, [in 
reality much of the profits is] ... siphoned off by those in 
control and relatively little reaches the needy. [Furthermore], 
... though the Bonyads' 1992-93 budget was equivalent to 
nearly half of the government's budget that year, the latter 
exercises very little control over these foundations, which 
answer only to the supreme leader [faqih] (Kanovsky, 
1997a:7). 
In personal interviews with the Chairman and Managing Director of the Audit 
Organization,67 it was discovered that the Bonyad owns: 
66 
67 
• 140 industrial enterprises, manufacturing products such as food and beverages, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
electrical appliances, construction materials, textiles and clothing, leather goods, 
plastics, metals and paper; 
64 mines; 
2,786 properties, covering agricultural, commercial or construction sites; 
230 commercial and trading companies; 
90 theatres and three of Tehran's leading newspapers . 
The Bonyads' economic structure (sprawling conglomerates), their client relationship with the 
ruling class and their dominance of the domestic economy make them close relatives of the 
Korean chaebol. Their potential for generating macroeconomic crises - similar to the chaebol's 
role in the 1997-8 crisis in Korea- should not be underestimated. 
Interview: Mr. Houshang Naderian, Chairman & Managing Director, Audit Organization, Tehran, 
December 2005. 
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It also owns a hospital, retail outlets, airline and shipping companies, an insurance 
company and a credit institution. In addition, it is involved in the construction of 
commercial buildings, roads and railways. It employs some 150,000 people and 
produces 28% of Iran's textiles and clothing, 22% of its concrete, 45% of its beverages, 
28% of its rubber products and 25% of its sugar. Its annual budget is reported to be 
around 10 billion U.S. dollars. 
The concentration and monopolisation of financial power in the hands of the Bonyad 
provides it with a disproportionate economic weight in relation to any single private 
firm wishing to obtain a share of any of its markets. Its decisions concerning production 
and imports have major consequences for the availability of raw materials, market 
prices of products and the profit margins of competitors. 
Therefore, the breaking up, regularisation and eventual privatisation of the Bonyad is a 
necessary precondition for the emergence of a competitive and efficient business 
environment in Iran. 
3.5.4 Evolution of Oil Policy 
The oil sector continued to dominate the Iranian economy during the 1979-89 period, 
although oil revenues were severely reduced by the collapse of the oil price in the rnid-
1980s, as oil revenues had fallen from $21 billion in 1983 to $6 billion by 1986. The US 
trade embargo and the Iran-Iraq war (particularly the 'tanker war') further impacted the 
already damaged economy (Kanovsky, 1997a:IO). 
With respect to oil sector policy, the authorities brought all oil and gas industry' 
activities under the auspices of NIOC, cancelling the agreements with the international 
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consortium and reducing the production target (Rahnema and Nomani, 1990:240). The 
reduction in production reflected the pre-revolution rhetoric against the Shah's oil sector 
policies, which Khomeini accused of favouring Western imperatives (ample, cheap oil) 
(Ibid.:236). As in other areas of the economy, clerical opposition to technocrats 
(perceived as pro-Western) and a significant brain drain resulted in the deterioration of 
management expertise in the sector. As early as the late 1980s, the regime was forced to 
reverse its initial decision to cut oil production, as the spiralling costs of the Iran-Iraq 
war and the economic crisis caused by the dramatic fall in oil prices took their toll 
(Richards and Waterbury, 1996:57-59). Since 1989, this renewed emphasis on oil and 
gas exports (another return to the Shah's development strategy) has become more 
pronounced. 
Interestingly, while the government's control over oil revenue allowed it to gam 
dominance within Iranian society, it also forced the government to develop and 
maintain a relationship with the international capitalist system. This was necessary in 
order to secure the sale of oil and gas (Personal Communication).68 In particular, it was 
necessary to work with the West, to some degree, even while faced with an embargo. 
While there was an attempt to move towards self-sufficiency within the economy, oil 
sales could never truly be replaced. Thus, whether or not the post-revolution 
government desired to separate itself from the international system, it could not possibly 
do so while also maintaining its place within Iran. 
One of the important effects of this deterioration of the Iranian economy, especially 
during the 1980s, was a change in economic policy. In particular, the government 
sought more private sector involvement and formally announced this in 1986 
(Ehteshami, 1995). The 1986/1987 oil crisis also forced the government to increase its 
reliance on taxation in order to continue promised subsidies. 
68 Personal Communication. Discussions with Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli, former Iran 
Ambassador to the UK and present editor of Economic Trends, Tehran, May 2006. 
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Economic liberalisation continued after Moussavi' s re-election in 1988. The 
government lifted some restrictions on the importation of certain goods. The Tehran 
stock exchange was reopened in the autumn of 1988. Earlier that year, the government 
announced a comprehensive privatisation plan in which "non-essential and non-
strategic" industries would be privatised (lbid.:97). After much debate, by 1989, the 
government reversed its long-standing policy against foreign borrowing and approved 
the borrowing of over $2 billion over the subsequent five years (Ibid.). 
The deep-rooted and self-inflicted problems of Iran's oil policy, to a major extent, stem 
from prolonged Washington sanctions, the Islamic Republic's ideological bent and 
populist policies, and the country's increased isolation from the Western diplomatic 
community in recent years. These elements have compounded the problems of supply, 
due to the nature of the buy-back contracts which have driven many potential investors 
away. Furthermore, with the rising demand for products in the country, population 
growth, as well as the addition of almost one million automobiles to the roads every 
year, not to mention the fuel subsidies, Iran's economy is in a dire state. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The Islamic Revolution ushered in a period of unprecedented political and economic 
turmoil for Iran. The first few years of the Islamic Republic were characterised by 
widespread political violence and economic chaos, heightened by the invasion of the 
country by Iraq in 1980 and by poor external relations, particularly in the wake of the 
1979-81 hostage crisis. 
The revolution, which continued in the form of the Islamic-based politics of Iran, led to 
a fundamental tension between politics and religion. This tension was partially due to 
the ambiguous views of Kbomeini, which reflected some ambiguities within Shi'ism 
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itself as well as the attempted blend between popular sovereignty and theocratic rule. 
This tension was pronounced when it came to economics and, specifically, the place of 
private property within the Islamic Republic. The initial take by the government was to 
nationalise much of Iranian industry, including strategic areas such as oil and gas. This 
statist development strategy led to chronic resource allocation problems, precipitating a 
sharp decline in investment. 
Ideological divisions led to a policy drift on the economic front. The policy vacuum was 
filled by ad-hoc expropriation and creeping cronyism as unaccountable quasi-public 
conglomerates - the Bonyads or foundations - came to control increasing portions of 
the Iranian economy. These foundations - with close, but opaque, links to the ruling 
clerical establishment - were the chief beneficiaries of economic rents generated by 
price distortions, state monopolies and financial repression. Eventually, however, the 
internal divisions within the government and the realities of a declining economy forced 
some economic liberalisation. 
The present perception of Iran internationally is based upon Khomeini' s rule. The 
hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war, as well as events such as the invocation of a fatwa 
against the British writer Salman Rushdie, created the image of an aggressive or 
potentially aggressive and fundamentalist regime. This also marred the interactions with 
respect to the economy. However, there are a couple of points that one needs to take 
into account. First, the flexibility of the Iranian system. In other words, factionalism and 
the existence of several views on different policies can work in a positive way. It leaves 
opportunities for an array of policies, depending of course on the political timing. 
Secondly, while Iran during this period was often labelled as a closed society, in fact it 
was not completely closed off. As has been noted by a distinguished analyst: 
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Iran is not a static and closed society, as it is often portrayed in 
the mass media. Iran is a dynamic country, and there are both 
positive and disturbing trends developing within it (Milani, 
1997:89). 
In reality, governing elites had more room for political discourse than in most Middle 
Eastern countries. There were factional controllers of the Majlis and this was critical. 
With the exception of the Israeli Knesset and the Turkish 
parliament, Iran's Majles is arguably the most independent 
parliament in the Middle East and North Africa (Ibid.). 
For instance, the Majlis has in the past rejected its choice of ministers; for instance, it 
rejected the US-trained economist Mohsen Nurbakhsh for Minister of Finance and 
Economy. 
In total, while this chapter has leaned in the direction of analysing the Iranian state as 
closed, it is necessary to keep a balanced opinion. Chapter 4 will look at these factors in 
more detail. 
The death of Khomeini in 1989 represented the end of the Islamic Republic's first 
revolutionary stage. Whereas, during the immediate post-Khomeini period (1989-97), 
leadership passed to more pragmatic and reformist figures such as Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei (who took on Khomeini's role as spiritual leader or faqih) and Ali Hashemi 
Rafsanjani (who was elected as Iran's first executive President) (Ehteshami, 1995:25), 
theorists have identified the Rafsanjani era as the beginning of the 'Therrnidor' (a 
reaction against the early idealism of a revolution) in the Islamic Republic, when 
Khomeini' s radicalism was replaced by a greater willingness to compromise, 
particularly in the field of economic policy. Thus, more 'pragmatic' or 'realist' 
politicians - headed by Rafsanjani and Khomeini' s successor as faqih, Ali Khamenei -
subsequently embarked on a programme of economic reform and foreign policy detente. 
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This subsequent period, labelled by some commentators the Second Islamic Republic, is 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OIL POLICY: 
1989 TO PRESENT 
4.1 Introduction 
By looking at the historical background, and social and economic relations within 
Iranian society, as well as the dynamics of internal and external politics, it has been 
shown so far that there are several factors (determinants) that must be taken into account 
when thinking about the specific issue of oil and gas privatisation in Iran. Whilst the 
toppling of the Shah brought some new elements within the analysis (such as an 
increased role for Islam), some other features of the political, social and economic areas 
are still persistent. Briefly, these are factionalism (amplified by the combination of the 
principles of popular sovereignty and Islamic rule, and by the ambiguities within 
Shi'ism), clientelism and repression of any opposition. 
Additionally, following a nationalistic discourse, the nationalisation and centralisation 
of the economy deepened, as did control over the oil and gas resources. Furthermore, 
the type of foreign policy pursued during Khomeini' s rule created a more negative 
image of Iran internationally, which can be traced through to the present. There are, 
however, some aspects that are often glossed over or not taken into account. The 
diversity of opinions with respect to private property, for example, as well as other 
issues, has been a source of instability and political deadlock, and a sign that options are 
available in the Iranian society. There is now also the possibility of uttering them in the 
public space. 
This chapter builds on the previous two historical political-economy chapters, to come 
closer to answering the project's question of whether there is the political will to 
privatise oil and gas in Iran. It will address several major sub-questions. The first sub-
question is: what are the determinants of the Iranian policy of oil and gas privatisation 
in Iran? As with the previous chapters, this question will be answered by exploring the 
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internal politics (role of leaders, political makeup, etc.) external politics, and economic 
policies and relations. 
Secondly, this chapter will answer the question as to which are the most influential 
constituents in the process of formulating privatisation policy? Again, this chapter will 
address the question by examining the major institutional constituents that determine 
privatisation policy. These include the executive and legislative branches of 
government, society as a whole, the media and religious elements. These constituents 
will be examined within the framework used in previous chapters. Before answering 
these questions, however, it will be useful to provide a brief history from 1989 to the 
present period. This will provide us with a frame of reference for the rest of the chapter. 
4.1.1 History in Brief 
The historical period that this chapter will focus on has seen significant internal political 
changes and these changes, as we will explore later in this chapter, have had a 
significant impact on the prospects of privatisation in Iran. During this period, three 
Presidents have taken power in Iran and each has had their own important impact. 
Historically, there were some fairly significant changes in the Iranian political structure 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.69 
69 During the Second Republic, the Expediency Council increased from 13 to 20 members under the 
I 989 Constitution. It was chaired by the President and members chosen by the jaqih. "In its 
current form, thus, the control of the council remains with the 'Leader-President' coalition. 
Despite the presence of Ahmad Khomeini, former Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karrubi, former PM 
Moussavi and former Prosecutor-General Mohammad Khoini'a as the Old Guard hard-liners and 
their counterweights in Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Yazdi and Mahdavi Kani in the council, it is 
clear that the 'institutional' appointments ensure a bias towards the realists' (or pragmatists') line" 
(Ehteshami, 1995:47). Constitutionally, besides the six Islamic jurisprudent members, the heads of 
the three branches of government and the Minister of the Interior, the Cabinet Minister and Head 
of the Majlis Committee concerned with the matter under discussion were always present. The 
clerical establishment continued. It was estimated at between 90,000 - 200,000 members and 
around 200 Ayatollahs. "[Clerics] continued to form the backbone of post-Khomeini Islamic 
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In August 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the long time speaker of the National 
Assembly, was elected President with an overwhelming majority of the vote and 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei took on Khomeini' s role as spiritual leader or faqih. 
Nateghnouri's 1993 win was much more modest and he lost to the moderate reformer, 
Mohammad Khatami, in 1997. Khatami was re-elected in 2001. President Mohammad 
Khatami tried to restore normality both in Iran and in its relationships with foreign 
countries. Elected with 69% of the vote in the May 1997 elections, and again, with some 
60% of the vote, in the 2001 elections, he certainly had the mandate of Iran's youthful 
population.70 However, in 2005, the conservative mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad was elected President, again swinging the pendulum of reform back 
towards the conservatives. 
4.2 Internal Politics 
The domination of foreign powers has had a profound effect on the mindset of the 
political elite of Iran. It has etched the fear of being dominated into the memory of the 
people to the point where it erupted in 1979. The clerical establishment has lived with a 
history of foreign manipulation and interference in the internal politics of modern Iran. 
Perhaps it would not be too difficult to understand the animosity and apprehension the 
Republican Iran" (Ibid.). Ehtesharni's table summarises the various agencies of formal power in 
Iran as of 1991: 
AGENcy: - ·-~~~ .-":.-". :-~"" '- , EOUNDED -~:~ EUNCTION:~,-- " -:--:'! .. ~-. -. ·- ~ "· ·.,· 
.- ~ - -
-
'_. ~ 
Faqih 1979 Spiritual leader 
Executive Presidency 1989 Executive leader 
Cabinet 1979 Control of ministries 
Assembly of Experts 1979 Nominate and choose the Faqih 
Council of Guardians 1980 Ratify Majlis legislation and supervise elections 
Majlis 1980 Approve government policy 
Expediency Council 1987 Arbitrate between Majlis and CoG 
Reconstruction Policy Making Council 1988 Formulate reconstruction policies 
Head of Judiciary 1989 Oversees courts 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 1991 Co-ordinate defence policy 
70 More than 40% of the country's 65 million citizens are under the age of fifteen. 
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decision-makers felt towards their foreign actors and counterparts. The 'Great Game' 
that Russia and Britain played for control over Central Asia in the nineteenth century 
left scars on generations of Iranian leaders and deeply instilled a determination to 
insulate Iran against foreign influence. This longstanding suspicion developed into deep 
ambivalence among the modern clerical establishment within the political hierarchy of 
Iran. To this day, the internal politics of post revolutionary Iran is directed by this 
dictum. 
4.2.1 Role of the Leaders: Has Anything Changed From Khomeini's Time? 
Khomeini was a strong and charismatic figure in control of the state apparatus. His 
personal beliefs (including his shifting positions between several views within Islam) 
impacted on the direction of policies over a decade. The following analysis aims to 
identify the role of the subsequent leaders of Iran in shaping policies. 
One important issue that one needs to take into account after the death of Khomeini, is 
the more obvious separation between the institution of the spiritual leader and that of the 
President. The latter's role has been (at least legally) strengthened with enlarged powers 
under the amended post-Khomeini constitution. For example, the post of Prime Minister 
was abolished and some executive powers were transferred to the presidency, creating 
an uncomfortable partnership between the elected President and the supreme leader. 
Since 1989, the President has appointed the government, although all ministers must be 
approved by the Majlis before taking office. The supreme leader still enjoys primary 
control over many organs of state and retains the right to appoint key officials such as 
heads of the judiciary, the broadcast media, the armed forces and various revolutionary 
bodies (Anon, 2005b). 
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Thus, the lack of an overlap between the political leader and the spiritual one is an 
important aspect of Iranian politics since 1989. Although the faqih still has considerable 
influence, having the power to intervene on any issue, including specific pieces of 
legislation, the final outcome of a policy is more about bargaining (as in the case of 
political bureaucracies in secular and democratic states) rather than outright imposition 
of the former's views. 
The religious figure who has been influential upon the Iranian political environment is 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. He was appointed as supreme leader for life in June 1989, 
succeeding Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic. He served under 
Ayatollah Khomeini holding different functions, 71 and was one of the founders of the 
Islamic Republic Party in 1979. He also served two consecutive terms as President in 
the 1980s. 72 
Khamenei's influence is seldom exercised explicitly, but many times it is exercised 
behind the scenes. He has aimed to preserve stability and to contain the power struggle 
between reformist and conservative factions, but as the schism in the political elite has 
widened he has increasingly backed the conservatives (Anon, 2005b). In other words, 
Khamenei, although not formally aligned to the grouping, is viewed as being broadly 
supportive of the conservative position on most issues. Over the years, he has come into 
conflict with the former Presidents Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, 
as well as with other reformists (Wells, 1999:30; Owen, 2000:112; BBC, 2005b). 
Rafsanjani, elected President in 1989, is a figure whose affiliations are harder to place. 
Owen locates him in the "reformers" camp; a third faction made up of "moderates" 
71 
72 
He served in the Central Council of the Party, also as Deputy of the Ministry of Defence, 
representative of the Council in the Ministry and Commander of Islamic Revolution's Guards 
Corps. For more details see Iranchamber (2005). 
In 1981, Hojatoleslam Khamenei was elected President of the Islamic Republic with 95% of the 
votes cast in his favour. 
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(social liberals with "third way"-style economic leanings), former radicals and 
pragmatic careerists (Owen, 2000: 112-3).73 Abrahamian (1991; 2001: 119) characterises 
Rafsanjani' s politics as closer to the conservative position and essentially similar to 
Khamenei's, particularly in the field of economic policy. Ehteshami argues that, at least 
initially, Western analysts tended to place Rafsanjani in the Maktabi camp, but that 
latterly Rafsanjani (and Khamenei) have been given a subset of their own - the 
"technocratic coalition" (Ehteshami, 1995: 18). 
However, Ehteshami holds that this group did not form a "homogeneous and cohesive 
force", but rather attempted to forge a pragmatic approach to policy formulation that 
"led to a sense of insecurity among the governing ranks of the republic, which in tum 
bred opportunism within the elite" (Ibid.). Rafsanjani now enjoys a position of power 
and influence at the head of the Expediency Council, from which, according to Owen, 
he has ensured "that attacks on [his successor as President] Khatami's leadership could 
be blunted and contained" (Owen, 2000: 113). This view supports the proposition that 
Rafsanjani' s political instincts are essentially reformist.74 
During his first time as President, Rafsanjani cemented a reputation as a corrupt and 
power-hungry politician (Personal Communication).75 He crushed personal freedoms 
and presided over a sharp economic downturn. He ushered in a particularly aggressive 
phase of Iranian sponsorship of terrorism, including alleged roles in the bombing of a 
Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires in 1994 that killed more than eighty people, 
and in the assassinations of several Iranian exiles, including former Prime Minister 
Shahpur Bakhtiar in 1991. 
73 
74 
75 
Rafsanjani undoubtedly qualifies as a pragmatic careerist in this context. 
Further evidence of this view is provided by Wright, who points out that Rafsanjani's daughter, 
Faezeh Hashemi, was the publisher of Zan, a woman's magazine which took up a campaigning 
position on social issues until it was banned in 1999 (Wright, 2000). 
Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director of 
Foreign Exchange Research Department of Central Bank of Iran, Tehran, December 2005. 
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Khatami, who was elected state President in 1997, comes from the relatively small 
moderate wing of the clerical establishment. He had enjoyed a ten-year ministerial 
career in the 1980s and early 1990s, but had fallen foul of the then-dominant 
conservatives in 1992. Khatarni had been a supporter of Ayatollah Montazeri, who was 
Khomeini's designated successor as faqih up until March 1989 (Wells, 1999:36). 
Montazeri fell out with his former mentor after criticising the regime for the slow pace 
of political reform and its autocratic leanings, resulting in his replacement by Khamenei, 
a then relatively junior cleric who was hastily upgraded to Ayatollah status (Ehteshami, 
1995:33). 
Khatami' s campaign focused on the need for political and social reform, calling for the 
establishment of an "Islamic democracy" (Owen, 2000: 113). Khatami drew support 
from a disparate range of groups, all outside the conservative camp and many of whom 
the Islamic Republic's power-brokers had sought to suppress or ignore in the past: 
secularists, Islamic leftists and women (Ibid.: 112). However, despite a significant 
electoral mandate in both the 1997 and 2001 elections, the President struggled to build a 
working coalition to implement his liberalising agenda. In large part, this was due to 
"the fact that the Majles [before 2000] and many of the major organs of government 
were controlled by his conservative opponents" (Owen, 2000:113).76 
Khatami also pushed for economic reform, and indeed the administration implemented 
structural reforms in a number of areas (IMP, 2003). This success in the economic 
sphere contrasts starkly with the failure of Khatami and his allies in the Majlis (before 
2004) to advance their social reform agenda. Powerful conservative opposition in the 
76 As demonstrated by the moderates' subsequent control of the Majlis (2000-2004), the critical 
levers of power in conservative hands were the Council of Guardians, the Expediency Council, the 
faqih-ship and the judiciary. Iran's (1989) constitution, which granted veto power to the Council 
of Guardians and gives the Expediency Council the key role of adjudicating between parliament 
and the Council of Guardians, effectively sidelines parliament. Hence Milani's characterisation of 
the Islamic Republic as a regime based on "limited popular sovereignty" [my italics] (Milani, 
1997:82). 
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Council of Guardians and the Expediency Council, as well as pressure from Khamenei, 
blocked Khatami' s attempts at reform. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the elected President in June 2005, was the former mayor of 
Tehran. His Presidential campaign focused on poverty, social justice and the 
distribution of wealth inside Iran, as well as being against corruption. However, his 
conservative take on reforms led, for example, during his office as mayor to curtailing 
many of the reforms put in place by the moderates who had run the city before him. 
Despite the fact that he was the first non-cleric President for 24 years, Ahmadinejad 
points to the fact that Khomeini' s legacy is still strong. His populist tone reverberates 
Khomeini's, and his support in the Majlis reflects this orientation (BBC, 2005c). 
Although not an extremist, he is rather conservative on an array of domestic issues 
(BBC, 2005d). In his own words: 
On the domestic scene, government policies will be based on 
moderation and any extremism will not only be avoided, but 
will be dealt with seriously (Ibid.). 
His role in shaping the views of the Western world (EU, UN and the US) on Iran has 
been already tested on the issue of the nuclear energy.77 The suspicion that he was one 
of the students involved in the hostage taking in 1979 contributes to a negative image 
towards the Iranian political establishment. The President seems to be in agreement with 
Khamenei more than with the former Presidents (BBC, 2005c ). However, he has 
difficulty in imposing this will on the Majlis, as in the case of getting agreement on the 
new minister of the oil industry (Anon, 2005c ). 
77 Ahmadinejad also drew widespread criticism from the West when he told a conference in Tehran 
that the state of Israel should be "wiped off the map" (BBC, 2006). 
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One can assert that the faqih still exercises important power on the decision-making 
process or on the outcome of specific laws and policies. However, the clearer separation 
after Khomeini's death between the institution of the President and that of the religious 
leader has created important opportunities for reform and expression of alternative (i.e. 
reformist) views. Presidents like Khatami did succeed in imposing a different type of 
outlook on Iran's economic (liberalisation) and social policies, despite many limitations 
(e.g. limited roles for women). Support from amongst the members of the Majlis, the 
Council of Guardians and the Expediency Council,78 is also crucial in the 
implementation of laws. 
4.2.2 The Political System: Features 
As discussed earlier, Iran's political complexity comes from a blend of modem Islamic 
theocracy with elements of the popular sovereignty of democracies. This is reflected in 
the type of institutions that coexist in Iranian society: a network of unelected institutions 
controlled by the highly powerful conservative supreme leader is countered by a 
President and parliament elected by the people. The purpose in highlighting this is to 
demonstrate the multiplicity of the decision-making bodies within the government 
which have varying degrees of political will in reforming the existing institutions within 
Iran. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the composition of the system and their relation to each other 
(Buchta, 2000; BBC, 2005b ). This repartition of power becomes more important after 
78 The Expediency Council mediates disputes between the Council of Guardians and the Majlis, and 
tends to rule on the side of the former. Rafsanjani took over as Chairman of the Expediency 
Council when his second Presidential term ended in 1997, and he has used the post to ensure that 
he continues to command influence at the heart of,the Islamic Republic. The Assembly of Experts 
is an elected all-clerical body with the primary task of selecting the supreme leader and the 
members of the Council of Guardians. The Assembly can also theoretically dismiss the supreme 
leader if he fails to meet specific criteria or becomes unable to execute his duties satisfactorily 
(Economist Intelligence Unit (2005). 
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1989 due to the disjunction between the institution of the President and that of the 
supreme leader. 
Figure 4.1: Composition of the Iranian Hierarchy 
ELECTED I NSTilUTIONS UNELHTED INSTilUTIONS 
ELEClURATE 
ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS 
KEY: ... Directly elected ... Appointed or approved •+Yets candidates 
Source: Buchta (2000). 
The wrangling between the above elected and unelected institutions speaks of the 
common trends with respect to internal politics that have emerged before 1989. The 
most salient are a persistent disjunction between state and society and endemic political 
factionalism. These two factors continue to play critically important roles in the 
determination of Iranian politics, as we shall see in the next sections. Both of these 
overriding features of the Iranian political landscape have had important effects on the 
political economy of privatisation in Iran. What we will come to see is that both factors 
are connected and the evolution of Iranian politics has been towards a distinction 
between conservative and liberal views of the world. This distinction has been played 
out not just in Iran but in many nations around the world and, in particular, in the 
Middle East. Thus, while we will begin by focusing on the continuity with the previous 
eras we have explored, the final conclusions will be based on this conservative-liberal 
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breakdown. Importantly, this breakdown does not just hold for internal politics, but has 
also determined the arguments over foreign and economic policy and, in particular, the 
potential for privatisation of the nationalised state industries. 
4.2.3 The Relationship Between State and Society 
An important element that has been more visible since 1989 is the participation of 
society in politks. Although many times limited to the casting of a vote or sporadic 
protests, this should be considered as an improvement from the previous decades. The 
spread of information technology and satellite TV has contributed to the creation of a 
more active and aware civil society. 
The fluctuation in the voting percentage is reflective of Iranian society's disinterest in 
the affairs of the state apparatus. Yet, disenchantment is not characteristic only of 
Iranian society. One could say, however that the support does reflect a perception on 
behalf of Iranian society that its contribution (through the election of a specific 
candidate) might be important in shaping the future of Iran. 
The lack of political will and the difficulties in the implementation of laws within the 
Iranian political system, as well as the continuous conflict between the conservative and 
reformist camps, can explain why the overwhelming majority that voted for Rafsanjani 
in 1989 did not come back with the same force in the 1993 elections (Personal 
Communication). 79 
79 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr. Narsi Ghorban, Managing Director, NarKangan 
(NGTLC) Gas to Liquid International Co., Tehran, December 2005. 
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The gap between the government and society deepened and reached a climax in July 
1999. During this month, there were large-scale anti-government protests in the streets 
of Tehran which lasted more than a week. The police and pro-government vigilantes 
were needed to disperse the crowds (personal observations at that time). In a country 
whose government had only recently taken power in a similar way, such protests were 
extremely ominous. 
This post-1989 period reflects a change, or at least a recognition on behalf of some parts 
of society regarding their different views from those of the Council of Guardians. In 
June 2001, Khatami's re-election signalled this fact. One should not assume, of course, 
an homogenous outlook by society. As with politics, a complex variety of opinions 
could be found amongst the common people. After Khatami's election, the more 
conservative elements in the Iranian government invoked the support of the more 
conservative elements in society (Personal Communication).80 The conflict between 
different views was dealt with by the same mechanisms as those used by the previous 
authoritarian regimes of the Shah and Khomeini. Liberal newspapers, representing the 
views of the reformers, were banned. Many of the reformist candidates were banned 
from running in parliamentary elections. The Council of Guardians enforced 
discretionary measures to counter societal preferences for different political candidates, 
as in the 2005 elections. 
The bad state of the economy, which affected the lower and working classes, allowed 
for populist discourses to become appealing. Ahmadinejad's populist views appealed to 
those who felt cheated by the trajectory of the Iranian economy and who had not gained 
from rising oil prices. These same social groupings were less concerned with the sort of 
social liberalisation which those in Tehran, and in many Western countries, found so 
80 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr. Narsi Ghorban, Managing Director, NarKangan 
(NGTLC) Gas to Liquid International Co., Tehran, December 2005. 
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important. Corruption is a salient element that affects the relationship between the state 
and government. 
Another factor that has come to play an increasingly significant role in reshaping the 
interaction between society and politics in Iran is demographics. The fact that more than 
50% of the Iranian nation is now under the age of eighteen (Personal Communication),81 
has meant that the majority of its citizens were not alive during the revolution. The 
existence of an important category of society which has not been directly affected by the 
revolutionary discourse only means that this category is more willing to pay attention to 
reformist, liberal tendencies. The participation of this part of society was politically 
significant in the 1997 and 2001 elections. 
4.2.4 F actio naZism 
Factionalism remained a trait of Iranian politics throughout the presidencies of 
Rafsanjani and Khatami, and by the signs so far it will impact on the presidency of the 
newly elected Ahmadinejad (Owen, 2000; Anon, 2005c). 
The fascinating and important thing about Iranian politics is the different combination 
between socially conservative or reformist agendas and liberal or conservative/socialist 
economic programmes. Examples of such combinations are briefly presented here. One 
is the left-leaning faction that favoured redistribution and social justice, alternatively 
referred to in the literature as "hard-liners", "Islamic socialists" or "radicals" and known 
in Iran as the "Imam's Line" or Maktabis (Ehteshami, 1995). They managed to initially 
rally the greatest electoral support and were well represented in the Majlis, at least until 
81 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr. Narsi Ghorban, Managing Director, NarKangan 
(NGTLC) Gas to Liquid International Co., Tehran, December 2005. 
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the 1992 elections.82 The conservative faction, initially centred on the Hojatieh society 
and later organised through the Society of Combatant Clergymen in Tehran 
(Ruhaniyat), has been aligned with powerful bazaar merchants and advocates a more 
economically liberal and socially conservative agenda.83 
A new coalition has been created in opposition to the conservatives, as a result of the 
defection of the political moderates and pragmatists from the conservative camp and the 
increasing pragmatism shown by the former hard-liners in terms of economic policies. It 
was this coalition, which can be broadly characterised as liberal, 84 that backed 
Khatami's Presidential campaign which focused on social reforms. 
The recent election of Ahmadinejad may change the factional politics of Iran, but this is 
doubtful. Rather, it is more likely that the distinction between 'conservative' and 
'liberal' will come to dominate decision-making. However, we may see a rewriting of 
this distinction along the lines outlined above - i.e. a separation between social and 
economic issues. The conservatives' victory in the 2004 Majlis elections, following 
their blocking of most of the moderate candidates, cemented their victory (Muir, 2004). 
However, despite the fact that parliament is dominated by conservatives, many of whom 
supported Ahmadinejad against Rafsanjani in the second round of the Presidential 
elections, in June 2005, since taking office the President does not seem to be able to win 
the necessary support for decisions concerning the oil industry. It is now only a minority 
that supports the President (Anon, 2005c ). 
The persistence of factionalism makes the political environment rather instable and 
makes difficult the decision-making process and then implementation of policies. On 
82 
83 
84 
Since the 1990s, the left's main political vehicle has been the Society of Combatant Clergy of 
Tehran (Majma-e Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran, or simply Ruhaniyat). See Wells (1999). 
The Ruhaniyat's full title is Jameh-e Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez-e Tehran (Wells, 1999). 
Khatami had been forced out of his former ministerial position by the conservatives in 1992 
(Wells, 1999). 
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the positive side, as a form of political pluralism, it allows the expression of a variety of 
views. However, as will be demonstrated in the next section, due to variable inclinations 
among the political elite and differing levels of political will for executing the reforms 
agreed and approved by the very same individual opinion formers, reaching a consensus 
and bringing harmony is a formidable task. 
Table 4.1: Iran's Current Political Leadership (2006) 
Name Title 
LEADERS: 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Supreme Leader (rahbar) 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad President 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani Chairman of Expediency Council 
KEY MINISTERS: 
Parviz Davudi First Vice-President 
Mohammed-Reza Eskandari Agriculture 
Masoud Mir-Kazemi Commerce 
Mohammed-Hossein Saffar-Harandi Culture & Islamic Guidance 
Mostafa Mohammed-Najjar Defence 
Davood Danesh-J afari Economy & Finance 
Ali-Asghar Fani Education 
Parviz Fattah Energy 
Source: Econonust Intelligence Umt (2006). 
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4.3 External Politics 
The 1990s and early twenty-first century have been times of increased international 
political and economic involvement for the Iranian state. Throughout this period, there 
have continued to exist the same foreign policy background issues that have plagued the 
Iranian state since the revolution and even before then. In particular, the Iranian state's 
and society's distrust of, and tense relationship with, the West and (especially) the US, 
has continued. 
UN sanctions have now been imposed and, though far from being decisive, they sent a 
troubling signal to the political elite in Tehran who had counted on Russian and Chinese 
support. Furthermore, less visible US efforts to curb Iran's access to the international 
banking system has made foreign direct investment or the purchase of shares in 
privatised industries more precarious. 
Beyond the background issue of the Iranian state's opposition to the West, three major 
foreign policy issues have arisen which have had a major influence on the Iranian 
privatisation policy. The first is the Gulf War between Iraq and the US and its allies in 
1991. The second is the war on terror, including the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Finally, the Iranian government's involvement in obtaining nuclear technology has had 
a major influence on not just political but also economic policies. 
This section now addresses each of these foreign policy issues and discusses them in 
relation to the past interactions of Iran with foreign actors. 
4.3.1 The Gulf War 
Iran's foreign policy has been at times contradictory, in that it has not taken advantage 
of international circumstances (e.g. the war against Iraq) to pursue an aggressive policy 
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towards long-standing enemies like Iraq (Personal Communication).85 This is 
particularly interesting, because it tells us about the Iranian political scene more broadly 
with the emphasis put on other values. Thus, during the Kuwait-Iraq war (1990-1991),86 
Iran limited its actions to condemnation of the US, but otherwise remained neutral 
despite the fact that Iran had only recently finished its war against Iraq. It refused to 
take part in the multinational invasion of Iraq. Furthermore, it allowed Iraqi aircraft to 
land within its territory and did allow refugees across its borders. 
This was exceptional among the region. Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and other nations in 
the region had all taken part in the invasion. Unlike the more recent US-led war against 
Iraq, it was unlikely that there would have been any detrimental effects from a societal 
perspective in joining the West. 
The Iranian attitude and choice of action with this particular event pointed to the fact 
that sovereignty and solidarity with Islamic countries in general is something that they 
wanted to show they cared about. The anti-American discourse was also an important 
determinant and, albeit as said, on this particular occasion, rallying with the invaders 
would not have alienated many groups of Iranian society. 
85 
86 
Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr. Mehdi M. Behkish, Secretary General, 
International Chamber of Commerce-Iran, and Associate Professor in Economics, December 
2005. 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990. Saddam Hussein had at least a threefold plan for the 
invasion: to obtain Kuwait's large oil reserves, cancel Iraq's existing debt with Kuwait, and gain a 
stronger regional position in the balance of power. Immediately after the invasion, the United 
Nations condemned it and ordered Iraq's withdrawal. In order to protect Saudi Arabia from the 
possibility of further aggression, the US and other nations sent forces to Saudi Arabia as a 
deterrent force. The United Nations Security Co~ncil authorised the use of force against Iraq in 
November 1990. By January 1991, the international forces had grown to around 700,000 troops. 
On 16 January 1991, the counter-invasion of Kuwait, known as Operation Desert Storm, began 
with US air strikes. Hostilities were over by 28 February 1991, when the US called a ceasefire. By 
this point, the Iraqi military had completely collapsed. 
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4.3.1.1 Hezbollah 
Iranian foreign policy against Israel, for example, took both overt discursive aggression 
and covert support for groups that were engaged in the fight or opposition to Israeli 
actions abroad or inside the Israeli state. Support of Hezbollah, the Party of God, was 
such an example. 
Hezbollah formed around a group of Shi-ite clerics in order to fight against Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Before this, the restively weak Shi'as in Lebanon had 
coalesced around the Amal movement, a largely secular and relatively moderate group. 
Hezbollah drew the majority of its support from the more radical members of the Amal 
group. It was based in the Bekaa Valley, southern Lebanon (site of the invasion) and 
southern Beirut. Beyond its desire to drive out the Israelis, Hezbollah also wanted to 
create an Islamic state. 
Hezbollah was and is a cross between a terrorist organisation, militia, guerrilla 
insurgency and proto-government. It fought in Lebanon's fifteen year civil war, which 
lasted from 1975 to 1990, as other militias did. At times it even fought against the Amal 
group. In parallel, it fought the Israelis until their state's withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah 
is also a service provider in Lebanon, bringing many of the traditional government 
welfare programmes to the Lebanese people, including, for instance, medical care. More 
recently, Hezbollah has emerged as a viable political party in Lebanon. At the same 
time, Hezbollah became adept at using terrorist tactics, including suicide bombers of 
various sorts. For this reason, Hezbollah was officially classified as a terrorist 
organisation after the 9111 attacks (CNN, 2003). 
From its foundation, Hezbollah has had close support from Iran. Hezbollah' s Shi' a basis 
and animosity towards Israel made it a natural ally of the new post-revolution Iranian 
state. Iran has provided Hezbollah with various forms of support, including both 
logistical support (such as the supply of weapons) as well as ideological support (in the 
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form of borrowed ideology). Support has traditionally come through the Revolutionary 
Guard. Hezbollah has been used as a front for Iran's policy towards Israel, which 
includes promoting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Globalsecurity, 2005). Though 
Hezbollah has at times been directed by Iran, there are cases in which the group has 
acted without Iran's consent (Ibid.). 
This type of support enhanced the West's negative perception of Iran. 
4.3.2 The War on Terror and the Axis of Evil 
Public sector reform and privatisation are public policy issues that are always embedded 
in other issues pertaining to structural adjustments, degrees of state economic 
intervention and the regulation of markets (Suleiman and Waterbury, 1990). Naturally, 
it would become an artificial exercise to separate out political issues, public resource 
allocation, the provision of collective goods and the distribution of wealth in society, 
from the larger policy context. Public sector reform and privatisation never take place in 
isolation from broader efforts at macro-economic and political adjustment. 
Whether justified or not, but certainly building on the negative perceptions already 
existing about Iran internationally and the belief that Iran was a state-sponsor of 
terrorism, the US's President, George W. Bush, included Iran within a new Axis of Evil 
(aside Iraq and North Korea) in his 2002 State of the Union speech. It has served as a 
verbal reminder of the tense relationship that exists between the US and Iran. Whereas 
during the mid-1990s, it seemed that there could be a detente and even a revitalisation 
of US-Iranian relations. The Axis of Evil speech demonstrated that, at least from the 
US' perspective, this would be impossible in the near future. 
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The consequence of this, along with the sanctions imposed by the US, has been to drive 
the potential investors interested in taking a stake in the development of the Iranian oil 
and gas industry away from badly needed foreign direct investments. 
4.3.3 The War in Iraq 
The war in Iraq should be regarded within a broader context, that of the previous foreign 
policies of both Iran and the US in the region; the former being of non-interference and 
the latter of balancing. 
Iran continued its politics of non-interference in neighbouring Iraq as it did in the Gulf 
War. However, the situation became more complex, as the war in Iraq evolved into a 
classic insurgency-counterinsurgency war (Personal Communication).87 
Iraq is dominated by three separate groups; the Shi'a majority in the southern areas of 
the country, the Sunni minority in the middle areas and the Kurds dominating the north 
of the country. There is significant mixing of the groups throughout and, in particular, in 
and around Baghdad. The secular, socialist Baath party ruled Iraq from 1963 until their 
leader's ousting in 2003. The party, and its leader, Saddam Hussein, was largely Sunni 
dominated. 
This Sunni-dominated government served as a convenient counterbalance to the Shi' a-
dominated Iranian government after the revolution in 1979. As has been extensively 
documented since the two invasions of Iraq in the last fifteen years, the US backed Iraq 
militarily and otherwise in its war with Iran. 
87 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr Jafar Ghamat, Lecturer, Tehran Azad University, 
December 2004. 
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This backing, however, ended with the Cold War and Saddam Hussein's invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990. The effect on US foreign policy was to create a policy of 'dual 
containment' in which the US stopped balancing one or the other power off each other, 
but instead attempted to keep both powers occupied. The major instruments of this 
policy were economic and political sanctions. The Iranian sanctions had been in 
existence since the revolution and storming of the US embassy; while the Iraqi 
sanctions were instituted after the was in Iraq in order to dampen Hussein's ability to 
produce weapons of mass destruction and to punish his government for its refusal to 
allow weapons inspectors full access. 
This balance between Iran and Iraq and, by extension, between Sunni and Shi'a 
Muslims in the Gulf region, has become an important factor in Iranian-Western 
relations since the war in Iraq and institution of a new government. While the 
permanent constitution of Iraq is not yet in place, the state has already become based 
upon a democratically elected representative government. This means that sheer 
numbers of persons will determine the leadership of the country. Since Iraq has a 
majority of Shi'a Muslims, the era of a balance between a Sunni-dominated Iraq and 
Shi' a-dominated Iran is over. 
The rising concern of some US-based analysts is that Iran may exert undue influence on 
Shi'a-dominated Iraq (Personal Communication).88 Such a situation would, assumedly, 
threaten the regional balance of power and potentially have more global ramifications. 
While such a situation is not visibly occurring in Iran-Iraq politics, it cannot be 
completely discounted. However, this chapter will nevertheless not focus on the reality 
of Iran-Iraq internal political influence but on the effects that the impression of such 
influence has had on both Iranian foreign policy and the US's and other states' foreign 
policies towards Iran. 
88 Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr Mustafa Zahrani, Former Director of the Institute 
for Political and International Studies, December 2004. 
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The balance of power between Iran and Iraq clearly has, and will continue to have, an 
effect on Iranian foreign policy. Perceived or real threats from an Iraq which has a large 
US presence forces both policy-makers and society as a whole to fear the possibility of 
attack. These fears are reinforced by situations such as the reported US reconnaissance 
missions. Combined with this offensive threat is the fear that Iraq could become a 
'failed state' if a civil war were to occur. For Iran, which already borders one failed 
state (Afghanistan) this leaves another, and in some ways, more dangerous threat. In 
either case, Iranian foreign policy is, and will continue to be, directly affected by 
changes in Iraq. 
The effects of paranoia over Iranian involvement by the US have been to create a more 
aggressive approach towards Iran. This has been most obvious in the US's reported 
special forces and other reconnaissance missions in Iran over the past year (Personal 
Communication). 89 However, this issue cannot be divorced from the more prominent 
factor of Iran's involvement with nuclear technology. 
4.3.4 Nuclear Technology 
This section highlights the distractions which delay the privatisation programme in 
general and reforms in the oil and gas sector in particular. It argues that Iran's depleting 
oil reservoirs, the government's long neglect of proper well maintenance in the oil 
producing fields, growing domestic demand for fuel products, inadequacy of domestic 
investment, and lack of access to foreign credit and technology have resulted in a 
petroleum crisis under which oil exports (the lifeblood of the Iranian economy) are 
likely to vanish in less than a decade (Amuzegar, 2007). 
89 Personal Communication. Discussions with Dr Mustafa Zahrani, Former Director of the Institute 
for Political and International Studies, December 2004. 
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While the Iranian nuclear programme has been going on for years, it has recently taken 
on increasing importance in world politics, especially within the new global context of 
preoccupation on behalf of the US with the so called 'rogue states'. The accusations 
over Iran's uranium enriching programme, that might lead to the construction of a 
nuclear weapon, are directly linked to the international reputation of Iran, especially 
since 1979, as an unreliable and potentially aggressive state. There have also been 
charges of Iran's intent to produce long-range missiles. The situation has led to 
extensive negotiations between Iran and Britain, France and Germany.90 
Iran's nuclear ambitions may have a considerable effect on the future economic 
situation. In particular, the negotiation process may lead to benefits for Iran if it plays its 
cards right. Specifically, the US has hung the carrot of membership of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) over Iran's head as a potential exchange for not going nuclear 
(Personal Communication).91 On the other hand, economic sanctions and even an 
embargo could be used to ratchet up the pressure on Iran. In either case, the effects on 
the Iranian economy could be disastrous. 
4.4 Economics 
Iran needs to revive its economy and address the acute problems of unemployment. 
High oil prices have provided the political elite with revenues far above and beyond 
their expectations. This in tum has given them the luxury of providing some breathing 
space before the patience of those young unemployed or underemployed becomes 
90 
91 
It is not clear what the solution to the problem is. As one analyst puts it: "Western options range 
from the poor to the abysmal. Military approaches are relatively easy to dismiss. Iran is simply too 
big to invade, and the United States is militarily overstretched and diplomatically unpopular even 
with its traditional allies because of the war in Iraq. A narrow strike on Iranian nuclear facilities 
similar to what Israel did in Iraq in 1981, when it destroyed the Osirak nuclear reactor and set 
back Iraq's bomb, would probably fail, as Iran has dispersed its facilities" (Byman, 2005). 
Personal Communication. Discussions with Seyed Hossein Mousavian, former Speaker for the 
Supreme National Security Council, Tehran, November 2004. 
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exhausted. In the recent city council elections of mid-December 2006, where the turnout 
was a hefty 60% of the voters, the population at large showed their displeasure by 
voting against the President's (Ahmadinejad) list of candidates. The President, who has 
only been in office for nineteen months, has failed in his campaign promise to put the 
revenue generated from oil on the table of every Iranian family. 
Iran is dependant on its oil and gas exports. According to a recent report released by the 
lEA in its World Energy Outlook through to 2030 (Clist, 2006). Iran will need to attract 
foreign investment and technology. The lEA estimates that Iran will need approximately 
US$200 billion to enable its oil industry to keep the current production rate through to 
2030. With further and tightening sanctions looming over its head, it seems quite hard to 
imagine any foreign investors being willing to provide the necessary finance and/or 
technology for Iran to make any progress. In short, it is incumbent upon the current 
administration to take a less confrontational approach to its foreign policy, enabling it to 
attract investments and avoid sanctions which could cripple its economy. 
With the rising demand for, and slowly rising supply of, major energy products, the 
Islamic Republic and its populist rhetorical reasoning for its oil industry ills are 
reaching a critical level. On the demand side, by paying the highest energy subsidies 
among the 22 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, the government has 
artificially raised consumer demand for various energy products far beyond 
international norms.92 With gasoline and other fuels sold at a fraction of their world 
averages, total yearly energy subsidies in Iran, according to a major newspaper report 
based on the oil ministry's figures, range between $30 billion and $42 billion a year 
(Amuzegar, 2007),or 16-23% of GDP, depending on f.o.b. prices in Iran's southern 
ports, or the prevailing consumer prices in Europe. As a result, Iran's appetite for the 
highly subsidised fuel products has arguably become the world's highest (with annual 
consumption of electric power, natural gas and gasoline growing by 7%, 9% and 12% 
92 Personal Communication. Discussion with Mr M.A. Ala, March 2007, London. 
164 
respectively), while its population is growing by about 1.55% a year, and real per capita 
income by less than 4%. With most fuel prices at about one tenth of those in 
neighbouring countries, an estimated $1 billion US dollars worth of energy products are 
annually smuggled out of the country (Ibid.). 
4.4.1 Economics and Islam 
The Iranian economy has, since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, been in a state of 
continuous crisis that has been engendered largely by the conflicting political and legal 
interpretations of the ideological objectives of an Islamic economy, and the nature and 
functions of the state in an Islamic society (Shahriari-Rad, 2002). Economic 
manifestations of this crisis have been reflected in the insecurity of private capital and 
property rights, with detrimental effects on the process of production in general, causing 
hyperinflation, shortages of basic commodities and stagnation of the economy. This 
situation has been further aggravated by the accumulation of foreign debt, a substantial 
increase in 'rent-seeking' activities at the expense of productive enterprise, a shrinking 
of capital stock, an inadequately trained workforce and a lack of reform in economic 
institutions (Khavand, 1999). 
The direction of the Iranian economy is still influenced by religious debates. More 
specifically, the privatisation policy is the result of negotiation between economic 
development, social justice and cultural identity. In all four periods, Iran's rulers have 
largely failed to overcome the conflicting demands of economic growth, social justice 
and a conservative, Islamic cultural environment. The Shah embraced economic growth 
at the expense of other objectives, alienating almost the entire population in the process 
(Personal Comrnunication).93 The various leaders of the Islamic Revolution have, at 
different times, promoted economic growth and social justice in the context of an 
93 Personal Communication. Discussion with Mr Hossein Nasiri, former Adviser to President 
Khatami, Tehran, July 2004. 
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Islamic government, but have been stymied by conflicts within governing coalitions 
over the appropriate balance between the two aims and their conformity with Islamic 
doctrine. 
Certainly, Iran is not alone in confronting these kinds of tensions. Other societies, not 
least those of the West, face similar challenges, and at different times have attempted a 
variety of political strategies to overcome them. Generally, where societies have been 
perceived to succeed in this regard, it is by promoting one or possibly two objectives at 
the expense of the other(s). 
This must lead one to pose the question: are economic growth, social justice and the 
maintenance of the cultural status quo an 'impossible triple'? Rahnema and Behdad 
(1995) argue that the attempt to implement Islam as a political philosophy is bound to 
disappoint because it promises to achieve all three objectives, despite the fact that 
laissez-faire economics (presumably conducive to growth) and social justice are in fact 
inimical: 
While Islam promises social justice to the poor and destitute, it 
also makes it clear that the quest fQr worldly possessions, the 
accumulation of property and profit, is not only accepted but 
highly respected .... The Islamic revivalist movements promise 
the establishment of a social order that will unite conflicting 
aims: the welfare of the poor and the security of property 
(Rahnema and Behdad, 1995:12). 
The authors go on to argue that, under the conservative-pragmatist coalition associated 
with Rafsanjani and Khamenei, social justice was downplayed in an attempt to attain 
cultural and economic imperatives. Khomeini' s Abu Dharrian rhetoric, to liberate the 
mostazafin (oppressed) from the mostakberin ('fat cats'), has been dropped.94 
94 Abu Dharr was a companion of Mohammed associated with defending the cause of the 
mostazafin. He was exiled by the third Caliph for his excessive radicalism. His version of Islam is 
associated with radical interpretations of the religion, arguing for social justice, land reform and 
the like- see Rahnema and Behdad (1995:12). 
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Abrahamian concurs, arguing that Rafsanjani and Khamenei, since Khomeini's death, 
have continued denouncing imperialism, Zionism and 'exploitative capitalism' while, at 
the same time, protecting petty-bourgeois property and further toning down their radical 
rhetoric. They no longer talk of land reform, income redistribution or nationalisation of 
foreign trade (Abrahamian, 1991: 119). 
The Khatami era, which has seen a more liberal approach to social policy resulting from 
a rapprochement between the radicals (leftists) and the moderates, now seems 
something of an aberration. As Wells argues: 
It is clearly the revisionist right that has the upper hand; so long 
as they control the courts and the faqihship, hard-liners and 
moderate reformers will be on the defensive .... Thermidor may 
be slowly and painfully corning to a close with Islamic Iran 
exiting its era of leftist supremacy only to embark on a new 
phase of revisionist right-wing domination (Wells, 1999:39). 
This view was confirmed by the victory of the conservative candidates in the 2004 
elections to the Majlis. 
If the Islamic Republic has largely failed to master the contradiction between 
development, equity and cultural imperatives, it has, to an extent, allowed Iran to move 
away from the wholly 'arbitrary state' identified by Katouzian (2000; 2003) as the norm 
for Iranian political institutions. Whether this is a long-term development is open to 
question, as Khatami's project of 'Islamic democracy', based on strengthened civil 
institutions, appears to be one of the main casualties of the conservatives' recent 
revival.95 
95 Other observers tend to be more optimistic about the future of reform in Iran: ''The ebbing of 
political Islam is bringing about a detachment from religion. The fact that the revolution took 
place means that the flow can run only in the direction of secularization ... " (Roy, 1994: 181). 
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Iran witnessed a further intensification of the Republic's chronic factionalism. Recent 
sabre-rattling over the country's nuclear facilities - in open defiance of the 'Great 
Satan' (the US) and other Western powers - suggests that the clerical establishment 
may also be engineering a return to Khomeini's policy, or raising the spectre of foreign 
intervention and domination to mobilise support internally. The anti-Western discourse, 
which previous Iranian leaders have used in the past, does not seem to help the Iranian 
economy. Khatami realised this and tried to promote an openness to foreigners. An 
example of this policy is reflected in the government's rapid acceptance of foreign aid 
after 2004's earthquake in Bam, which stood in contrast to the rejection of similar offers 
that followed Iran's last big quake, in 1990. The Council of Guardians has even been 
persuaded to ratify legislation designed to attract foreign investment (Anon, 2004b ). 
'Revisionist' or conservative domination is unlikely to derail Khatami' s economic 
reform programme, mainly because the conservative coalition is at least as committed to 
privatisation and (economic) liberalisation as was the broad leftist coalition associated 
with the President. During the 2004 election campaign, conservatives stressed the need 
to eliminate factional struggles and concentrate on economic reform to attract inwards 
investment (Muir, 2004). The incumbent President seems in favour of encouraging 
foreign and domestic investment, but still keeps a cautious or rather nationalistic tone 
when emphasising the role of Iranians living abroad rather than of totally alien or 
Western companies. In his words: 
One of the main topics of our economic policy is the expansion 
of foreign and domestic investment... We will especially use 
our dear Iranians [currently living abroad] who are ready to 
take part in developing their country ... (BBC, 2005d). 
Whether this will be attainable, given Iran's recent history of chronic political 
factionalism, the continuing friction between state power and wider society, and the 
tension caused by Iran's strained foreign relations, is more open to question. 
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4.4.2 Ecollomic Developmellt 
The Iranian economy is in rather a bad shape. Iran's population has doubled since the 
revolution, dramatically increasing consumption. With no growth in the output of the 
economy (GDP), the standard of living has halved. Half the population, including 70% 
of government employees, live below the official poverty line. Many have more than 
one job just to make ends meet. Unemployment is estimated to be 25%, and the future 
seems bleak. Every year 800,000 young people enter the job market. It is estimated that 
more than $100 billion needs to be invested to maintain current employment levels, but 
only $2.3 billion is currently allocated to job creation (Reuters, 1998a). 
After 1989, the critical division was on economic policy, between the radicals 
(Maktabis) who clung on to Khomeini's early populism, and the conservatives whose 
economic views reflected the laissez-faire approach of their bazaari constituency. The 
balance of power between the two factions ebbed and flowed, whilst prominent power 
brokers - notably President Rafsanjani and spiritual leader Khamenei - attempted to 
implement a pragmatic reformist agenda with little success. As Owen argues, the 
chronic factionalism of the period (1989-97) resulted in "a stand-off between the two 
main factions in which few new policy initiatives were possible at the national level" 
(2000:112). 
The conservatives' improved showing in the 1992 Majlis elections, which left them in 
control of most of the institutions of state and with an ally (on economic matters 
particularly) in President Rafsanjani, should have cleared the way for economic reform. 
However, the right was hamstrung by its "reluctance to compromise on a number of 
critical issues, most of which revolved around foreign and cultural policy" (Wells, 
1999:33). Having attained power, the conservatives undermined their coalition by 
weeding out socially liberal clerics and technocrats. This inability to forge a consistent 
position on economic development and cultural/political issues then undermined the 
conservatives' ability to implement their economic reform agenda. 
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President Khatami has been fully committed to restructuring the economy. His 
government approved the privatisation of 538 state-owned companies through auctions 
and stock sales, with plans to privatise another 2,000 (Reuters, 1999). The Iranian 
parliament (Majlis) approved plans to overhaul the oil industry and boost Iran's sagging 
oil production from 3.5 million bpd (barrels per day) to 6 million bpd over the next ten 
years (USEIA, 1998). This will require at least $120 billion in capital, which has to 
come from private investors and foreign sources. 
One major factor affecting the development of the Iranian economy is the effect of 
subsidies. These subsidies amount to more than $7 billion a year for foodstuffs and, in 
particular, gasoline. They have led to chronic budgetary problems for the Iranian 
government. 
In 1998, fuel subsidies alone reached $11 billion per year - double the country's 
development budget. Food subsidies on basic commodities such as bread, rice and sugar 
account for another $2.2 billion per year. Together, these subsidies use up virtually all 
of the country's $16 billion oil income for the year (Reuters, 1998b). President Khatami 
has come to accept market reform and, with no other source of capital available to the 
country, advocates attracting foreign investments. The President has skilfully combined 
cuts to subsidies, the privatisation of state firms and changes to labour laws (in short, 
'shock therapy' to the market), with calls for the liberalisation of social and political 
rules to allow freedom of expression, freedom of the press and the establishment of a 
'civil society'. Most recently, the unbearable costs of subsidies for public finances has 
forced parliament to present a draft law that aims to cut down on the amount of 
subsidised petrol that motorists can consume. One should mention that what is 
beneficial for the economy may not necessarily bring with it support from the 
population. This last measure, if implemented, will certainly go against Ahmadinejad's 
electoral campaign promises and therefore against his popularity (Coville, 2005). 
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4.4.3 The Evolution of Economic Policy 
Briefly, the evolution of the Iranian economy since 1989 has been one of economic 
reform of varying degrees of intensity. Broadly speaking, there are two major ways that 
this has been occurring. The first has been to attempt to diversify the Iranian oil-reliant 
economy into others areas. An example is the growth in the investment of oil revenues 
into the petrochemical industry (PUC, 2000). 
Through a strategic development plan and the implementation of various petrochemical 
projects, efforts are underway to raise the production level of Iran's petrochemical 
industry. Begun in 1997, the plan is divided into five phases, lasting until 2013. By the 
end of this period, the total volume of final products is estimated to be 16.8 million 
metric tons per year. The value of investment will amount to $20.6 billion, with total 
sales topping $11.8 billion per annum (Ibid.). 
The services sector has seen the greatest long-term growth in terms of its share of GDP, 
but currency exchange restrictions, excessive bureaucracy and the uncertainty of long-
term planning have made this a volatile sector. State investment has boosted agriculture, 
however, with the liberalisation of production and the improvement of packaging and 
marketing helping to develop new export markets. Large-scale irrigation schemes, 
together with the wider production of export-based agricultural items such as dates, 
flowers and pistachios, have produced the fastest economic growth of any sector in Iran 
over much of the 1990s, although successive years of severe drought in 1999, 2000 and 
2001 have held back output growth substantially. Agriculture remains one of the largest 
employers, accounting for 22% of all jobs according to the 1991 census (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2004). 
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The other method of economic reform is the attempt to attract foreign investors into the 
Iranian economy by creating a more favourable investor climate. The methods of doing 
this include reducing restrictions and duties on imports or creating free trade zones. 
4.4.4 The Financial Sector 
The financial sector in Iran was transformed following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, 
with the nationalisation of all banks and re-vamping of the financial sector based on 
Islamic financial principles upheld by the Law on Usury-Free Banking of 1983. In 
recent years, the government has implemented reforms in the Iranian financial sector 
aimed at bringing it closer to international standards. However, the sector remains 
characterised by heavy government intervention (Iran Daily, 2004). 
The banking sector in Iran is run according to Islamic law, which prohibits interest 
payments. Only since 2001 have private banks been authorised to opera.te and foreign 
banks been given permission to operate in Iran's free trade zones. Currently, the 
banking system consists of six state-owned commercial banks, four state-owned 
specialised banks, a state-owned postal-operated bank (licensed in 2004) and four 
recently established small private banks.96 State-owned commercial and specialised 
banks dominate the banking system, holding about 98% of deposits. Iran's financial 
system also includes a number of small banking institutions and informal financial 
intermediaries. About 6,000 'Qarz-ul-Hasanah' funds, which raise zero interest funds 
and provide interest-free loans, operate on a small scale. The sector is supervised by the 
Bank Markazi, the central bank. The World Bank and the IMF have been providing 
assistance in enhancing banking supervision to the Bank Markaz. 
96 June 2004 pronouncement of Article 44 of the Constitutional Law. 
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Iran's insurance sector is still dominated by the state. However, the sector has also been 
on the path to reform and liberalisation. Following the revolution, all insurance 
companies were nationalised and the sector still remains under state control, with 
approximately 50% of policies issued for compulsory third-part liability car insurance 
(Dana, 2004). Recent reforms include the allowance of private insurance companies in 
the free trade zones. There are currently five major state-owned companies, five private 
domestic companies and the first foreign representative office was opened by a UK firm 
in Tehran in 2004. The Central Insurance Authority (Bimeh Markazi) is the regulator 
and provides re-insurance. 
The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) reopened in 1989 and has performed well in recent 
years, with over 300 listed companies, the majority of which are parastatal enterprises 
with a varying degree of direct and indirect government ownership. The TSE has also 
started a modernisation programme and has opened regional branches in other cities in 
Iran. There is no independent supervisory entity that oversees issuance and the trading 
of securities (First Initiative, 2005). 
Mr. Ahmadinejad had denounced Tehran's Stock Exchange, equating it with gambling. 
Although his position quickly changed once he took office, the market nonetheless took 
a serious blow. According to a survey by Karafarin Bank,97 Tehran's Stock Exchange 
reached its lowest point nine months into Ahmadinejad's presidency. The index 
registered a 26% decrease compared to its peak at the end of the first month of the year. 
The drop affected financial stocks by 44% and industrial stocks by 20%. 
97 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr P. Aghili, Managing Director of Karafarin Bank, 
Tehran, December 2006. 
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4.4.5 Oil 
Oil continues to play an extremely important role in the Iranian economy. Iran is still 
the second largest oil producer in OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries). It holds 10% of the world's proven oil reserves. In addition, what may 
become even more important in the future is that Iran holds the world's second largest 
natural gas reserves (the largest belonging to Russia) (Personal Communication).98 
Clearly, such large oil reserves dominate the Iranian economy. 
An additional complication is that Iran's international economic situation is highly 
dependent on the price of oil. In fact, it is possible to trace the Iranian internal economic 
situation based on the changes in the world's oil prices. For instance, the strong oil 
market in 1996 led to increased government revenue for Iran which eased financial 
pressures on the country and allowed for timely debt re-payments by Tehran. Then in 
1997, the lowering of world oil prices led to a tightening of the Iranian financial 
situation. Then, again, in 1999/2000 the rise in world oil prices afforded the Iranian 
government an increase in funds. Such booms and busts in the world oil market can be 
traced up until this present day and should continue to have some effect on the Iranian 
internal political situation. 
In particular, we may predict that rising oil prices will have a dampening effect, ceteris 
paribus, on the drive for economic reform in Iran (Personal Communication).99 The 
reasoning is that with higher oil prices the government has more money in its budget to 
pay the previously discussed subsidies in the Iranian economy. These subsidies provide 
incentive in Iranian society to continue a status quo political situation - including an 
economy based on oil and subsidies. Thus, it is a self-reinforcing cycle. 
98 
99 
Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr Mohammad R. Arasti, Assistant Professor, Sharif 
University of Technology, Tehran, December 2005. 
Personal Communication. Discussion with Engr. Mohamed Hossein Nejad Hosseinian, Deputy 
Minister of Petroleum, International Affairs, Tehran, December 2005. 
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It is when the oil price drops that we may expect, again ceteris paribus, more calls for 
reform in the economy. The logic is similar. With a lower oil price, the government is 
left with less money to bring to the internal economy in the form of subsidisation. This 
in tum can translate to unpopularity within society. Unpopularity can lead to calls for 
reform in different ways. Again, a self-reinforcing cycle is formed. Thus, we see here 
the sort of political-economic interactions that will help to determine change in the 
Iranian economy. 
Investment is badly needed in the oil industry as it produces benefit for the entire 
economy. A recent IMF report on the Iranian economy predicted that Iran needs to 
mobilise $4 billion a year in foreign loans and direct investment if it is to achieve a level 
of growth which stabilises unemployment, that is 5.4% on average (IMF, 2003:34). The 
report assumes that Iran will secure significant foreign investment in the oil industry 
and that Iran will borrow $3 billion a year. If Iran did not have access to that kind of 
foreign capital, it would suffer directly from the $4 billion a year shortfall and it would 
suffer further from the loss of the expanded oil exports that those funds would finance. 
In particular, the IMF forecasts that foreign funds will allow Iran to expand its oil 
exports from 2.3 million bpd in 2002/03 to 3.9 million in 2008/09. However, if oil 
exports stagnate at the 2002/03 level, Iran would have $11 billion a year less by 
2008/09. In other words, foreign funds and the expansion in oil exports they make 
possible are central to Iran's economic plans - and could be key to preventing social 
unrest (Clawson, 2003; IMF, 2003:34). 
The country has failed to properly maintain its oil fields since the revolution, and 
particularly after the severe damage sustained during the Iran-Iraq war. As a result, the 
recovery factor in Iran's oil fields has declineq to a range considerably below that of 
international norms. Yet while some oil deposits might have been permanently lost as a 
result of poor maintenance, oil well capacity has not been irretrievably damaged and the 
ongoing gas injection programme has significantly raised the recovery factor 
(Amuzegar, 2007). Accordingly, official data show that since the end of the Iran-Iraq 
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war in 1989, Iran has actually added more oil to its reserves than it has taken out of the 
ground. 100 In addition, due to some one million b/d condensates from the South Pars gas 
fields being added to the daily output, the Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) 
estimates show an actual rise in Iran's domestic production in recent years (Amuzegar, 
2007). 
In short, based on official101 and generally accepted reserves figures, at the current rate 
of extraction, Iran will be able to produce and export oil for the next 70 years. 
4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on the more recent post-revolution era (after the death of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989). During the immediate post-Khomeini period (1989-97), 
leadership passed to more pragmatic and reformist figures such as Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei (who took on Khomeini' s role as spiritual leader or faqih) and Ali Hashemi. 
Rafsanjani (who was elected as Iran's first executive President). Theorists have 
identified the Rafsanjani era as the beginning of the 'Thermidor' (a reaction against the 
early idealism of a revolution) in the Islamic Republic, when Khomeini's radicalism 
was replaced by a greater willingness to compromise, particularly in the field of 
economic policy. During the post-1997 period, a more politically liberal climate has 
emerged under the presidency of the moderate cleric Khatami. Most conclude that the 
President, re-elected in 2001, has largely failed to overcome the opposition of powerful 
conservative elements within the clerical establishment. 
Political factionalism and the inherent contradiction between an Islamic Republic and 
economically liberal tendencies have marked the decision-making process. One of the 
100 
101 
Personal Communication. Discussion with Engr. Mohamed Hossein Nejad Hosseinian, Deputy 
Minister of Petroleum, International Affairs, 1 anuary 2007. 
Ibid. 
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elements of novelty within the Iranian political scene after 1989 has been the separation 
of the institution of the supreme leader and that of the President of the Republic. 
Although the faqih still preserves considerable influence, having the power to intervene 
on any issue, including specific pieces of legislation, the final outcome of a policy is 
more about bargaining (as in the case of political bureaucracies in secular and 
democratic states) rather than outright imposition of the former's views. Political and 
religious leader are important, but their will does not necessarily translate into action. 
Since 1989, the population has boldly risked the wrath of the Revolutionary Guards by 
erecting camouflaged satellite dishes in order to tune into the news of the world. 
Furthermore, the use of computers and the Internet has swept across the society, which 
in tum has helped the masses to be more aware of both regional and international 
politics. 
A more obvious tendency in the period analysed in this chapter has been the polarisation 
of politics around conservative and reformist camps. However, one must say that this 
separation refers only to economic issues. An additional factor is the social one. This is 
a reflection of a need to reconcile the conflicting demands posed by economic growth, 
social justice and the Islamic cultural environment. 
The Iranian foreign policy and the discourse towards the West have consolidated the 
image of a potentially aggressive state together with accusations of supporting 
international terrorism. The Gulf War, Iran's relations with the Hezbollah, the recent 
Iraq war and controversies over the Iranian nuclear programme have impeded an 
environment of trust between Iran and Western actors. However, the post-1989 
Presidents have been more opened to market-oriented reforms and have pursued 
privatisation policies and openness to foreign investments. The dependency on oil prices 
and increased subsidies and lack of extensive investment in other sectors have remained 
the major stalemates in the country's economic development. There are, however, 
economic measures (e.g. in the financial, oil and gas industry sectors) that signal Iran's 
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willingness to adopt liberal policies. The questions regarding the degree and deepness of 
reforms, as well as about the options available, will be addressed further in the next two 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER 5: PRIV ATISATION IN IRAN 
5.1 Introduction 
So far, this study has detailed the theoretical and historical background to Iranian oil 
and gas privatisation. This chapter will address the privatisation of Iranian oil and gas 
head on. 
We are now in a position to directly address the specific determinants of Iranian 
privatisation policy. This chapter focuses on the four primary factors which directly 
affect privatisation policy. These are the specific background of privatisation thought in 
Iran; the legal and institutional framework; the nature of oil and gas relative to 
privatisation in Iran; and the personal thoughts of relevant policy-makers. 
The first factor to be addressed is the specific background of privatisation in Iran. This 
section will build on the earlier historical, political economy sections. The concepts it 
explores will be taken for granted, based on the background of the earlier historical and 
theoretical chapters. 
The second point is the legal and institutional framework. This section will be based on 
a reading of the relevant legal documents concerning privatisation post-1990 in Iran. It 
will also explore the institutional issues which have arisen since that time and which 
constrain policy decisions. 
The third point is that the oil and gas sector is unique in Iran and needs to be addressed 
separately from different types of privatisation. This section will directly address the 
contemporary determinants of Iranian oil and gas privatisation. It will be based on the 
political economic issues concerning oil and gas in Iran covered earlier. It will also 
bring into play supplementary information towards understanding this sector. Together 
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this will provide us with a specific understanding of oil and gas sector privatisation in 
Iran. 
Finally, this chapter presents primary research on the personal views of relevant 
decision-makers in Iran who are concerned with privatisation. This is based on 
extensive interviewing with relevant sources. The interview questions are explored in 
order to provide a perspective on what kind of information is relevant and what sort of 
biases can be expected. The results of the interviews are then described and examined. 
5.2 Background 
In order to consider the extent to which privatisation relates to economic development, 
the latter concept needs to be considered in the particular context of the country in 
focus. In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, religious cannons and cultural values 
are obviously a factor to be considered on a par with the specific political and social 
context. Modernisation and growth, including the insertion of the national economy into 
the dominant Western models of organisation and management which are based on 
private ownership and state laissez-faire policies, need to be considered alongside the 
firmly established social traditions and beliefs (Shahriari-Rad, 2002). 102 The Qu'ran 
itself recognises that growth and change should come naturally, as they do through the 
cycles of human life. Hence, the necessity for combining 'effective' with 'appropriate' 
economic policies and development strategies (Poku and Pentiford, 1998). 
With respect to this, no privatisation plan should dare to go against or challenge the 
legacy of the past and the embedded cultures and values in society, else it risks having 
to be implemented in an overtly hostile environment. Being a critical mechanism for 
change, privatisation needs to serve legitimate social purpose and meet pressing human 
102 The introduction to the following section is based upon the work of Shahriari-Rad (2002). 
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needs. This way, it is less likely to give rise to populist political discourses that would 
ridicule, or even cancel, its achievements. In addition, it must take into account what is 
tolerable within the given society and how far ownership transferral can go before 
generating a debilitating backlash. Privatisation policies thus need to be carefully 
crafted with a view to ensure their proper implementation, by bringing on board as 
many influential constituents as possible. 
At present, Iran seems to be committed to some level of privatisation, both in terms of 
practical activities and political discourse. Domestically, this is a subject of diverging 
interpretations stemming from conflicting readings of Islam and its economic doctrine. 
The latter range from more conservative approaches to capitalism, treating with 
suspicion the accumulation of wealth and wishing to limit its permissible level and 
usage, to more liberal stands, calling for some degree of synthesis between Islamic 
principles and theories of modernity (Zubaida, 1993). They have defined the framework 
within which related economic policies have been initiated, formulated and 
implemented and have given guidelines for the latter's interpretation and assessment, 
particularly with the lack of immediate and visible short-term effects. 
Despite divergences, a consensus has emerged that the economies which have taken on 
board the principles of Islam are neither purely capitalist, nor avowedly socialist. 
Instead, they are represented as following a 'third path' of economic management by the 
state, one where both the material and the spiritual needs of people and communities are 
taken into account in constructing a reliable frame of reference for assessing the 
viability of its policies (Amuzar, 1997). Under this ideology, private property is not 
recognised as absolute; it is subject to the limitations defined by Shari' a rules, which 
postulate its legitimate acquisition and socially responsible usage. Since the ultimate 
owner is God, the holders of property rights are accountable to him for how they 
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exercise them. The state is a necessary arbiter in this relationship. In this sense, the 
Iranian economy is a particular mixture of private and public property rights. 103 
Capitalism is rejected on the grounds that it produces great disparities of income and 
property distribution. Its emphasis on individual self-interest and the strive for profit in 
business is seen as reducing solidarity within communities and depriving societies of 
their humane character, the sense of brotherhood and the need for cooperation. The 
almost absolute respect for property rights, individual ownership and free enterprise 
result in antagonistic and competitive practices that are detrimental to the socially just 
distribution of resources and industrial and public goods. Seen from the viewpoint of 
Islamic political economy, capitalism is an inherently contradictory economic 
philosophy within which greater production and consistent growth do not necessarily 
translate into higher levels of welfare for greater numbers of people (Sadr, 1989; 
Abrahamian, 1993 ). 
Similarly, socialism is rejected on the grounds that it limits the chances of personal 
development by curtailing freedom and choice, and determining a dominant economic 
role for the state and its government. Moreover, class struggle is considered to be 
inimical to the Islamic way of life, where harmonious society is the result of all 
individuals working together for the good of the whole society. The corruption 
inevitably accompanying ubiquitous economic ownership and management by the state 
has also been criticised, as is the employment of surplus resources for financing the 
internal security apparatus and the repression of dissenting opinions. Taking on board 
some positive aspects, such as central planning, the popular welfare system and the 
reduction of unemployment, Islamic scholars have redefined their desirability and 
positive societal effect with exclusive reference to the Shari'a (Mannan, 1989). 
103 As such, it is based neither on the unlimited freedom of private ownership typical of capitalism, 
nor on the public ownership that denies private property rights (Taleghani, 1983). 
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Historically, the presence of influences from the two largely opposite positions 
(capitalism and socialism) in Islamic economic thought has resulted in conflicting 
strategies of economic management undertaken by the Iranian state since the Second 
World War. For decades, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Iran's economy 
remained disintegrated, largely owing to the control exerted by the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company over the oil industry. It thus remained an independent economic enclave with 
no 'forward' or 'backward' linkages to the rest of the economic life in the country 
(Nazrni, 1989:33-54). The private sector was small and insignificant, while the state did 
not command sufficient resources in order to build a strong base of state-owned 
industrial enterprises that would generate economic growth and secure re-investment 
funding. 
With this objective in mind, but also guided by the desire to remedy an historical 
injustice, the National Front majority in the Iranian parliament passed a nationalisation 
law in 1951 (Personal Communication). 104 Under it, all of the oil industry that was 
practically developed in the preceding decades by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
entered the portfolio of the state. The latter thus acquired full property rights, including 
control rights (through appointing management teams), exploitation rights and the right 
to the profits from the sale of oil, which were earlier channelled back to England. Oil 
export sanctions were the logical answer of the British government, which generated a 
domestic policy of import substitution. This helped the national bourgeoisie flourish and 
resulted in an increased domestic production and modest industrial development. Some 
of it was financed by the state itself, which raised revenues by selling its gold reserves 
held in Canada and South Africa. 
In the early 1950s, there was a brief involvement of the World Bank in the Iranian 
economy, with a proposal for settling the dispute between Iran and England by 
distributing the revenues from oil between the two states. The National Front leader, 
104 Personal Communication. Discussions with Mr. Houshang Naderian, Chairman & Managing 
Director, Audit Organization, Tehran, December 2005. 
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Mossadegh, who was then the Prime Minister of the country, refused the plan as it 
offered a price for Iranian oil significantly lower than the current market price. Adding 
the US's reluctance to respond positively to Mossadegh's request for additional aid in 
times of heightened inflation, resulted in the visibly bad shape of the Iranian economy 
due to the lack of badly needed rehabilitation cash. In these conditions a conflict arose 
between Mossadegh, supporting and supported by the bazaars and the national 
bourgeoisie, and the Shah, supported by the landed gentry. At this point in time the 
religious community was divided in its allegiances, being the largest landowner in Iran 
while supporting the nationalisation of the oil industry. 
When oil production and export resumed, the economy quickly picked up speed. 
Between 1953 and 1978, under the Shah's rule, the Iranian economy grew at a rate 
matched by only a few other countries. Nazmi quotes the 1960s as a relevant example, 
during which time the real GNP increased at an annual rate of 7.5%, and also the years 
between 1965 and 1973 when the real GDP increased by an annual average of 10.4% 
(Nazmi, 1989:40). This process of economic growth, although beneficial in terms of 
social development (reduced infant mortality rate, increased life expectancy, etc.), 
brought about conditions for overall underdevelopment in Iran. The main reason for this 
was the over-reliance on economic rent from natural resources, which had shaped class 
relations and determined a structure of incentives for economic agents that led them into 
passive co-existence alongside the national oil industry. 
In such conditions, privatisation took the form of the state-led development of a 
rudimentary private sector within a mixed property rights regime (Personal 
Communication). 105 Before the revolution, the emerging entrepreneurial class in Iran 
relied exclusively and unequivocally on resources supplied to it by the state apparatus. 
The state thus, instead of being an impartial regulator of a vibrant private sector, became 
its most important and influential sponsor and, by implication, its unwitting controller. 
105 Personal Communication. Discussion with Dr. Manouchelir Lighrani, M.D., former landowner, 
Tehran, December 2004. 
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This was largely enabled by the independence of foreign capital offered due to the 
possibility to receive and manage the revenues from oil sales. The state could afford to 
help the national entrepreneurial class not only by direct financial means, but also by 
passing legislation that protected it from foreign competition, by granting tax cuts and 
subsidies. 
According to N azmi (1989), the private capitalist class in Iran was thus not an 
indigenously created bourgeoisie, i.e. generated by entrepreneurial economic actors 
wishing to (re) invest the surplus from directly productive industries in the same or 
other sectors. It was created because the demand structure for the chief natural resource 
of the country (oil) was such that the state could collect a considerable amount in 
economic rent and artificially finance an investing class. Hence, the orientation of this 
class towards the state as a guardian and mentor. It was not born out of the development 
of internal relations of production and could not be an independent economic force in 
and of itself. In this way, the private sector in Iran. was doomed to be composed of 
people who, often with relatively little capital of their own, acted as agents of the state 
empowered to use public funds. 
In the 1960s, enabled by the state's command over large financial resources, and aiming 
to stir up this emerging entrepreneurial class, the Shah started to openly pursue 
modernising economic and social policies. Industrialisation was supported by the West. 
The Iranian economy thus became a workable system from a Western point of view 
which, even if experiencing certain problems, was able to adjust and survive in the face 
of the economic challenges of a globalised world (Rubin, 1981 ). It has to be 
acknowledged that the Pahlavi dynasty managed to generate huge cashflows and attract 
foreign investors into Iran. The Shah created opportunities for economic modernisation 
and development by rapidly expanding the basic infrastructure of the country. However, 
as Shahriari-Rad (2002) argues, these efforts proved unsustainable and cut across both 
the socio-cultural and economic capacities of the country to absorb change. 
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It was this discrepancy that gave strength to a rising discontent, fuelled by the religious 
clergy and supported by the bazaars. The Islamic Revolution of the late 1970s 
emphasised traditionalism in economic development, social justice and sovereignty. It 
was aimed against foreign influence in the Iranian economy and society and all national 
actors who promoted it (Khalili and Manafi, 2000). In a way, the revolutionary mood in 
the country became self-reinforcing. The rapid economic change and undue foreign 
presence generated an open opposition. Once it became an evidently potent social force, 
it caused a sense of insecurity that resulted in insiders asset stripping banks and private 
enterprises. This in tum made the revolution an even more pressing need and gave it 
additional and favourable arguments and justification. In the years following the 
revolution, the private sector was largely stifled and economic initiatives returned to the 
state sector through the five-year plan. 
At present, having lived through more than two decades of Islamic revolutionary rule, 
Iranian society and body politic seems to be decisively turning towards the 
modernisation paradigm again. An important part of this is privatisation and the 
drawing in of foreign investors with technological resources and know-how. The latter 
is particularly relevant if productivity in the oil and gas fields is to increase. In the 
government's third economic plan, privatisation occupies a central place. It is 
recognised to offer the possibility of reversing the economic problems inherited from 
the past and to open the existent, but obviously neglected, potential for growth and 
development. It has been argued that, at present, there appears to be a very little choice 
on the part of the Iranian government but to privatise. Rather, the important choice 
concern the modalities of implementing the Iranian privatisation policy and the 
industries which it will eventually cover (Shahriari-Rad, 2002). 
There are a number of pronouncements and reports supporting such a line of 
argumentation. The Deputy Energy Minister, Reza Amrollahi, recently issued a 
statement to the effect that the Energy Ministry is acting more rapidly than other 
ministries to cede its affiliated companies to the private sector: "we have prepared 
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almost all subsidiary companies of the Energy Ministry for cession to the private sector 
and our speed is unparalleled by other state bodies" (PIN, 2004). It seems, however, that 
the promise for reform backlashed in the last parliamentary elections of February 2004, 
at which the reformist followers of President Khatami lost their majority to conservative 
hardliners. Since taking office in 1997, Khatami has sponsored efforts to modernise the 
economy in a number of ways, including privatisation, but the lack of visible progress 
has revealed an incapacity to win over antagonistic political and social forces. 
5.2.1 Analysis of Background to Privatisation in Iran 
The relevant question for analysis then becomes, 'what does this return to an attitude of 
modernisation hold for the future of privatisation in Iran?' To put the question in a 
different form, 'how and to what degree is this a factor in the decision-maker's mind 
with regard to the future of the privatisation of the oil and gas industry in Iran?' 
This question may be impossible to answer, however, since it is predicated on an 
understanding of how the context, or structure; of the dedsion-making system affects 
the actual decisions of actors. In other words, we have to ask such theoretical questions 
as to the degree in which history and attitudes matter in decision-making in the present. 
There is a related question about the degree to which the system itself will determine the 
nature of decisions in and by the state. For instance, 'to what degree does the 
competitive struggle of Iran in. the international system determine the decisions which 
policy-makers will reach in Iran?' Or, looking at it another way, 'to what degree do 
internal political, demographic, or other chang~s in a state determine these decisions?' 
Finally, one could take the perspective that the nature of the capitalist market system 
will simply determine the nature of the policy choices which are made, because 
otherwise the state and its economy will simply go bankrupt. 
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These questions are clearly far beyond the scope of this thesis, although there has been 
an attempt to partially address them throughout the text. For instance, Giddens' concept 
of structuration was used to explain the interplay of structure and agent in determining 
the theoretical and precedent-based boundaries and constraints in the possibility of 
privatisation in Iran, or for that matter, any state. Yet, even the use of this concept does 
not provide conclusive answers to the questions posed in the previous paragraph. 
In fact, this thesis is not really looking to answer this kind of broad question. 
Throughout the text, it has gradually narrowed down its scope to only asking what the 
determinants of the policy of oil and gas privatisation are in Iran. In doing this, we 
assume that the historical and background factors discussed are in fact important issues 
to be taken into account. However, at the same time, they may not necessarily be the 
only, or even the primary, cause of a particular policy. It also means that we can assume 
that the final decision of the policy-makers might be constrained by structural issues 
within the economic, internal political or international military-political system in the 
long run. Nevertheless, in the short term, subjective determinants (such as the minds and 
views of the policy-makers) will come into play and influence the decisions made. 
This is simply a convoluted way of saying that this thesis will not consider a 
considerable portion of the existing theoretical literature in reaching its conclusions. 
Theory is nevertheless an important tangent that situates this study within the theoretical 
constraints of social science theory in general. Without doing this, we would be 
assuming a level of potential knowledge about the subject and proof of findings that is 
impossible given the constraints of the epistemological realities of the field in general. 
Although these issues are often simply assumed in many theses which have the same 
scope of this one, they should not be. This might result in the readership being falsely 
convinced, or even worse, it might trivialise the real findings that this thesis provides. 
Thus, given this qualification, we should conclude that the factors noted in the previous 
section and predicated by the political economic analysis of history performed in 
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (between 1945 and contemporary Iran) are in fact worthy of 
consideration. Moreover, the reversion to modernisation as an underlying concept which 
will determine Iranian privatisation policy is equally important. The reversion to a 
causal view of modernity is likely to inform policy-makers' decisions and decision-
making in Iran. At the same time, these insights must be brought into the context of 
other factors that have determined, and will continue to determine, the timing, nature 
and possibility of privatisation in Iran. These supplementary factors include the ones 
discussed in previous chapters. Specifically, these are the further historical factors, the 
boundaries of privatisation theory in general and the precedents set by other examples 
of privatisation taking place within the geographical region of Iran, and in other regions 
which have similar industries and/or natural resources. 
There are three more factors to be discussed in this chapter. The first is the nature of the 
legal and regulatory system in Iran. The second refers to the particular constraints of the 
oil and gas industry versus other industries, such as telecommunications. The final 
factor concerns the current, subjective, political, social, cultural and other views of the 
decision-makers relevant to privatisation policy-making in Iran. For each of these 
factors, the same epistemological issues noted above hold, and the same answers to 
those epistemological issues should be assumed. 
However, before moving on, there is another matter that needs to be briefly mentioned. 
This is the acknowledgement of unpredictability in national politics. In particular, the 
recent election of Ahmadinejad was taken by some analysts as being unexpected 
(Pollack, 2006). Also, more importantly for this discussion, the particular policies and 
policy paths that he has chosen, and will choose, do not necessarily align with the points 
made above - i.e. that there has been a reversion to the pursuit of modernity, and that 
modernity is causal for privatisation policy in fran. This issue will be covered in more 
detail in the concluding chapter of this study, but needs to be kept in mind given the 
conclusions and implications of this chapter, the discussion of this section in particular 
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and the thesis as a whole. With this in mind, it is possible to move on to discuss the 
other three factors affecting privatisation in Iran. 
5.3 Legal and Institutional Framework 
Whilst privatisation in Iran (Privatisation Organisation, 2002)106 may have been initially 
considered in the early 1990s, 107 the first concrete indication that a privatisation policy 
was gaining currency within the political, economic and, possibly, religious elite in the 
country was the law of the Third Socio-Economic and Cultural Plan of the Islamic 
Republic (Privatisation Organisation, 2002). It was adopted in 2000 and incorporated 
two chapters devoted to privatisation: a) Chapter Two- Reorganisation of State-Owned 
Enterprises and b) Chapter Three - Privatisation and Management of State-Owned 
Enterprises. Within a couple of years of its adoption, it was completed with a number of 
by-laws regulating the implementation of some of its articles and with the articles of 
incorporation of the Privatisation Organisation, which would become the main 
institutional embodiment of the privatisation policy. It has to be noted that such· 
fragmented legislative framework is normal where state-ownership and control of the 
economy are pervasive. Privatisation Acts usually provide only the overarching 
elements of the policy, leaving the details of its implementation to sub-normative 
regulation. 
Chapter Two of the Third Socio-Economic and Cultural Plan (Privatisation 
Organisation, 2002) authorises the government to take "all appropriate measures 
towards the divestiture, dissolving, merging anq reorganising state owned enterprises", 
including the "reforming and sanctioning of their article of association, and their 
transactional and financial by-laws" (Article 4). The stated purpose of these measures is 
106 
107 
This section is based upon the compilation by the Privatisation Organisation (2002). 
Officially the Iranian privatisation programme began in 1995, when the origins, the reasons for 
popularity, requirements, management, social and economic consequences of privatisation 
policies, were relatively new to Iran and other countries in the Persian Gulf (Molawi, 2003). 
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to reorganise state-owned enterprises into specialised holding companies, managed 
under the auspices of resource ministries, and thus prepare the ground for the easy 
transfer of their shares into private hands. Chapter Two also provides for the separation 
of wider policy-making by the respective ministries and the day-to-day governance of 
the enterprises they control. The government is also required to dissolve all overseas 
branches of state-owned enterprises and to coordinate its restructuring activities with the 
State Administrative and Employment Affairs Organisation. 
The need for the restructuring of state-owned companies is justified with the broadly 
stated need to "effectively utilise their resources and potentials" (Article 4). More 
concretely, Chapter Two contains two related objectives to "enhance the productivity 
and efficiency of those state-owned enterprises that will remain in the public sector" and 
to "facilitate transferring to the non-public sector the enterprises whose continued 
operation in the public sector is deemed unnecessary" (Article 4). The first category is 
guaranteed the privilege of utilising public capital, but only on the condition that the 
activities of those enterprises represent monopolies by their nature, or are of no 
investing interest to the non-governmental sector. Despite its reform-oriented tone, 
Chapter Two refrains from introducing price liberalisation (Article 5) which, in fact, 
could be essential for encouraging private entrepreneurial activity into the country. 
Chapter Three of the 2000 Socio-Economic Plan (Privatisation Organisation, 2002) 
deals more specifically with the Iranian policy regarding privatisation. It mentions the 
need to "promote the role and scope of the private and cooperative sectors" in the 
economy and provides that "shares and stocks of the state-owned enterprises that are 
transferable shall be sold" (Article 9). Article 10 then sets the conditions and limitations 
with respect to the policy. According to Article 10, privatisation is to be considered only 
as a means for the realisation of the wider objectives of the Third Plan (Privatisation 
Organisation, 2002) and not as an end in itself. Furthermore, it must not jeopardise the 
national security or threaten the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic, nor should it 
infringe upon people's rights, or create any monopoly. Privatisation is subject to the 
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Constitution with the condition that the policy should be implemented in the context of 
the latter. It is also required to promote the widest possible public participation. 
Chapter Three enumerates the holders of shares, whose transfer into private ownership 
it regulates. Among them are governmental agencies and ministries, as well as profit-
making entities affiliated with the government (Article 11). Article 11 also mentions the 
Iranian National Oil Company and the shares that it holds in non-public enterprises and 
companies. Control and supervision over the divestiture process is vested in the High 
Commission of Divestiture, which was set up under the chairmanship of the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Finance (Article 12). Together with him/her, it comprises six 
other members (all high-ranking government officials): the Head of the Plan and Budget 
Organisation, the Governor of the Central Bank, the relevant minister (i.e. representing 
the ministry that owns the enterprise), the Minister of Justice, and one representative 
each from the Parliamentary Commissions of 'Economic Affairs, Finance and 
Cooperative' and 'Plan and Budget'. 
The other relevant institution in the policy implementation process is the Privatisation 
Organisation. In fact, it inherited the previously existing Organisation for Promotion of 
Ownership of Production Unit through the change in the Articles of Association of the 
latter (Article 15). Since it is not the owner of any state company shares, the 
Privatisation Organisation receives them in trust from their holders, so that it can 
implement the transferral policy. The organisation is affiliated with the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Finance, possesses a legal subjectivity and is financially 
independent. Following the adoption of the Third Plan (Privatisation Organisation, 
2002), its structure and responsibilities were further determined by the Articles of 
Incorporation adopted through a Council of Ministers Decree of 16 May 2001. 
Article 16 outlined the criteria to be used in selling the shares of state-owned 
companies. According to it, the shares of small companies would be sold to (individual) 
"entrepreneurs of high managerial calibre". Medium-sized companies had to be sold to 
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specialised commercial groups, cooperatives and entities. By contrast, the shares of 
large companies were to be sold to the general public, while preserving a controlling 
share for the management. In preparing privatisation of state-owned companies, the 
High Commission of Divestiture was required to: 
... determine the buyer's commitments towards employment, 
production programme, new investment, special activities to 
protect the environment, and avoidance of certain restrictive 
commercial activities (Article 17). 
The implementation of Articles 16 and 17 was subsequently regulated through by-laws. 
In terms of privatisation revenues, Chapter Three determines the following distribution. 
Fifty percent would be utilised to further finance the privatisation process, helping 
towards the restructuring of saleable companies and the rehabilitation and preparation of 
other state-owned enterprises earmarked for sale, as well as promoting industrial 
development with preference given to paying off the saleable companies' debts. Some 
48% was designated to support the country's treasury. Finally, 2% was meant to support 
the Iranian mobilisation forces. It has to be noted that by 'privatisation revenues', 
Article 19 does not only envisage the sale of company shares, but all kinds of contracts 
(rental, leasing, etc.) that generate monetary income for the owner within the given 
fiscal period. 
Chapter Three also provides for dispute settlement relating to claims made by physical 
or legal persons against decisions within Iran's privatisation policy. Interestingly, both 
parties to any given privatisation deal are obliged to insert a clause to this effect in the 
divestiture contract (Article 20). They are thus not granted any choice of dispute 
settlement body or procedure and are practically disallowed to refer to the general 
courts in the country; rather, they have to comply with the prescription of the 
Privatisation Act. This narrowing condition invites questions over the reasoning behind 
it. There is obviously a thrust towards laying the complete structure of privatisation 
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relations and creating what it seems are parallel institutions, such as the Arbitration 
Commission, that are required to take up functions generally performed by other state 
institutions. 
For the purposes of the privatisation process, the Arbitration Commission consists of: a) 
five experts in economics, finance, commerce, technical and legal fields Gointly 
nominated by the Ministers of Economic Affairs and Finance, Justice, and the Head of 
the Plan and Budget Organisation and approved by the Cabinet for an appointment of 
six years); b) the Head of the Chamber of Cooperatives and c) the President of the 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Mines. Under Article 21, the Arbitration 
Commission is required to review and rule on all claims relating to divestiture. Its rules 
and procedures are to be formulated in a special by-law approved by the Cabinet. The 
minimum quorum for effective sessions of the Arbitration Commission is five of its 
members, while decisions are taken by a simple majority with on-the-record minority 
reports. 
Once the Arbitration Commission has delivered judgement, it becomes binding ten days 
after the parties concerned have been notified. Within that period, any of them can raise 
objections to the decision and file it in writing. If an objection arises after the grace 
period, the parties can refer it to the Chief Justice of the country; having to prove, 
however, that there has been an objective reason for the delay. In such an eventuality, 
the Chief Justice needs to refer the case to a special tribunal, which will then review the 
claim extraordinarily and rule a judgement, which becomes final and binding for all 
parties (Article 23). 
Following that, Article 24 requires the government to insure, at its own expense, all the 
officials who are individually or collectively involved in the privatisation process 
against possible penal consequences of financial conviction emanating from 
unintentional misconduct in connection with divestiture. It is required that the insurance 
policy obliges the insurer to compensate for whatever costs are to be borne by the 
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convicted official(s). This is again an interesting departure from modem legal tradition 
where costs may be covered for lawsuits, but not in cases of conviction. Questions arise 
as to why this is so in the Iranian privatisation code. One possible explanation was that 
this provision would alleviate the dislike towards engaging in a process that is 
potentially controversial and which could result in claims being made against personal 
decisions. 
Finally, Chapter Three winds up with three articles relating to liabilities of the seller and 
the buyer for the company's debt or for potential losses during the process of 
concluding the divestiture deal (Article 25), to the tax implications of privatisation deals 
(Article 26) and to the social insurance of the employees (Article 27). Under Article 25, 
the divested company (i.e. its new owner) remains liable for all of its debt, which 
understandably should result in a discounted price, although this is not specified in the 
provision. Article 26 exempts all shares sold under the Privatisation Act, as well as 
shares transferred between executive agencies in enforcing the Act, from transaction 
tax. With regard to corporate income tax, this remains an obligation of the owner up to 
the end of the fiscal year prior to the sale, and this in fact transfers a bigger obligation 
onto the buyer, especially for companies purchased in the second half of a given year. 
Concerning the social insurance of the employees of a privatised enterprise, Article 27 
provides that those of them who are subject to the special pension funds affiliated to 
ministries or public agencies and whose employment with the divested company will be 
terminated upon its sale to the private or cooperative sectors may, upon reinstatement of 
their employment with the same company, continue to stay with the same pension fund. 
The provision is deceivingly reassuring for employees, as it does not guarantee their 
work place, but only their participation in pension funds if they stay or resume 
employment with the company after its sale. Understandably, this would generate 
antagonism to privatisation within the worker's associations in any given enterprise. 
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With regard to the practical implementation of the privatisation process, the Council of 
Ministers decreed special Articles of Incorporation of the main body dealing with it -
the so-called Privatisation Organisation. As mentioned earlier, it inherited the existing 
Organisation for the Promotion of Ownership of Production Units, is affiliated to the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, possesses legal entity and is financially 
independent. With headquarters in Tehran and branches of representative offices 
throughout the country, the Privatisation Organisation was charged with a number of 
key duties and prerogatives with respect to divestiture of state ownership. Article 5 of 
the Articles of Incorporation enumerates them as follows: 
a) formulating proper guidelines in order to expedite and 
facilitate public participation towards the realisation of 
enhanced efficiency and increased productivity of material and 
human resources and development of potentials of the private 
and cooperative sectors, and presentation of the said guidelines 
to the High Commission of Divestiture; b) working out plans 
for enhancing the capabilities of the private sector and 
providing incentives to specialised groups and organisations 
and educating entrepreneurs; c) acting as proxy in matters of 
divesting shares of the companies slated for privatisation on the 
basis of the related regulations; d) offering shares of the 
saleable companies according to an approved time-table; e) 
implementing policies sanctioned by the High Commission of 
Divestiture; f) rendering any other action, operation and 
services towards execution of the programme of divesting 
shares and management of governmental corporations and 
privatisation within the framework of the laws and regulations; 
g) supervising the prompt execution of the terms of contracts 
relating to divestment, management, rent and performance of 
other matters entrusted to the organisation according to the 
contracts; h) performing other duties related to divestment of 
shares and privatisation that are entrusted to the organisation 
within the five-year development plans. 
In terms of organs, the Privatisation Organisation consists of a General Assembly, an 
Executive Board, a Managing Director and an Auditing Officer, each of them with 
clearly defined duties and prerogatives. According to Article 7, the General Assembly 
consists of seven members: the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance (President of 
the Assembly), the Head of the State Management and Planning Organisation, the 
Minister of Justice, the Minister of Industries and Mines, the Minister of Labour and 
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Social Affairs, the Minister of Commerce and the Minister of Cooperative. Decisions 
are taken by a simple majority of the members, which also constitutes the quorum for its 
meetings. 
The meetings of the General Assembly are called by the President or at the request of 
the other institutions of the Privatisation Organisation. The duties that the General 
Assembly discharges through its work are enumerated in a ten-point list of Article 10. 
They are: 
a) to appoint and dismiss the chairman and the members of the 
Executive Board; b) to determine the salaries of the Managing 
Director and the Executive Board; c) to approve budgets, 
financial statements and the reports produced by the above two 
organs; d) to appoint the Auditing Officer and determine 
his/her remuneration; e) to sanction by-laws needed by the 
Organisation, including ones for employment, financial, 
administrative and business transactions; f) to adopt the general 
strategy of implementing the privatisation process and to 
approve the structure of the Organisation upon the consent of 
the State Management and Planning Organisation; g) to 
approve proxy fees and charges in connection to the sale of 
stocks; h) to make decisions concerning arbitration, to appoint 
arbitrator and to settle claims arising out of divestiture 
procedures; i) to propose to the Council of Ministers changes 
and amendments to the articles of incorporation; j) to take 
decisions concerning all other matters that according to the 
commercial law fall into the domain of competence of the 
general assembly, but are not determined in these Articles of 
Association. 
Respectively, the Executive Board of the Privatisation Organisation consists of a 
Chairman (one of the undersecretaries of the Minister for Economic Affairs and 
Finance), who is simultaneously the Managing Director, and four other members 
elected by the General Assembly for a renewable period of three years. In the case of 
resignation, retirement or demise which results in a vacancy, it is filled through another 
election at the Assembly. The Executive Board can take decisions with a minimum of 
three votes. Among its duties are: 
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a) the preparation of annual budgets, financial statements and 
performance reports; b) the proposal of amendments to the 
articles of incorporation and the organisational structure; c) the 
proposal of settlement of claims and reconciliation to the 
General Assembly; d) the proposal of necessary by-laws and 
fees and charges in connection to the sale of stocks; e) the 
preparation of strategy plans for the Organisation in 
implementing the privatisation policy. 
· Notwithstanding the powers and duties of the General Assembly and the Executive 
Board, the highest executive authority within the Privatisation Organisation rests with 
its Managing Director. The duties of the position are: 
a) implementing the policies, decisions and strategies 
formulated by the High Commission of Divestiture, the 
General Assembly and the Executive Board; b) annual 
budgeting in coordination with the Executive Board; c) 
preparation of financial statements for the Auditing Officer; d) 
the preparation of organisational charts, staffing policies, 
annual performance reports, etc.; e) presenting the Organisation 
before other legal persons and judicial authorities, 
governmental institutions and agencies, public, private and 
cooperative entities both domestic and foreign, with the right to 
appoint attorney and to propose reconciliation and arbitration to 
the Executive Board; f) defming the job desc1iption for the 
Organisation's staff and delegating duties and responsibilities 
in accordance with the respective laws. 
Finally, the Auditing Officer (also called the Legal Inspector) is appointed for one year 
according to the employment regulation in the country. Re-appointment is permissible 
and the Articles of Incorporation do not specify the number of permitted re-
appointments. There is also no specification, similar to the detailed enumeration above, 
of the duties and responsibilities of the Auditing Offices. Article 20 limits itself to 
simply declaring that his/her functions shall be in accordance with the relevant laws and 
regulations. Following this, the Articles of Incorporation wind up with miscellaneous 
provisions, among which Article 22 requires that the Privatisation Organisation 
prioritises the divestment of the shares which are in its possession at the time of its 
establishment. Article 24 states that the organisation should transfer 10% of its net profit 
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to the legal reserve account, which is required to be maintained at the level of the capital 
of the organisation. 
5.3.1 Analysis of Legal and Institutional Framework 
Such is, in fairly broad sketches, the legal and institutional framework of the 
privatisation process in Iran as outlined in the Third Social, Economic and Cultural 
Development Plan of the Islamic Republic (Privatisation Organisation, 2002). At face 
value it does not tell us much about the practical implementation of the process. As 
such, it brings to light a number of questions with respect to the background to this legal 
foundation, the interests and ideas that lie behind it and form its base, the modes and 
outcomes of the institutional interaction codified by it, as well as the practical results of 
actually carrying out the privatisation policy. The answers to these questions are crucial 
in making reliable statements and claims about the possible development of Iranian 
divestiture and its meaningful spread over the oil and gas sector, as well as about the 
opportunities available to foreign capital to make substantial inroads into the country's 
economy. 
In the first place, at the conceptual level, it needs to be ascertained what the likely 
impact of the stated objectives would be upon Ivanian enterprises and their privatisation. 
In other words, 'how does the country's elite see this relationship and what are the 
elements of contradiction and symbiosis between these two elements?' In economics, 
they are not mutually exclusive, but in politics they can often tum out to be so. Another 
related issue is the symbiosis that the official privatisation programme stipulates 
between politicians and company managers. How does this work out in reality? Both 
groups presumably have their own agendas and the process of reconciling them could 
easily produce a stalemate and conflicting ideas of the practical steps to be taken. 
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Secondly, at a more pragmatic level, there are a number of unclear positions in the 
institutional framework. An important one, for example, is the removal of privatisation 
claims for the judicial system of the country by creating a specialised Arbitration 
Committee subordinated to the Cabinet. Would this not impair the credibility of the 
whole process, or was it made precisely with this objective in mind? Similarly, various 
lines of accountability and relations of sub- and super-ordination need to be explained 
and analysed. Within the institutional set-up of the privatisation process, the Cabinet 
stands out as a central organ, which devises the policies, implements and controls them, 
and adjudicates arising claims. This of course is not done directly, but if one takes the 
rules stipulated for the appointment of relevant personnel, including the Privatisation 
Organisation, this is the conclusion at which one arrives. Why is this so? Does this not 
place Iranian privatisation in the vortex of political struggles, swinging it from one side 
to the other with every major political change? 
The Cabinet is also charged with the important function of laying down the normative 
framework of by-laws that unpack the contents of the Third Social and Economic Plan 
(Privatisation Organisation, 2002). The Articles of Incorporation of the Privatisation 
Organisation, for example, come into effect through a Cabinet Decree (No. 
H23708/T/7858 of 16 May 2001) as do the by-laws for Article 14e (Decree No. 
H24285/T/24094 of 13 August 2001), Article 14f (Decree No. H24653/T/23511 of 8 
August 2001), Article 15 (Decree No. H23743/T/4508 of 29 April 2001), Article 16 
(Decree No. H24654/T/23760 of 11 August 2001) and Article 21 (Decree No. 
H23833/T/45536 of 2 January 2002) of the Third Socio-Economic and Cultural 
Development Plan of the Islamic Republic (Privatisation Organisation, 2002). Such a 
combination of legislative, executive and judicial power in one organ, 108 in this case the 
Cabinet, would potentially lead to closures (i.e. no-go zones and preferences) and a lack 
108 Clearly, there are some contradictions and amalgamated functions. One example among many is 
the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance who sits on the Assembly of the Privatisation 
Organisation, but who also plays a crucial role in the appointment of the members of the 
Arbitration Commission, which is supposed to be independently adjudicating the contracts 
prepared and signed by the Privatisation Organisation. 
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of transparency and consistency in implementing privatisation. Empirical research needs 
to be undertaken to establish to what extent this is true and how this limitation is 
perceived and addressed by the Iranian political, economic and religious elite. 
Thirdly, at the most basic level of defining functions, duties and powers, the researcher 
has to consider the broad formulation of the responsibilities of the Privatisation 
Organisation. The first two are particularly (see the exhaustive enumeration above) 
broadly sketched and have no obvious relation to the practical task of transferring 
property from the public and private sectors. What is the reason for this? Does this 
automatically imply private ownership of domestic entrepreneurs only, once they have 
been trained and prepared for this by the Privatisation Organisation? In fact, the actual 
selling of shares comes only fourth in the functions of the organisation. The 
organisation itself seems to be overly saturated with institutions that parallel external 
ones (i.e. how does the General Assembly work with the High Commission for 
Divestiture or with the Arbitration Commission?). An overarching question is whether 
the system is workable at all. Following on from this are the issues of what kinds of 
networks form within and across these parallel structures, and how the different pieces 
connect and control each other. Are there relations enabling or hindering the 
privatisation process? 
5.4 The Oil and Gas Sector 
It has to be noted that the Iranian economy relies heavily on oil export revenues. They 
form around 80% of total export earnings, 50% of the government budget and 20% of 
GDP (USEIA, 2005). 109 As such, the economy's development is very much dependent 
on the price of oil. When it plunges, as during 1998 and early 1999, stagnation is a 
logical result. Conversely, when the prices go up, the government is enabled to finance 
109 The following section is based upon USEIA (2005). 
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economic recovery. The relatively high oil export revenues in the past couple of years 
have allowed the setting up of an oil stabilisation fund, which provides a guarantee for 
governmental economic leverage in the case of price plunges. In a bid to ensure 
stability, the government has also attempted to diversify its activities by investing some 
of the oil revenues in other areas, such as the petrochemical industry. 
In terms of its existing oil fields, Iran holds around 90 billion barrels of proven reserves, 
roughly 7% of the world's total, and claims another 30 billion barrels (so far unproved). 
The vast majority of the crude oil reserves are located in giant onshore fields in the 
south western region (Khuzestan) near the border with Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Iran 
produced 3.5 million barrels in 2002 and 3.9 million barrels in 2003 (USEIA, 2005). At 
the end of 2003, Iran's sustainable crude oil production capacity was estimated at 
around 3.75 million barrels per day. It is acknowledged, both domestically and 
internationally, that with sufficient investment, Iran could increase its oil production 
capacity significantly. This can be done through improving the efficiency of the 
operative oil fields, or through the exploitation of new ones. 
By way of comparison, Iran produced 6 million barrels in 1974, which is almost double 
the amount produced in 2002 and in the years following the Islamic Revolution. The Oil 
Minister, Zanganeh, has acknowledged the need for upgrading and modernisation, since 
extraction from some of the fields has been carried out using methods damaging to their 
future production capacity. The current government has devised ambitious plans to 
double the national oil production, to more than 7 million barrels by 2015, and is 
counting on foreign investment to accomplish this; possibly as high as $5 billion per 
year between now and then (USEIA, 2005). The production activities of NIOC are 
concentrated mainly on sustaining output levels from large, but ageing fields. This 
indicates that the oil sector is gradually becoming inefficient and is in need of 
modernisation through the introduction of advanced technologies and investment. 
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Table 5.1: Iranian Oil Fields and Their Production Capacity 
Major Iranian Oil Fields (estimated production, bbl/d) 
Onshore Offshore 
Agha Jari (200,000 bblld) Abuzar (125,000 bblld) 
Ahwaz-Asmari (700,000 bblld) Dorood (130,000 bblld) 
Bangestan (around 245,000 bblld current production, Salman (130,000 bblld) 
with plans to increase to 550,000 bbl/d or more) 
Bibi Hakimeh (130,000 bbl/d) Sirri A&E (95,000 bblld) 
Gachsaran (560,000 bbl/d) Soroush/Nowruz (60,000 bblld) 
Karanj-Parsi (200,000 bbl/d) 
Marun (520,000 bbl/d) 
Pazanan (70,000 bblld) 
Rag-e-Safid ( 180,000 bbl/d 
Note: BbVd =British barrels per day 
Source: USEIA (2005). 
With regard to consumption, the ratio between the exported amounts and those for the 
domestic market is approximately 67% to 33% (2.6 to 1.3 million barrels in 2003) 
(USEIA, 2005). The major overseas customers for Iranian Oil are Japan, China, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Europe. Iranian oil is traded on the spot market by NIOC's London 
division. Domestically, Iran's consumption is increasing rapidly, which reflects the 
steady growth of the economy and population. The Iranian government heavily 
subsidises the internal prices of oil products, to the amount of $3 billion per year, which 
does not contribute to reasonable levels of consumption; instead it encourages waste and 
inefficiency. The gasoline policy could be helpful in this respect. Iran has to import it 
for domestic consumption and has been addressing the rising gasoline subsidy 
expenditure by raising the prices and introducing rationing restrictions. About $5 billion 
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per year is imported. In addition, the domestic petroleum products are in effect 
subsidised, considering the price of crude oil and the cost of production, refining and 
distribution. 
In the gas sector, the scope for development is much greater. Iran contains an estimated 
940 trillion cubic feet (tcf) in proven natural gas reserves - the world's second largest 
and surpassed only by those found in Russia - of which 62% have not yet been 
developed (Ibid.). Due to its enormous reserve, Iran has the potential to become a 
significant natural gas exporter. In 2002, for example, Iran produced about 2. 7 tcf of 
natural gas, some of which was used for enhanced oil recovery. In March 2004, Iran 
signed a $1.2 billion contract with a consortium of two foreign and two domestic 
companies to gather natural gas from the Nowruz, Soroush, Hendijan and Behregansar 
fields (Ibid.). Russian Gazprom has also expressed interest in developing Iranian gas 
resources. Currently, natural gas accounts for nearly half of Iran's total energy 
consumption, and the government plans billions of dollars worth of further investment 
in the coming years to increase this share. The cost of gas to consumers is state-
controlled at extremely low prices, encouraging rapid consumption, growth and 
replacement of the demand for oil. 
In terms of privatisation, the Iranian Constitution (adopted following the Islamic 
Revolution) currently prohibits the granting of petroleum rights on a concessionary 
basis or direct equity stake. In 1987, the Petroleum Law was passed and enacted, which 
permits the establishment of contracts between the Oil Ministry, state companies and 
local and foreign national personal and legal entities. So far, the most often used system 
is the so-called 'buyback' agreement. According to it, NIOC concludes a contract with a 
company willing to invest in the development of new oil fields or the improvement of 
existing ones. Once in place, the buyback mechanism confers the obligation on the 
company (domestic or foreign) to fund all necessary investment for the project and the 
right to receive remuneration from NIOC. After the end of the contract, the operation of 
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the field is transferred back to NIOC together with the right to the whole revenue from 
sales. 
Throughout the years of its implementation, the buyback mechanism has been assessed 
as having both drawbacks and positive elements for each of the two sides of the 
contractual relation (Personal Communication)_no NIOC has no guarantee against a 
possible drop in oil prices; it has to pay the remuneration to the contractor anyway. So it 
bears the whole risk in the initial years of the project, and potentially faces payments 
larger than its revenues. Compensating this, it remains the sole proprietor of the field 
and the right-holder for all future revenues after the expiry date of the contract. In turn, 
the investor has no guarantee that they will not be prohibited from developing their 
discoveries after the initial investment. The current political system of Iran bears this 
risk by itself. Failing this, however, investors bear no risk of falling oil prices as they 
still receive the contracted remuneration for their work. If the oil price falls, the 
contractor will receive his payback over a longer period, thus in effect less financial 
reward. So the contractor also bears some of the risk of an oil price fall. 
The current political risk in Iran stems largely from the antagonism between the 
conservative and reform-oriented forces. The former are embodied by the Council of 
Guardians (a 12-strong religious body formed after the Islamic Revolution), which has 
veto power over laws adopted by the National Assembly and supervises the elections. 
The latter are the base of President Khatami' s overwhelming electoral victories in 1997 
and 2001 and are embodied by his government. The conservative forces have been 
leading in the implementation of the nationalisation policies during the post-revolution 
period. As such, they vehemently oppose any efforts at economic liberalisation or the 
opening of state-owned enterprises to foreign investors and buyers. However, to the 
110 Personal Communication. Discussions with Mr. Hpssein Kazempour Ardebili, Deputy Minister of 
Petroleum/Head of Iran delegation to OPEC, Member of NIOC Board of Directors and Chairman 
of NICO, December 2005. 
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contrary, the reformists are willing and wishing to do exactly that, arguing that this is 
the only way the Iranian economy can recover in a sustainable way (Katouzian, 1989). 
The conflict between the two opposing sides has been visible on at least two occasions 
with respect to the legal regulation of foreign investment. In May 2001, the National 
Assembly (then dominated by reform-oriented MPs) passed a bill on the attraction and 
protection of foreign investment. The next month, the Council of Guardians rejected it 
as being too liberal. Heavily amended, the bill was passed again by the National 
Assembly in November 2001. The following month, the Council of Guardians rejected 
it for a second time. Following a number of rebounds and consultations, the greatly 
weakened bill was finally adopted in May 2002 and approved by the Council of 
Guardians as the 'Law on the Attraction and Protection of Foreign Investment'. It aimed 
at encouraging foreign investment by streamlining procedures and guaranteeing profit 
repatriation. In fact, the law, which was sent to the government for implementation in 
January 2003, represents the first foreign investment act passed by Iran's legislature 
since the Islamic Revolution. 
Similarly, the conservatives have proven to be potent in frustrating the economic policy 
of Khatami by introducing retroactive legislation and thus demonstrating disrespect for 
private property rights. After winning the February 2004 elections for the National 
Assembly, the conservative majority passed a bill which would allow them a veto over 
foreign investment. The Petroleum Bill was adopted in September 2004, but was 
backdated to March 2004. Under its provisions, foreign holdings of Iranian enterprises 
must be approved by the MPs. Its backers did not conceal their willingness to employ 
the bill in discontinuing a pair of deals with Turkish consortia who had previously 
conducted business with Israel and were thus considered to present 'security risks' for 
Iran. The first was the Turkish-Austrian group Tepe-Akfen-Vie, which had the 
concession to build Tehran's new Imam Khomeini airport. The second was Turkcell, 
which had earlier been awarded a $3bn contract to build a second GSM network in Iran 
(BBC, 2004a). 
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Following Khatami's victory for the Presidency in 1997, NIOC and the Oil Ministry 
concluded a number of buyback contracts with large foreign investors in the oil sector. 
Despite the fact that some of them (see examples below) have been marred by 
corruption scandals involving foreign oil companies and high-ranking Iranian officials, 
they have brought considerable investment into the country. This policy is exemplary of 
the reformists orientation with regard to the economic development of Iran and is part of 
the political struggle in the country. Another of the restrictive acts of the current 
conservative majority in the National Assembly has been the rejection of a proposal to 
give oil exploration companies the right to exploit their discoveries. 111 The measure 
formed a central plank of Khatami's liberal economic plan, introducing privatisation 
and attracting more foreign investment. Currently, there are a number of buyback 
projects being implemented in Iran, several of which are presented below (USEIA, 
2005). 
A final agreement was signed in February 2004 on the $2 billion Azadegan oil field 
development project, with the field being developed by Iranians (although Inpex is said 
to hold a 10% interest). 112 Azadegan was discovered in 1999, representing Iran's largest 
oil discovery in 30 years, and is located onshore in the south-western province of 
Khuzestan, a few miles east of the border with Iraq. Reportedly, Azadegan contains 
proven crude oil reserves of 26 billion barrels (USEIA, 2005), but the field is also 
considered to be geologically complex, making the oil more challenging and expensive 
to extract. In January 2001, the Majlis approved the development of Azadegan through 
a buyback scheme with a foreign investor. As the biggest importer of Iranian oil, Japan 
agreed to loan Iran $3 billion in exchange for receiving the development rights for 
Azadegan. According to estimations, at its peak Azadegan production only could 
account for as much as 6% of Japan's oil imports. 
Ill 
!!2 
It is unclear whether the National Assembly rejected the right of a company to develop its 
discovery. The company that made the discovery .does not have an automatic right to exploit the 
discovery but is given priority and, under some conditions, can invest further and develop the 
field. Its share of production would be according to the buy-back agreements. 
It is reported that some Indian companies are also discussing involvement in this field. 
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Since 1995, NIOC has made several other sizable oil discoveries, including the 3-5 
billion barrel Darkhovin onshore oil field, located near Abadan. In late June 2001, 
Italy's ENI signed a nearly $1 billion, five and a half year buyback deal to develop 
Darkhovin. The contract contained a clause reducing the risk for the investor. The added 
incentive included a limited risk/reward element, whereby the payment of NIOC 
remuneration was linked to the production capacity of the oil field. This is a provision 
aiming to neutralise the disadvantages inherent in the buyback model and as such is a 
significant improvement of the Iranian oil development policy. Ultimately, the 
production capacity at Darkhovin oil field is expected to reach 160,000 barrels per day, 
which ranks it relatively high among other production sites. 
The first major project under the buyback investment approach became operational in 
October 1998. The Sirri A oil field was developed and operated by Total and Malaysia's 
Petronas and began production at 7,000 barrels per day (USEIA, 2005). The 
neighbouring Sirri E field began production shortly thereafter (in February 1999). In 
March 1999, France's Elf Aquitaine and a consortium of Italy's ENI and Agip were 
awarded a $1 billion contract for the recovery of the Doroud oil and natural gas field. 
The project had been intended to boost its production capacity by approximately 50% 
by 2004. In April 1999, Iran awarded Elf (46.75% share), along with Canada's Bow 
Valley Energy (15% share), a buyback contract to develop the offshore Balal field. Eni 
was also involved, with a 38.25% stake. The field, containing some 80 billion barrels of 
reserves, started producing at a 20,000 barrels per day rate in early 2003, and reached 
40,000 barrels per day in February 2004 (Ibid.). 
In November 2000, Norway's Statoil signed a series of agreements with NIOC to 
explore for oil in the Strait of Hormuz area. The agreement envisaged cooperation on 
the development of a processing plant for natural gas from four onshore fields and the 
possible development of the Salman offshore field at a cost of $850 million (Ibid.). On 
18 March 2005, a much sought-after contract to develop the Bangestan reservoirs in the 
three giant fields of Ahvaz, Mansuri and Abe Teymour. Bangestan projects were 
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awarded to Petro Iran Development Co. (a subsidy of NIOC), after having been delayed 
several times since 2001. Bangestan contains an estimated 6 billion barrels of oil 
reserves, but the field is one of the oldest in the country, requiring investment and 
technological applications to compensate for natural decline. Shell, Total and BP had 
been bidding for the project, but stated they were frustrated with the slow pace of 
negotiations and the numerous changes to its terms (Ibid.). 
In May 2002, Iran's Oil Ministry signed another buyback contract (for $585 million) 
with the NIOC subsidiary Petrolran to develop the Foroozan and Esfandiar offshore oil 
fields (Ibid.). Petrolran was expected to increase their production at the fields to more 
than 120% by the beginning of 2006. In January 2004, the Cheshmeh-Khosh field, 
which had previously been awarded to Spain's Cepsa for $300 million, was re-a warded 
to the state-owned Central Iranian Oil Fields Company (CIOFC). In December 2003, 
Cepsa and OMV 113 withdrew from lengthy negotiations after a reported failure to agree 
on the development costs and the terms of the buyback project. However, both 
companies had stated they could still be involved at the site in some way under 
conditions acceptable to them. 
Similarly, Iran has been employing the buyback model with natural gas resources. In 
September 1997, Total signed a $2bn buyback deal, together with Russia's Gazprom 
and Malaysia's Petronas, to develop part of South Pars (Iran's largest gas field, part of 
what is most likely the largest gas field in the world). Total has a 40% share of the 
project, with the other two companies each having 30% (USEIA, 2005). Further on in 
the phases of the development project, ENI and Petropars will also be involved with the 
construction of onshore treatment facilities. Hyundai has also been contracted by NIOC, 
for $1 billion, to build four natural gas powered trains. Shell and Statoil have also 
expressed interest in participating in the development of the South Pars gas field. Also 
113 Austrian Drilling Oil Company. 
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active has been a consortium of national and international companies led by Norway's 
Aker Kvaerner. 
In recent times, the Iranian government appears to have had some doubts about the 
viability and effectiveness of the buyback projects. Among such are a) recurring charges 
of corruption of high-ranking officials in the Oil Ministry and NIOC and its 
subsidiaries; b) insufficient benefits to Iran and its economy and c) worries that 
buybacks are attracting too little investment. There are signs that the reformist political 
elite is considering substantial changes in the system (Personal Communication). 114 In 
late May 2002, Canada's Sheer Energy became the first foreign company since the 
Darkhovin deal to reach an agreement under the terms achieved by ENI one year earlier. 
However, even this re-introduction of the limited risk/reward model has not attracted 
the amount of foreign energy investment that the Iranian economy needs. 
5.4.1 Analysis of the Oil and Gas Sector 
It seems clear that the most important issue to take into account in the examination of 
what the determinants of Iranian privatisation policy in the oil and gas industry are, is 
the sheer size and importance of the oil and gas sector. The previous section, combined 
with the historical chapters (2, 3 and 4) illustrated this matter to a certain degree. Oil has 
been the lynchpin of the Iranian economy and has had an overwhelmingly important 
role to play in determining the nature of the Iranian economy, its political system and 
even its international relations. Although policy may determine the nature of the 
privatisation of the Iranian oil and gas industry, in many ways it is oil which is 
determining, and will continue to determine, the nature of policy - at both foreign and 
domestic levels. 
114 Personal Communication. Discussion with Engr. Mohamed Hossein Nejad Hosseinian, Deputy 
Minister of Petroleum, International Affairs, Tehran, December 2005. 
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4 described the various ways in which oil has played a fundamental 
role in Iranian domestic and foreign policies and policy-making. 
Beyond the size and importance of the Iranian oil and gas industry to Iran itself, we 
must also consider its importance to the world in general (Klare, 2005). It has been 
noted that only Saudi Arabia possesses more oil than Iran - 260 billion barrels, more 
specifically. Even Iraq, for which it has been argued that the US fought a war due to the 
strategic importance of its oil reserves, lies behind Iran with its (Iraq's) 115 billion 
barrels of oil in reserve. In total, it has been estimated that Iran has a full one-tenth of 
the world's total supply of oil (USEIA, 2005). These figures cannot be underestimated, 
although it should be borne in mind that estimations of total reserves can vary over time, 
depending upon accuracy of measurement, discovery of new fields etc. 
We should not forget, on the other hand, that Iran's oil reserves are not the only 
resource in which we are interested and which have strategic importance for the world 
as a whole because of their sheer size. Iran, as already noted, has 940 tcf of natural gas 
reserves (PIIC, 2000). That is some 16% of the entire world's reserves of natural gas. 
The only other state with a larger reserve of natural gas is Russia, which has 1,680 tcf of 
natural gas in its reserves. 
Translating the gas supply into terms of oil may help to demonstrate just how massive a 
resource we are actually discussing. Klare performs such a translation, noting that: 
As it takes approximately 6,000 cubic feet of gas to equal the 
energy content of 1 barrel of oil, Iran's gas reserves represent 
the equivalent of about 155 billion barrels of oil. This, in tum, 
means that its combined hydrocarbon reserves are the 
equivalent of some 280 billion barrels of oil, just slightly 
behind Saudi Arabia's combined supply (Klare, 2005:1). 
In other words, in terms of combined resources, Iran is one of the most important, if not 
the most important, states in the world. 
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At the same time, we must be careful to not only include the actual amount of oil and 
gas reserves in our calculations, but also the relative future production capacity of Iran 
versus other leading oil and gas producing states in the world. Analysts have noted that 
while Saudi Arabia has higher reserves than Iran, it is currently producing at about the 
maximum sustainable rate at which it can possibly produce oil (see, for example, Klare, 
2005). This rate has been estimated at around 10 million bpd. Within the next two 
decades, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will be able to produce much more oil than that 
rate. 115 Yet, at the same time, the oil consumption of the world's leading oil-consuming 
countries - the US, China, and India - is estimated to rise by 50% in that same 
timeframe. In other words, there is going to be a much higher world demand for oil, and 
Saudi Arabia is unable to meet that demand. 
Within this context of supply and demand in the world system, Iran has a significant 
potential to increase its yearly production of oil. Currently, Iran is producing around 4 
million barrels per day (PIIC, 2000). However, it is capable of almost doubling that 
production value to 7 million bpd. This fact alone puts Iran in a league of its own in 
terms of its oil and potential for future oil production. 
Moreover, Iran is not even nearly producing as much natural gas as it possibly could. 
Nowadays it produces approximately 2.7 tcf per year of natural gas. Given the huge size 
of its reserves (some 940 tcf), it is clear that Iran has a huge potential to increase the 
exploitation of its natural gas reserves (Koussari, 1999). Furthermore, it is one of the 
few countries which has such a potential, again putting it in a league of its own. 
These statistics point to the degree to which oil and gas are not so much determined by 
but determine Iranian policy. There is significant pressure from all parts of the world for 
Iran to open and keep open its supplies of oil and gas. At the same time, oil and gas 
ll5 Although Saudi Arabia's oil production capacity was about 10 million bpd in the past, this is 
being increased to about 12. Currently, it is probably about 11 or 11.5. Saudi authorities have 
announced that they have plans for raising capacity to 15 million bpd, but have not yet started to 
implement the necessary field operations for expanding to 15. 
212 
provide Iran with an extremely powerful bargaining chip in determining its foreign 
policy. To the degree that foreign policy determines the internal political and economic 
policies of a state, this factor will also affect Iranian policy in terms of privatisation of 
the oil and gas industry. 
This brings us to what is probably the most important element in terms of oil and gas 
privatisation in Iran - that is, its strategic value. The sheer value of its reserves to the 
rest of the world, in particular to the world's most powerful countries (which also 
happen to be the countries which are most dependent on oil) leaves Iran with an 
enormous margin of negotiation. This is, for instance, visible in terms of the manner in 
which the nuclear issue is being dealt with by the US and Europe. It is, of course, a 
double-edged sword, for it also often implies that Iran is constantly under threat from 
other states who fear for the safety of the world's oil supply. 
Therefore, at least since the revolution, Iran has continued to treat oil as a strategic 
resource. This means that the nature of privatisation of the oil industry will be different 
than that of any other privatisation process in Iran. Iran is not alone in viewing oil and 
gas in such a manner and of protecting it in terms of privatisation. As noted in Chapter 
1, other states like Egypt and China have adopted similar perspectives for protecting this 
vital sector in terms of privatisation relative to other industries. 
Thus, it is within this context that the discussion, in the previous section, on buyback 
and other models of Iranian oil and privatisation must be considered. Moreover, it is 
within this context that the future potential of oil and gas privatisation in Iran ought to 
be regarded. The concluding chapter of this study will return to this issue of the internal 
and external strategic importance of oil and gas. Yet, before that, we are going to 
approach the last factor determining the privatisation of the oil and gas industry in Iran, 
that is, the views of relevant policy-makers. 
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5.4.2 Relevant Policy-makers' Views 
There is an urgent need to reform Iran's economy, particularly since the fall of the 
Iranian stock market. This was essentially caused by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad' s call to 
'wipe Israel off the map' and the November 2005 presidential announcement that the 
general population of Iran would all receive shares in Iranian publicly-held industries. 
This was taken to be an initial step towards the seizure and re-distribution of the many 
private industries operating in Iran. As a result, there was a sudden and massive exit of 
capital from Iran, perhaps amounting to around'US$200 billion. 
On his election to office in June 2005, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that he 
was against corruption. However, around 40% of Iran's GDP is accounted for by the 
Bonyads. These were essentially set up as charitable foundations, but are in actuality 
massive corrupt machines which bankroll the senior leadership. Such corruption has 
resulted in increased inflation and unemployment, reduced liquidity and investment, 
made the middle-class less well off, diminished non-oil exports, and further increased 
the gap between Iran's rich and poor. 
Iran, consequently, has called for some US$20 billion investment each and every year, 
in addition to US$70 billion to recapitalise Iran's decrepit oil industry. One major 
problem is that there are only three capital markets in the world capable of such high 
investment levels- the US, Europe and Japan (Amini, 2004; Nili et al., 2004). No other 
countries are able to substitute the place and power of the West in the near future. Also 
to be considered is the far superior technology available to the Western companies 
(Pollack, 2006). As a result, President Khatami realised the need for market reform and, 
in the absence of any other capital, advocated attracting foreign investment. He applied 
a short sharp shock to the market through some privatisation of state firms, further 
liberalisation allowing more freedom of expression to the people and popular press, and 
some changes to the labour laws. 
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President Khatami's government approved a massive programme of privatisation of 
state-owned companies (Reuters, 1999). Parliament also passed plans to modernise 
Iran's oil industry and almost double its production of oil over the next decade (USEIA, 
1998). Such an increase in production has a cost (some $120 billion), and Iran is looking 
towards its private investors and foreign sources for this capital. Iran has not yet 
discovered oil in the Iranian side of the Caspian Sea, but there is great potential for the 
discovery of oil and gas. 
The final immediate determinant of Iranian privatisation policy for the oil and gas 
industry is the personal, subjective views of those policy-makers and policy-enactors 
who are concerned directly, or are otherwise relevant, to the said privatisation. Towards 
this goal, I have taken part in extensive primary research in order to assess these 
personal, subjective views. Two methods have been employed to assess these views; the 
first is a questionnaire filled in by relevant personnel, and the second is through first-
hand interviews with some of the key members of personnel who filled in the 
questionnaires. In many ways, the human factor is one of the most important factors to 
take into account, because it is the most immediate one leading to the determination of 
policy. We are, in effect, literally asking what these men and women think as they are 
about to make a policy or otherwise influence it. In a way, their answers could be 
thought to provide an answer to the question of this thesis as a whole, therefore 
constituting the most important, perhaps even the only, determinant of oil and gas 
privatisation policy now and in the future. 
Yet there are multiple problems and issues which arise in examinations like this that 
make such a simple answer untenable and the views of these individuals but one 
amongst many factors. These problems can be seen as involving, at their very base, 
epistemological and methodological issues. 
Some of the epistemological issues have been discussed in the section above. 
Specifically, it was noted that there has been debate concerning the degree to which 
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historical and other structural factors truly affect the decision-maker's final decision 
(i.e. his or her agency). This issue comes up again in this section, although in another 
form. This time, however, the issue is that the determination of policy is not necessarily 
made in terms of what people think they think. Although it might sound confusing, the 
idea is relatively straightforward. Individuals may report that they believe they are 
going to make their decision based on a set of particular views, historical experiences 
etc., and then may, potentially, completely ignore such views and make a decision using 
other methods. This means that for the analyst, knowing these views, historical 
experiences etc., may not lead, necessarily, to a prediction of the decision-maker's 
action. 
A related issue is that such 'misreporting' is particularly prevalent in the realm of 
politics. This is because decisions are made not only in terms of the policy-makers' own 
views, but also in terms of their constituency. Such a constituency may involve the 
people who elected them to office, those within a bureaucracy which they work in, or 
those to whom they must respond, such as religious personalities. Thus, the personal 
views of someone involved in politics may not necessarily lead to the actual policy 
implemented. At the same time, the political individual may misreport his or her views 
in order to please his or her constituency or to otherwise bring about an external (i.e. 
from the particular issue at hand) political goal. Thus, we must, in effect, take the results 
of such personal inquiries with a grain of salt. 
These different epistemological issues force us to rely on other factors in order to 
answer the central question of this thesis ('what are the determinants of oil and gas 
privatisation policy in Iran?'). It is for this reason (the idea that the results of simply 
asking people what they think will not always answer your question), that the study has 
taken a multi-pronged approach in examining the determinants of privatisation policy. It 
has included theory, history and contemporary facts on top of the subjective views of 
policy-makers. 
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Related to these epistemological issues are methodological issues, which concern the 
nature of the analysis being undertaken (questionnaires versus interviews). There are 
also issues concerning the means by which these methodological implements and their 
findings are analysed. The following section will address these issues, before turning to 
an overview of the actual results and findings from the primary research. 
5.4.2.1 Analysis of Primary Research Methodology 
In any interview-based primary research there will be biases (Robson, 1997). This is 
due to the inherently biased nature of human interaction and, in a deeper sense, to the 
inherent biases in human thought. For instance, in the study of foreign policy, the field 
of International Relations specifically addresses such issues. An example is the bias 
brought on by bureaucratic placement. The old saying, 'where you sit determines where 
you stand' sums the problem up well -individuals are recruited and then initiated into 
not just a profession, but also a professional outlook on how problems should be solved 
and this outlook is reflected in their responses to questions or decisions. 
However, these biases can be controlled. One way to control for them is to be very 
specific and frank about who is answering what question and how they answer it 
relative to others in a different situation. Of course, there are issues of confidentiality in 
providing the names of interviewees. However, it is generally acceptable to provide the 
organisation for which an individual works and, sometimes, their position. In this study, 
we have been able to provide such information. Thus, in the following sections, all 
responses will be tagged to individuals based on the organisation to which they belong. 
In order to safeguard the confidentiality of the replies from each of the individuals 
interviewed, or who repliec) to the questionnaire, the full and complete transcripts from 
each interview or questionnaire is not included in this thesis, but can be made available 
separately for examination, on request. 
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Another issue is that interviews often provide 'spotty' information (Robson, 1997). The 
limitations in time spent with an interviewee and the knowledge of any particular 
interviewee limit the amount of possible responses that can be obtained. It is therefore 
necessary to control this. 
In this study, the entire inventory of questions was posed to each interviewee. This was 
done in the belief that an interviewee's inalDility to answer a question can tell us 
something about their view or organisational bias. For instance, it may be found that 
those in a particular bureaucracy are unable to answer questions about the puolic's 
perceptions of privatisation as a rule, whereas in another bureaucracy they may have 
more insight. This could then tell us something about the ability of one bureaucracy to 
be sensitive to the public's perceptions relative to another bureaucracy. It also limits the 
bias of the interviewees by leading them down the same thought pattern that each of the 
other interviewees has been led down during the interviews. For instance, it may be the 
case that an interviewee will respond to a question concerning the public's perceptions 
of privatisation if oil and gas is mentioned as a topic of study first, since otherwise they 
may simply be considering privatisation in general, but afterwards they may think of it 
only in regard to oil and gas. Finally, it is the belief of this author that by asking all 
questions, sometimes you 'just get lucky'. 
The inventory of interview questions is listed below in order to provide the reader with 
an understanding of the nature of each interaction with the interviewee, what they were 
considering at the time, and what the realm of possible responses is expected to have 
been. The interviews were split into questions concerning the following topics: 
background and privatisation policy, legal framework, implementation, outcomes and 
follow-up, the public's perceptions on privatisation, political influence, and the oil and 
gas sector specifically. 
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Background to the privatisation policy: 
• What have been the main debates leading up to the formulation of the Iranian 
privatisation policy? At least three categories of debates must be analysed: 
academic, political, and economic. 
• Were there differences of opinion between the team in charge of the practical 
drafting of the law and the Cabinet? If yes, on what issues? 
• To what extent has the expert opinion played a role? Or was it largely 
marginalised in favour of political considerations? What was the profile of the 
expert group in charge of drafting the privatisation law? 
• Which actors (politicians, religious elite, interest groups, formal and informal 
associations, etc.) were most involved and put most weight in drafting the initial 
privatisation legislation and its subsequent by-laws and amendments? 
• Does the privatisation framework favour a particular social, economic, political, 
etc. group? Does it make clear a distinction between domestic and foreign 
capital? If so, why? 
• Why did so much time elapse between 1995 (when the privatisation programme 
of Iran was officially inaugurated) and 2000 (when the Third Plan actually 
codified procedures and institutions)? What are the reasons for this delay? 
• In those five years who were the most active actors in pushing for the actual 
privatisation codification and the go-ahead for the Iranian privatisation 
programme by the Third Plan? 
Legal framework: 
• Did the privatisation legislation regulate the most important issues? If not, what 
were the areas that were insufficiently regulated or omitted altogether? How did 
this change at later stages? 
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• Consistency of legislation: are the by-laws decreed subsequently by the Cabinet 
in accordance with the general framework set out in the Third Plan? Who were 
the initiators and the most influential actors in devising the by-laws? 
• What are the main areas allowing for discretion of key institutions and officials 
in charge of carrying out the privatisation programme? How has this discretion 
been exercised and to whose benefit? 
• Within the legislative and institutional set-up who has come to be the central and 
most influential institutional actor? Why? 
Implementation: 
• What is the level of political control and interference in the privatisation 
process? Are there concrete examples of how this was done in practice? 
• Methods of privatisation: who is in charge of selecting among various 
privatisation methods? Which ones are the most frequent types used? What are 
the most common types of preferences and closures? 
• Who is responsible for evaluating assets of companies identified for 
privatisation? Has this practice been abused? 
• Are there detailed criteria that have to be met for the privatisation deal to be 
approved? 
• What was the most common form of breaching the legislation on privatisation? 
How are such cases dealt with? 
• What is the practical impact of the relationship between enhancing economic 
efficiency and privatisation, which is clearly stated in the laws and regulations? 
Outcomes and follow-up: 
• Who are currently the main winners and losers in the privatisation process? 
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Public perceptions on privatisation: 
• To what extent was privatisation something of importance to local people? 
• Has this changed during the past ten years? 
Political influence: 
• Has the direction of the privatisation programme changed with changes m 
government? 
• Is there any political purpose performed by the oil and gas sectors, i.e. is it a 
politically intensive industry in the sense that the way it is being regulated 
creates dis/advantages to different political parties? 
The oil and gas sector: 
• How much has been already privatised in the Iranian oil and gas sector? 
• What trend do statistics reveal, i.e. in which direction is Iran moving - a global 
strategy for the whole sector or compartmentalising it and deciding different 
strategies for each separate area? 
• Has the legal and institutional framework been devised to account for substantial 
privatisation and modernisation in the oil and gas industry? 
As is apparent from the above questions, the interviewees were each given a wide swath 
of issues to comment upon. Of course, all interviewees did not comment on each issue 
at length. However, the response rate was high enough to draw a number of 
conclusions. The following section will detail the findings from these interviews. 
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5.5 Findings From the Primary Research 
A total of fifty people were contacted and discussions were held with all of them, 
although, strictly speaking, only 32 interviews were performed. The interviewees 
included representative members of industry, government and academia. The full list of 
these interviewees is provided in Appendix IV. 
Furthermore, a total of I 00 questionnaires were sent out to representative members of 
the government and academia in Iran. Only seven completed forms were returned. In 
some cases the questionnaire was filled out and the individual was interviewed 
separately. The low figure of returned questionnaires is in itself a valuable piece of 
information, and proves that the more qualitative approach of interviewing people 
worked better in this case. Appendix V contains a list of those who returned their 
questionnaires. 
Based on these interviews and the questionnaires which were filled out, it is possible to 
draw some generalisations and conclusions. The majority of this thesis has taken a 
structural level approach to the analysis of factors influencing privatisation policy in 
Iran. By generalising the results of these interviews, it is possible to add to this 
structural level approach (Silverman, 2000). This was done through a process of 
detailed comparison of interviewees. 
These general findings can be roughly split into two categories. First, there are the 
perceptions about why, how, when and what kind of privatisation will take place. 
Second, there are the perceptions about what groups are influencing the privatisation 
policy and how they are doing so. 
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5.5.1 Why, How, When and What Kind of1Privatisation 
Some interviewees (see Appendix N) suggested that there were structural factors 
involved in the decision to privatise in Iran. In particular, the relative price of oil is 
thought to play a major role in the possibility, or at least the pace, of the privatisation of 
the oil and gas industry in Iran. As one interviewee remarked: 
There has been a direct correlation between lower oil prices and 
faster pace for privatisation. Every time the price of oil has 
dropped in the international market, the pace and the impetus for 
privatisation has picked up. When in 1989/1990 the talk of 
privatisation started, right after the Iran - Iraq war, Iran hit the 
bottom of the selling price for its exports of oil. When this 
phenomenon is present, the government thinks seriously about 
reducing its cost of running its vast operations and therefore 
thinks of divesting itself of the companies it operates (Interview: 
Dr. Parviz Aghili, Managing Director, Karafarin Bank, Tehran, 1 
29 December 2005). 
Whatever the structural issues involved, it is generally assumed amongst most elites that 
the process of privatisation will make the Iranian economy more efficient and 
profitable. Furthermore, it is assumed that this process may also lead to better prospects 
for the government of Iran, in that it will have an increase in income from the 
burgeoning economy and less need to pay out. For instance, the following quotes were 
taken from several different interviews: 
The effect of privatisation [on the economy] will improve the 
profitability of the entity and hence will benefit the workers 
and the shareholders alike. Furthermore, this will reduce the 
size and the burdens of the government enabling it to regulate 
and supervise the activities, to everyone's benefit (Interview: 
Mr. Houshang Naderian, Chairman & Managing Director, 
Audit Organization, Tehran, December 2005). 
Other benefits noted were that privatisation will: 
(a) ... abolish all governmental restncuve policies and 
procedures enabling the management to act quickly for the 
benefit of the organisation. 
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(b) [Reduce] in the size of the government and hence, its 
overall expenses. 
(c) [Distribute] the assets and holdings amongst ordinary 
people. [Increasing] profitability (Interview: Mr. Hossein 
Mamdooh, Member of Board of Directors, Iran Helicopter 
Services Company (IHC) and Head of Quality Assurance, 
Tehran, December 2005). 
Although there is a clear logic behind the drive to privatise, most interviewees also 
noted that there were significant delays in implementing privatisation. While some 
pointed toward the structural effects of issues like the price of oil, as noted above, others 
simply noted that there were inefficiencies in the system. For example: 
The loss of time and the delays were the direct result of the 
lack of knowledge and clear-cut policies of the officials at the 
start. The firms that were privatised initially ended up in 
sacking its workers and ended in the closure of those 
production units and, hence, created the delays in establishing 
clearer ideas and methodologies for privatisation (Interview: 
Mr. Hossein Mamdooh, Member of Board of Directors, Iran 
Helicopter Services Company (IHC), Tehran, December 2005). 
These kinds of inefficiencies are to be expected given the size of the undertaking. 
However, it was not clear what the relationship was between these inefficiencies and 
other structural effects, nor was it clear which issues elites considered to be more causal. 
One factor that came up was that there were too many control and interest groups 
involved. As one interviewee noted: 
There are too many controls and interferences. This is the 
reason for the slow pace with which this process has moved 
forward since its inception. A case in point is when the oil 
ministry decided to sell off its drilling activities and privatise 
this division. Economically it was a viable proposition but 
since it was not accepted politically, this plan was set aside 
(Interview: Dr. H. Ghanirni Fard, Executive Director, 
International Affairs, NIOC Petroleum Ministry HQ, Tehran, 
22 December 2005). 
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Another factor is that changes in government, as expected, have led to changes m 
privatisation policy. As one source remarked: 
Unfortunately, every time a new government takes over, the 
privatisation programme goes through some modifications. It is 
as if they wish to re-invent the wheel, by putting their own 
signature on the agenda. By making the alterations and refitting 
the programme to suit their personality and to have their own 
signature on the scheme, much valuable time has been lost in 
the past (Interview: Mr. Iraj Nadimi, MP I Deputy Head of 
Majlis Economic Committee, and university lecturer, Tehran, 
24 December 2005). 
Although many interviewees seemed to agree that privatisation was a necessity and that 
at some point there would be a certain degree of privatisation of the oil and gas industry, 
there was not always agreement on which parts of the industry would be privatised. 
However, one of the recurrent views was that downstream oil and gas industry would 
privatise before upstream ones. For instance, one interviewee noted that: 
It seems to me that the downstream activities [marketing, 
distribution, transportation, refining] are more prone to being 
privatised in the short term (Interview: Dr. Narsi Ghorban, 
Managing Director, NarKangan (NGTLC) Gas to Liquid 
International Co., Tehran, 18 December 2005). 
One factor in particular is the capital intensiveness of an upstream industry. As one 
interviewee noted: 
I do not feel we are going to see a move in the upstream side of 
the oil industry being privatised as yet. There are a number of 
sections in the downstream side of the oil and gas industry that 
have already been privatised, and shall continue this trend. 
However, there are limits to privatising capital-intensive units 
i.e.: the refineries which are being heavily subsidised. The 
distribution, tanker company, and some others have already 
been sold off to the oil company pension fund organisation, 
before they go onto the Tehran Exchange, for a full-blown 
privatisation and IPO (Dr. H. Ghanimi Pard, Executive 
Director, International Affairs, NIOC Petroleum Ministry HQ, 
Tehran, 22 December 2005). 
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Another interviewee noted that politics might play a role in the privatisation of upstream 
versus downstream industries. He noted that: 
It does not appear to be a politically intensive industry, but it is. 
There are politicians who wish to stay close to the industry and 
this naturally breeds politicians trying to place their own close 
associates to run sections of this industry. I do not think that the 
politicians are going to have much effect on the upstream side 
of the industry. However, they probably will exert pressure in 
the downstream side of oil and gas, through their contacts and 
connections that they try to promote into positions of power in 
the sector (Interview: Dr. Mehdi Assali, President, Institute for 
International Energy Studies (liES), Tehran, 19 December 
2005). 
5.5.2 For or Against 
The question of politics leads naturally to the issue of what groups within Iran are for or 
against privatisation. In fact, the general consensus was that oil and gas privatisation in 
Iran is a fundamentally political issue. As one interviewee remarked: 
... petroleum and all its by-products are politically influenced 
and politically intensive commodities. Naturally, the industry is 
also motivated by the political agenda. There are certain people 
who could profit by keeping the oil sector this way (Interview: 
Mr. Hassan Lajevardi, Lecturer and, Deputy Director Econ. 
Research, Centre for Energy Studies-MATN, Tehran, 20 
December 2005). 
Put more boldly, which are the interest groups involved? The interviews and 
questionnaires made it possible to get some idea of who the elites perceive as being the 
relevant interest groups on each side of the equation. 
Different interests groups have different views on the issue and each group attempts to 
bring about its policy choice. Yet, most interviewees seemed to believe that the 
privatisation plan in theory does not favour one group over another. However, they also 
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tended to believe that it is the lack of transparency and complexities of the process 
which has "left a bad taste" in some people's mouths. For instance, one academic noted: 
From the looks of it, [privatisation] does not appear to be 
favouring a particular segment of the public. At the beginning 
the implementation of some of the production units took place 
by direct negotiations. This left a bad taste for many who were 
watching, whilst the de-nationalisation of these assets ended up 
in favour of the political elite's cronies (Interview: Dr. Ebrahim 
Razaghi, Professor of Economics, Tehran University, Tehran, 
26 December 2005). 
Nevertheless, although the privatisation plan may not specifically favour one particular 
group over another, there are clearly winners and losers in the privatisation plans in 
Iran, and this has created interest groups on both sides who are pressurising the process. 
These groups do not necessarily make the decisions on privatisation directly, but 
nonetheless, they seem to have some effect on the decision-making process, at least in 
the eyes of elites. 
Broadly speaking, some sources thought of the well-connected and those involved in the 
political system as being beneficiaries of privatisation. 116 This political elite is generally 
thought to be harmonious in its backing. As one interviewee noted: 
There is harmony and consensus amongst the political elite. 
The differences are usually pronounced in some using 
privatisation as a tool to balance their yearly budgets, whilst 
others think of it as the engine for economic progress and 
development. These two differing opinions are probably still in 
place (Interview: Mr. Houshang Naderian, Chairman & 
Managing Director, Audit Organization, Tehran, December 
2005). 
While the political elite is perceived as being for privatisation, all in all, the civil 
servants were not behind nor for this idea. As was noted: 
116 For instance, as noted by Dr. Aghili, Managing Director, Karafarin Bank, Tehran, 29 December 
2005. 
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The biggest problem of the consecutive governments has been 
that they have become 'competitors of the people', rather than 
passing on the management of the companies to the people. 
The ministries who have been asked to divest themselves of the 
companies under their wing are reluctant as they see this as a 
reduction of their 'reach, or their powers' (Interview: En gr. 
Mohamed Hossein Nejad Hosseinian, Deputy Minister of 
Petroleum, International Affairs, Tehran, 18 December 2005). 
Another interviewee noted that: 
[the] winners are the employees as a whole and the selected 
capable management of the newly privatised institutions. The 
losers are the narrow minded old government managers who 
have taken over the privatised institution and are too afraid of 
taking risks or bringing about new ideas which could improve 
the competitiveness and profitability (Interview: Mr. Hossein 
Mamdooh, Member of Board of Directors, Iran Helicopter 
Services Company (IHC), Tehran, December 2005). 
As expected, such views tended to be most prominent in interviews with those who 
were themselves part of the major government bureaucracies. 
Also similarly to other states, in Iran those on the left side of the political spectrum have 
tended to oppose privatisation. For instance, one interviewee noted that: 
Yes, there were those leftist oriented cabinet ministers who 
were against the privatisation and deep down inside did not 
wish to see the plan for privatisation succeed. Whilst they gave 
lip service by saying yes to the concept, in reality, they were 
not believers in the programme (Interview: Dr. Parviz Aghili, 
Managing Director, Karafarin Bank, Tehran, 29 December 
2005). 
Also, as we might expect, such views tended to come from those who were already 
involved in privatised businesses (i.e. from those more on the right). 
Moreover, as is the case in other states, the unions were also seen as stumbling blocks. 
For example, one interviewee noted: 
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There were no direct objections to the privatisation plans, 
except, we have seen the unions and middle management were 
putting stumbling blocks on the way of implementing this 
programme. They were afraid of losing their jobs. These same 
workers were those who helped to bring about the revolution 
and therefore, in the current labour laws, out of 203 Articles, 
102 Articles are in place to protect the workers against the 
owners! The labour laws have to change if privatisation is to 
succeed (Interview: Dr. Ali Hamadani, Legal Advisor, Society 
for Industrial Management, Tehran, 17 December 2005). 
Interviewees also addressed their perceptions of the feelings toward privatisation among 
the bulk of society (the 'masses'). It is generally assumed amongst the elite that 
privatisation is something which mainly affects and concerns elites. The masses are 
thought to take little interest in it, not to know about it, or simply not to care very much 
one way or the other. 
The masses, i.e. blue-collar workers, farmers, and generally the 
common people, are not too bothered by this concept. The 
academics, management people, upper middle classes with 
knowledge of economic issues, this concept is considered to be 
very important (Interview: Mr. Houshang Naderian, Chairman 
& Managing Director, Audit Organization, Tehran, December 
2005). 
One reason for this is that: 
[the] public has not had a choice or a say in the matter. They do 
not know how to differentiate between the private and public 
sector entities. [However] ... the public is gradually becoming 
more educated about differentiating between private and public 
sector (Interview: Dr. Parviz Aghili, Managing Director, 
Karafarin Bank, Tehran, 29 December 2005). 
In some cases, interviewees did point out that the masses were against privatisation. For 
instance, one interviewee, the Deputy Minister of Petroleum, remarked that: 
The common people and the masses do not think favourably of 
this concept. They think here is another way for the 'rich to get 
richer' ploy. They think of this issue as yet another way of 
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auctioning away what belongs to the future generations. The 
reason is that they have yet to see a successful outcome from 
the entities that were privatised (Interview: Engr. Mohamed 
Hossein Nejad Hosseinian, Deputy Minister of Petroleum, 
International Affairs, Tehran, 18 December 2005). 
In particular, it was thought that in some cases: 
... the local people see this process going against the 
distributive policies of the government. To this end, they are 
not favourable to this agenda (Interview: Dr. Abbas Maleki, 
Chairman, International Institute for Caspian Studies, Tehran, 
24 December 2005). 
Although the interviewees noted that there were several different constituencies which 
were either for or against privatisation, they all tended to understand who was 
specifically responsible for making privatisation policy. For example, this interviewee 
put it very concisely: 
The Privatisation Organisation is charged with this task. 
However, the Central Bank of Iran, Economic Committee, 
Tehran Stock Exchange and MPO (Management and Planning 
Organisation) can all have inputs into the discretionary issues 
raised on privatisation of the companies belonging to the 
government sector. They could also present a bill through the 
Cabinet of Ministers, and once ratified by Majlis and 
Expediency Council, the Privatisation Organisation will 
implement the execution (Interview: Mr. Ali Khorram (Former 
Ambassador to China), Deputy, High Council of Free Trade-
Industrial Zones Secretariat, Tehran, 17 December 2005). 
A related point is the fact that some of the respondents also addressed the question of 
whether the change in government would affect privatisation in Iran (i.e. would a 
change in the constituency change the policy?). As this thesis has tended to argue, there 
are strong structural issues that govern privatisation in Iran and these will likely force it 
through or not regardless of particular governments (at least in the short term). This 
view also tended to be accepted by elite members in the interviews. Moreover, the 
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conventional view was that these structural causes would eventually lead to 
privatisation. As one interviewee concisely put it: 
No. The privatisation programme will survive. The society 
wishes for this to happen (Interview: Mr. Ali Khorram (Former 
Ambassador to China), Deputy, High Council of Free Trade-
Industrial Zones Secretariat, Tehran, 17 December 2005). 
5.6 Analysis of Relevant Policy-maker Views 
Although this thesis has tended to point out the differences between Iran and other states 
in order to tease out the effects of Iranian idiosyncrasies on privatisation, there are some 
similarities between Iran and other countries in terms of structural constraints on 
privatisation. In particular, bureaucratic power seems to be playing a large role, 
particularly in terms of elite perceptions. For instance, many interviewees made the 
point that one of the primary obstacles to privatisation has been middle managers' and 
other bureaucrats' reticence in losing their influence. 
Similarly, there were some notable class differences in Iran which seem to have an 
effect on the future of privatisation in the eyes of political, business and academic elites. 
Almost all interviewees noted these differences, although not all of them thought that 
the differences would lead to the same results. For instance, some thought that the poor 
were ambivalent about privatisation, while others saw them as being very much against 
it. Yet, most believed that the political elite in general was for privatisation. 
It is evident from this discussion that this chapter is totally based on field surveys. 
These surveys are of special importance in the analysis of the privatisation process in 
Iran because they reveal the inside story of the situation. The outcome of these surveys 
suggests that: 
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• It was widely believed and experienced that privatisation reduces the burden of 
the government. 
• There was a mixed feeling that the privatisation process should be carried out 
through the stock exchange and/or through limited tender/negotiation, and 
dealings should be focused on potential and genuine buyers. 
• Due to limitations in the various sections of the constitutional laws related to 
foreign investment, there has not been significant progress in attracting foreign 
investment. 
• Interest and pressure groups had a major role in the decision-making process of 
privatisation and in its implementation. 
• From the beginning of this process, there have been disputes and debates 
between the religious elite and other influential bodies. 
These structural factors need to be accounted for in our overall analysis. In this sense, 
the interviews and questionnaire data have proved useful in the overall political, 
economic and theoretical analysis of privatisation in Iran. The conclusion to this study 
will put this subjective data into the broader context of the entire thesis and thereby lead 
to some final thoughts about the answer to the question of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION- PROSPECTS FOR THE 
FUTURE 
6.1 Summary of Argument 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the issues surrounding privatisation of some of 
Iran's national institutions, focusing on the oil and gas industries. By determining the 
critical factors which influenced such policy-making, some understanding of the reasons 
for both the public and private sectors' reluctance to enter into privatisation has been 
gained. More specifically, this study has investigated the specific privatisation policy 
determinants in order to ascertain whether there actually is the political will to privatise 
the Iranian oil and gas industries. To answer this question, various sub-themes were 
addressed, including the Iranian domestic, external and international environments over 
the past sixty years, along with the past privatisation policies of both Iran and other 
states. 
The thesis started by presenting an overview of the theoretical basis of privatisation, by 
detailing schools of thought. The central question of this study was also examined by 
looking at the opportunities for privatisation at a theoretical level, then looking at other 
examples of privatisation. Specifically, it looked at privatisation in Pakistan, Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan and India, along with the non-neighbouring states of Egypt and China. This 
methodology has enabled further refinement of its answer to the study question, by 
discussing and developing an understanding of the opportunities open to Iran for 
privatisation. 
Through a political economic approach, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examined the historical 
aspects which led to the present discussions of Iranian oil and gas privatisation. Each 
chapter explored a specific era of Iran's history. Chapter 2 looked at the post-Second 
World War period, dominated by the Shah, which led to the 1979 revolution. Chapter 3 
then examined Khomeini's rule from 1979 to 1989. Finally, Chapter 4 addressed the 
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contemporary situation in Iran, from 1989 to the present. Each of these chapters 
explored in detail the political and economic issues, culminating in an analysis of the 
interplay between these factors. 
With such theoretical and historical contexts established and in place, this thesis then 
addressed more specifically the contemporary determinants of Iran's pri vatisation 
policy. The next chapter, Chapter 5, then critically examined the four primary factors 
which directly affected Iran's privatisation policy. 117 
6.2 Summary of Conclusions 
Taking all of the chapters together we can draw some conclusions as to what the 
determinants of privatisation policy for the oil and gas industry are in Iran. These 
determinants are wide-ranging and based on the multiple perspectives and 
methodologies used in this case study. Each chapter has drawn its own conclusions, 
which have been summarised and analysed. The following paragraphs summarise these 
conclusions. 
6.2.1 Theoretical and Precedent-Based Conclusions 
Part Two of Chapter 1 examined the theoretical boundaries and precedent constraints on 
the determination of privatisation policy in Iran. In doing so, it effectively defined the 
landscape within which privatisation possibly takes place in Iran. 
117 The four being the specific background of privatisation thought in Iran; the legal and institutional 
framework; the nature of oil and gas relative to privatisation in Iran; and the personal thoughts of 
relevant policy-makers. 
234 
It was found that there are at least four theoretical factors that must be taken into 
consideration in our analysis of privatisation of the Iranian oil and gas sector. These are: 
• the definition and understanding of what privatisation is; 
• the boundaries set by other forms of economic change and alternatives to 
privatisation; 
• the different possible types and shades of privatisation; and 
• the limits and obligations within any privatisation deal, as set by the basic 
concept of the right to property. 
Within these theoretical bounds, the empirical information and historical background of 
privatisation were incorporated within each chapter. 
There were also some specific lessons to be learned from the different models of 
privatisation that were investigated, as well as from the historical precedents of 
privatisation. These lessons contribute directly to the policy-maker's decision-making 
process, showing that: 
• even though privatisation may be agreed upon, the nature of the method of 
privatisation will have a huge effect on the timeframe upon which privatisation 
is actually carried out and this factor must also therefore be considered in 
analysis and predictions for future investment; 
• it is often assumed that, in theory, there will be a fairly correct analysis by the 
government and that policy will conform to this. However, we must keep open 
the possibility that such an assumption may be wrong and that the government 
may simply make a mistake; 
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• different industries may or may not privatise depending on their type; 
specifically, so-called 'strategic' industries, including the oil and natural gas 
industry, will tend to privatise differently from other non-strategic industries; 
• we must keep the possibility of other such options open when considering what 
decision-makers in Iran are taking into account, e.g. based upon precedents, in 
their analysis of whether to, and how to, privatise the oil and gas industry in 
Iran; and 
• political infighting over privatisation is the norm, not the exception to the rule, 
and this is a double-edged sword. For, even in the case that the core of the 
Iranian government decided not to privatise the industry, there would still be the 
hope of a debate and that out of this debate, there would emerge a possibility for 
compromise. Thus, potential parts of the industry could be subject to 
privatisation or there may otherwise be changes in the prospects for 
privatisation. 
Finally, it was discovered that the Iranian state-controlled economy has been 
unsuccessful in improving the lives of its people, as promised by the founder of the 
Islamic Revolution and repeated by its current President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. 
6.2.2 Political Economy Conclusions 
The political economic analysis performed m the historical chapters (2, 3 and 4) 
demonstrated that there is an interplay of domestic and international political and 
economic factors that has been the determinant of the Iranian policy of privatisation. 
Each of these factors was explored separately. 
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The first factor is the disjunction between Iran's government and society. This issue is 
theorised by what Katouzian (2000, 2003) has called the theory of 'arbitrary rule'. This 
factor has traversed time and affected all governments in Iran, even after the revolution 
of 1979. 
The second factor is the disjunction between economic and political/social 
modernisation. This disjunction was examined in relation to the Shah's attempts at 
economic and political reform, then continued on past the revolution and into today. 
The third factor in determining policy is Iran's dependence on oil. Oil played a major 
role in the Shah's Iran and has continued to do so since the revolution. It has skewed 
and biased both domestic and international policy in the state through to the present day. 
The fourth factor to consider is the relationship of Iran with the West (and the US in 
particular), and Iranian society's perception of this relationship (including the legacy of 
Anglo Iranian Oil Co and the coup against Dr Mosaddeq). In particular, the perception 
of the West's imperialistic attitude towards Iran had significant effects on the nature of 
Iran's policy before the revolution and has continued to do so since. 
These four factors have all helped to determine the nature of Iranian policy in regard to 
privatisation throughout the history of Iran, going back at least to the Shah. These 
factors continued into post-revolution Iran due, in part, to the brevity of the Iranian 
revolution. Beyond these factors, there are two supplementary factors that have had 
significant sway since the revolution. 
The first supplementary factor is the role of the Islamic Republic's revolutionary 
ideology. After the revolution, politics and economics in Iran showed some continuities 
with pre-revolution Iran, but huge changes were also experienced. The revolutionary 
ideology led to changes in the government, including factionalisation, as well as 
changes in foreign policy. These included, specifically, the Iran hostage crisis, and 
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Iran's handling of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. Another key issue has been the 
Iranian relationship with nuclear power and nuclear weapons. 
The second supplementary factor is the role of religion in Iran. In particular, religion has 
had a complex, and very direct, relationship with privatisation in Iran. However, it has 
also had other effects on politics and economics in Iran, such as the complex 
relationship of Khomeini' s views on the revolution with his views on fundamentalist 
Islam. 
6.2.3 Contemporary Iran-Based Conclusions 
Chapter 5 analysed, from a contemporary perspective, four of the primary factors 
affecting privatisation in Iran. It examined the background issues that led up to the 
current views of privatisation in Iran. It also studied the role of legal and regulatory 
issues in privatisation. It looked at the unique importance of oil and natural gas in Iran. 
Finally, it incorporated the primary fieldwork information in terms of the personal, 
subjective views of relevant Iranian policy-makers and policy enactors. 
The general conclusions to be found here in terms of legal, regulatory and oil issues are 
fairly straightforward. Legal and regulatory issues are, at the broadest level, tools of 
policy. While there are uncertainties in the effects of the legal and regulatory policies 
already on the books, these uncertainties are at the mercy of even more fundamental 
issues - these being the immense role played by oil and the role of ebtes. 
As was demonstrated, oil plays an immense role in the economic and political life of 
Iran. Because of this, and in particular, because of its strategic importance, it holds a 
special place in terms of privatisation. Therefore, it is not necessarily helpful to consider 
oil and gas privatisation in terms comparable to other industries. As such, it was helpful 
in this study to take a more direct look at some of the specific concerns of elites in Iran. 
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As was alluded to in the more theoretical political economy sections of this study, there 
is a relevant difference between those in the government or connected to its higher 
echelons (the 'elite') and those who are not (the 'common people'). Since the elite are 
the ones who are actually writing the policy, it was helpful to look at their perceptions 
of privatisation in Iran in particular, as well as their perceptions of non-elite influence 
on privatisation policy. The difference in these views is well summarised by one 
interviewee in particular, who notes that: 
The blue-collar workers and the farmers had no clues as to 
what was and is going on. The higher income and middle 
management as well as the political elite and policy-makers 
think very highly of the privatisation scheme (Gholam Hassan 
Abiri, Lecturer, MPO and Tehran University, Applied 
Economics Research, Tehran, 19 December 2005). 
Yet, although these differences in opinion exist, and even within the elite there is a 
difference in that it was generally accepted that privatisation would happen, the question 
that the elite were more concerned with was how fast it would happen -due to systemic 
delays, as well as which parts of the oil and gas industry would be privatised. Thus, 
although the government has recently shifted in Iran and foreign relations have been 
changing radically since 2001, there is still a widespread feeling that privatisation will 
happen because of fundamental structural issues. 
6.3 Summary Chart and Final Conclusion 
Taking together all of the points discussed in the preceding chapters, it is possible to 
draw up a chart which summarises these factors. 
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Table 6.1: Factors Determining Iranian Privatisation Policy 
Factors Determining Privatisation 
Historical Disjunction Disjunction Economic Relations and Revolutionary Religion 
and Political between state between dependence perceptions of ideology 
Economy and society economic and on oil relations with 
political/ the West and 
social us 
modernisation 
Theoretical Theories of privatisation Alternatives to privatisation 
Precedents Neighbouring states: Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Other important states: Egypt and China 
Kyrgyzstan and India 
Specific Background of Legal and institutional Oil Sector Personal perceptions 
privatisation factors of policy-makers 
Source: Privatisation Organisation (2004 ). 
Thus, we are able to conclude that the answer to the thesis question posed is this: 
privatisation policy in Iran will be determined by several interacting factors including 
the disjunction between state and society, the disjunction between economic and 
political/social modernisation, Iran's economic dependence on oil, relations and 
perceptions of relations between Iran and the West (and the US m particular), the 
Islamic revolutionary ideology and religion, as well as through theories of privatisation 
and international precedents of privatisation. 
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6.3.1 Summarising Major Themes 
The conclusion made in the previous section is, in a sense, a sufficient summary of the 
factors that affect the prospects of privatisation in Iran. However, based on a reading of 
the themes that have emerged throughout this study, it is possible to make a more 
inclusive and conceptual conclusion. The two themes in particular that are key here are 
Iranian exceptionalism and structural factors. 
6.3.2 Exceptionalism 
This thesis has found, in both its primary and secondary research, the persistent theme 
of Iranian exceptionalism. Although many states have come to privatise their national 
industries, it seems that the case of Iran is somehow exceptional. This view permeates 
through much of the literature on Iran and its economy, and is further illustrated in this 
study. The particular factors leading to this exceptionalist view, which were addressed 
throughout this study, come down to the role of religion and revolution in Iran. 
Religion creates exceptionalism in terms of Iranian privatisation, due to Iran's 
fundamental basis in Islamic theocracy. This has meant that all politics and economics 
are affected, to some degree, by Islam, and in particular, by the dictates of Shia' Islam. 
For example, Chapter 4 discussed the effects of Islamic thought on the Iranian 
economy. 
However, there are other Islamic states, and even ones that are also dependent on oil. 
For instance, we might also look at Saudi Arabia. However, Iran differs from these 
other states in that it is not only a theocratic state but also a revolutionary one. 
The Iranian revolution and its aftermath had an immense and, to a certain extent, unique 
impact on Iran. For example, it was discussed how the revolution led to foreign policy 
crises in Iran, as with, for instance, the hostage crisis. At the same time, there has been 
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an echo of the revolutionary policies that has led all the way up to present day political 
and economic decisions. 
Together, these factors (religion and revolution) have led to the exceptionalism of Iran 
and Iranian privatisation policy more specifically. As noted, academics both within and 
outside of Iran hold this view. It was also prominent in the interviews and questionnaire 
responses carried out as part of the primary research for this study. 
For this reason, we should not take it to be the case that we can understand privatisation 
in Iran purely in terms of the theoretical or comparative factors previously discussed in 
this study. These theoretical and comparative issues were of some help in 
contextualising Iranian privatisation. However, Iran differs fundamentally from other 
cases of privatisation that have been discussed here in terms of direct comparisons or 
more theoretical issues. The relevant difference, of course, arises out of the fact that 
Iranian policy and economics is affected to such a high degree by religion and 
revolution. As such, it has been necessary to take a very specific look at Iran - one 
which has taken into account many issues that might not be relevant in other state 
privatisation examples. 
Yet, although this thesis has tended to point out the differences between Iran and other 
states in order to tease out the effects of Iranian idiosyncrasies on privatisation, there are 
some similarities between Iran and other countries in terms of structural constraints on 
privatisation. In particular, bureaucratic power seems to be playing a large role, 
particularly in terms of elite perceptions. For instance, many interviewees made the 
point that one of the primary obstacles to privatisation has been middle managers' and 
other bureaucrats' reticence at losing their influence. 
It was argued that Iranian exceptionalism is the result of a combination of the effects of 
religion, revolution and bureaucracy. In this liRe, it is suggested that the Iranian five-
year development plans reflect some aspects of this combination including, among 
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others, the pernicious effects of an inefficient bureaucratic power. Iranian five-year 
central planning, first established in 1979, appears as the coalescence of religion and 
revolution in the form of Islamic Marxism. Over time, the effects of central planning 
and the views on it have varied. When analysing the outcome of the Third Development 
Plan covering 2000-2004 (Privatisation Organisation, 2002), the most recently 
completed plan, Amuzegar suggests that: 
Five-year central planning has now become a sacred ritual in 
the Islamic Republic ... and although [it] has proven to be a 
costly exercise in futility, it is still regarded as a talisman for 
Iran's economic salvation (Amuzegar, 2005:61). 
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Professor of Economics at Virginia Tech, suggests in turn that 
planning has become more indicative than centralist and that it fulfils a necessary 
function of coordination between the private sector and the government (Samii and 
Aman, 2005). 
It ought to be said that Amuzegar is not entirely negative about the outcomes of the 
Third Plan either. He claims that these outcomes were much better than those of the 
previous Plan (the Second Development Plan) (Privatisation Organisation, 2002), yet he 
insists in pointing out the lack of effective formulation of the development goals and the 
lack of meticulous implementation that seemingly characterise the Third Plan. It is 
suggested that both kinds of deficiencies are typical features of vast and largely 
ideologised state machineries like the Iranian administration. Furthermore, the lack of 
commitment among the different levels of bureaucrats to conform to the plan mandates 
and, at the same time, the unrealistic nature of some of the goals are also emphasised by 
Amuzegar as contributing factors to the partial failure of the Third Plan. Finally, 
Amuzegar (2005:61) also denounces that no real progress has been made in price 
decontrols and in privatising money-losing state enterprises under the Third Plan. 
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The successor of the Third Plan, the Fourth Plan, was approved in September 2004 and 
contains six parts (Privatisation Organisation, 2004). The first part, which delineates 57 
articles aiming at the development of a "knowledge-based growth of the national 
economy in interaction with the global economy", along with the sixth part, devoted to 
"good governance and the modernisation of the state" appear to be the most relevant 
ones for the context of privatisation (Ibid.). Beyond the more obvious concern with 
rapid economic expansion, there is clearly an interest in addressing the issues pointed 
out by Amuzegar (2005) in relation to the current inefficiency of the state apparatus (by 
improving governance and modernising the functioning of the public administration) 
which have direct implications for privatisation. However, the Fourth Plan (Privatisation 
Organisation, 2004) had a shaky start. According to some legislators, the by-laws and 
instructions required to commence the implementation of the plan had not been 
prepared in time and had to be designed 'on the march' (Samii and Aman, 2005). This 
kind of amending dynamic, that is, the practice of designing the actual implementation 
measures as the central plans unfold instead of planning ahead, seems to have become 
the rule within the Iranian administration. For all these reasons, it is suggested that the 
notion of exceptionalism is applicable in the context of government central planning, 
and that the five-year development plans actually reflect some key aspects of the triad 
that sustains the notion: religion, revolution, and bureaucracy. 
Finally, there are also some perceivable class differences in Iran which seem to have an 
effect on the future of privatisation in the eyes of the political, business and academic 
elites. Almost all interviewees noted these differences, although not all interviewees 
thought that the differences would lead to the same results. For instance, some thought 
that the poor were ambivalent about privatisation, while others saw them as being very 
much against it. Yet, most believed that the political elite in general was for 
privatisation. 
Nevertheless, while these issues have played a role, they do not override the importance 
of religion and revolution. This is illustrated by the very fact that Iran has not privatised 
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its oil and gas industry in the same way or as fully as other countries which do not have 
the same exceptionalist issues to deal with. 
6.3.3 Structural Factors 
Combined with this exceptionalism, there are also structural factors that need to be 
taken into account in terms of understanding the privatisation of oil and gas in Iran. For 
instance, Gidden' s (1984) concept of structuration was discussed. At this point it is 
helpful to fully account for these effects. 
There are multiple structural factors that have had, and will continue to have, an 
overwhelming causal effect on privatisation in Iran. These include: 
• the gradual shift of Iranian internal and foreign policy towards a more pragmatic 
approach due to the realities of internal and foreign policy realities, as opposed 
to revolutionary ideologies; 
• the growth and shrinking of the Iranian economy over time, and in particular in 
relation to oil prices; 
• the gradual trend towards inefficiencies in the Iranian economy as the 
nationalised oil economy has evolved over time and in relation to the regional 
and global economy; 
• the evolution of internal Iranian politics, in particular, in regards to its having a 
younger and more educated population which is more connected to the outside 
world; and finally 
• in this sense the exceptionalist role of religion and revolution and these factors' 
evolution over time also count as structural factors. 
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Together, these factors are more fundamental than any particular policy or politician in 
Iran. They are also more relevant than any particular external foreign policy or political 
event, including the war in Iraq or the ongoing nuclear crisis. As such, privatisation in 
Iran must be understood within the context of an ongoing structural progression. 
In particular, we should conclude that these structural factors have been inextricably 
pushing Iran towards privatisation. This is clear at a theoretical level in terms of the 
need to deal with inefficiencies in the Iranian economy. It is also clear from the fact that 
Iranian privatisation policy has continued to move forward, though at a variable pace, 
for over a decade. Finally, this was made clear in the views of the elites who were 
interviewed for this study. 
6.4 Factors in the Determination of Political Will and Prospects for the Future 
Yet, such a conclusion should not be taken too far. Although this study finds that 
privatisation will happen in Iran, it is less clear how and when privatisation will occur. 
Three factors must be taken into account in order to make more precise conclusions and 
find more precise implications. These are the role of unpredictability in internal politics, 
the effects of the global economy, and the differences inherent to Iran's oil and gas 
economy, especially in regard to upstream and downstream privatisation. 
The main issue for Iran at the moment is its nuclear stand-off with the international 
community. What is obvious, taking into account the paradox of the 3 July 2006 
declaration of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is that the resolution of this crisis will impact on 
the future course of Iran, not just in terms of its foreign policy, but also in terms of its 
domestic politics, its economy and potentially even the nature of the state itself. 
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6.4.1 Problem of Unpredictability 
An important issue covered in Chapter 5, which we promised to return to, is the 
problem of the admission of unpredictability in national politics. In particular, Chapter 5 
noted that the recent election of Ahmadinejad was taken by some analysts to be 
unexpected. And, importantly for this discussion, the particular policies and policy paths 
which he has chosen and will choose are not necessarily those which align with the 
point made above (i.e. that there has been a reversion to the pursuit of modernity and 
that modernity is causal to privatisation policy in Iran). 
This issue is particularly important with regard to the implications from this study and, 
especially, for our ability to make predictions of what will happen in the political, 
economic and oil spheres. Specifically, it forces us to ask the question of whether we 
really can make any predictions, even based on the significant amount of background, 
historical and theoretical information which this thesis has brought forth. 
At the least, we must accept that the pace and extent of privatisation will be determined, 
to some degree, by changes in Iranian politics. Although we have come to the clear 
conclusion that privatisation will happen regardless of the changes in Iranian politics, 
changes in the leadership of Iran (such as in the form of the election of Ahmadinejad) 
do have an effect on the pace of privatisation. In particular, we might conclude that in 
the case of Ahmadinejad's election, privatisation's progress in Iran will be slower than 
it might have been if, for instance, Rafsanjani had won the election. 
6.4.2 The Effect of Globalisation on Iran 
This study has continually brought out the effects of the regional and global political 
system and economy on Iran. This began long ago with the British and American's 
placement of the Shah with an economic rationale. It continues through to today. Even 
though Iran separated itself, and was in tum seJJarated from many other states after the 
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revolution, globalisation has meant that it cannot escape the effects of the global 
economy and other states' foreign policies - if it ever could. Iran's view of globalisation 
is a tool in the hands of the former coloniser and the current superpower to legitimise 
the neoliberal global project; that is, the creation of a global free market and the 
consolidation of Anglo-American capitalism around the world (Held and McGrew, 
2002). In post-revolutionary Iran, there has been no sustained dialogue between 
globalisers and the Iranian political elite. The revolution swept away the secular, pro-
Western elite and delivered the state to Islarnists, thus removing the thesis against which 
Islarnist antithesis could react. Instead of becoming a tool with which to forge a 
synthesis with globalisation, the Islamic state turned in on itself, both because of the 
imposition of sanctions by the US and because of the perceived need to consolidate and 
defend the revolution (Henry and Springborg, 2001). Notwithstanding this 
phenomenon, I contend that Iran has and will be sensitive to global issues, since the 
elasticity of its oil revenues is linked to its awareness and connection to the global 
systems. 
A particularly significant issue to account for is the role of world oil prices. As was 
noted in the primary research of this study, changes in oil prices affect the prospects of 
Iranian privatisation of the oil and gas industry. To simplify the matter, when oil prices 
are relatively high, privatisation progress tends to slow; when oil process are relatively 
low, privatisation progress tends to speed up. 
The logic behind this is fairly straightforward: as high oil prices mean that oil is worth 
more to the Iranian government and therefore it is less willing to part with it. Moreover, 
since the government of Iran has more money at such times, it is able to make up for 
inefficiencies in the economy and support itself, remain politically stable and, in 
general, prop up the overall economy. Therefore, it does not need to reform and 
privatise the oil and gas industry. The logic goes in reverse as well: when oil prices are 
low, the government has less money to prop itself up and maintain the overall economy 
(due to, for instance, the need to subsidise various products and industries). This means 
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that it is forced to look for ways to make the economy more efficient and privatisation is 
an obvious way to do this. 
6.4.3 Upstream Versus Downstream Oil Privatisation 
Chapter 5 pointed out that there is a discemable difference in the prospects of upstream 
versus downstream privatisation in Iran. This point needs to be further reinforced. In 
particular, we need to take into account three factors: oil and gas are considered to be 
strategic industries in Iran, and Iranian exceptionalism. 
The oil economy in Iran is strategic on multiple levels. At one level it is necessary in 
order to keep the total Iranian economy afloat since its economy is so dependent on oil 
as an export that brings in foreign capital and as a means of employing (or subsidising) 
a large number of people in Iran to some degree. At the same time, Iran's oil and gas 
gives it significant strategic weight in its dealings with neighbouring and global states in 
that it can threaten to lower or end oil and gas exports. Finally, oil and gas are used 
generally as a means of strategic trade, for instance, as illustrated by recent deals 
between Iran and China. Together, these factors mean that Iran cannot easily let go of 
its control over its oil and gas economy, especially at the hands of companies based in 
states that may potentially be enemies. 
The strategic value of Iran's oil and gas industry is compounded by Iranian 
exceptionalism. As noted, Iran's politics and economics are dictated to some degree by 
religious and revolutionary undertones. In this r:espect, other states (and even companies 
from other states) are seen through the lens of revolution and (different) religion. This 
means that Iran should be seen as even less trusting of international agreements, 
including economic ones, than other states. 
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Together, this has led to a reluctance to privatise the oil and gas industry in general. By 
extension, it has led to Iranian reluctance to pri vatise some parts of the oil and gas 
industry relative to other parts of the industrial sector. In particular, Iran has been less 
willing to privatise those areas of the oil and gas industry which are more relevant to 
Iran, and which make the country more dependent on other states. In other words, it is 
less willing to privatise upstream oil and gas industry than it is to privatise downstream 
oil and gas industry. 
6.5 Implications and Prospects of Iranian Privatisation 
Thus, we can draw some implications and prospects for the future out of the conclusions 
of this study. These prospects can be summarised into three areas: continued 
privatisation, pacing being dependent on internal politics and global oil prices, and 
privatisation of the downstream oil and gas industry followed later by upstream 
industry. 
An important overall conclusion to this study is that privatisation will happen in Iran. 
This privatisation will include the privatisation of the oil and gas industry. This is 
demonstrated by the structural drivers of Iran's political and economic system, and is 
independent of short-term political or economic changes. Rather, the question of 
privatisation in Iran is a matter of pacing and extent. 
The pacing of Iran's privatisation of the oil and gas industry will depend on multiple 
factors. Of particular importance are the changes in the internal political situation and 
changes in global oil prices. Internal political changes, such as the continued 
governance (or re-election) of Ahmadinejad, will lead to a slowdown in the pace of 
privatisation. Nevertheless, privatisation will continue to move forward. Similarly, 
privatisation will be dependent, to a degree, on world oil prices. In particular, prospects 
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of continued high world oil prices leads to the conclusion that privatisation will 
continue at a slower relative rate in Iran. For the privatisation of oil and gas to succeed 
in Iran, there is a need to restructure the state organisation. In particular: 
• National financial matters must be tackled by professionals and not on the basis 
of their political affiliations. 
• At present, the country lacks a clear and comprehensive investment policy, and 
rules and regulations attached to investment, particularly foreign investment. 
The government should hire independent professionals from both within and 
outside the country to review the existing rules and regulations in Iran. 
• There is a requirement to overhaul the bureaucratic system now m place. 
Independent financial consultants should be invited to provide objective 
solutions to the process of investment by local and foreign investors. 
• Tax and labour laws will need to be overhauled, enabling investors to make 
short, medium and long-term plans for their investments. Furthermore, tax and 
labour laws should create an investment-friendly environment to attract foreign 
investment in investment-intensive projects. 
• New regulatory and 'watch-dog' organisations should be created to monitor each 
phase of the investment to performance of the privati sed institutions. 
Finally, the extent of privatisation m Iran will depend on the relative strategic 
importance of the industry in relation to the exceptionalist factors of Iran's politics and 
economic system. This means that we can expect a continuing fast pace of privatisation 
in non-strategic areas such as farming. Within the oil and gas industry, we can expect 
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that downstream industries will privatise at a relatively faster rate than upstream 
industries. Even so, eventually we can expect both upstream and downstream industries 
to become fully privatised. 
Although Ahmadinejad (current President of the Islamic Republic of Iran) was elected 
on a platform that featured anti-corruption, it seems highly unlikely, now that one year 
has passed since his election, that he will be any more effective at alleviating the plight 
of the Iranian people than President Khatami - and he may even make circumstances 
worse. Ahmadinejad, as a perceived pious man, is committed to fighting corruption, but 
it is hard to imagine that the regime will allow him to do anything meaningful, because 
it is the regime itself that is the principal engine and beneficiary of this corruption. 
Likewise, whilst Ahmadinejad campaigned on a platform of economic reform, his 
vision of this was a take on the populist version of 1970s' socialism. Unfortunately, Iran 
needs less socialism, not more. It needs fewer price controls, more privatisation, more 
private investment and more free enterprise. 
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION: 
Dear Sir I Madam, 
With greetings and salutations, I enclose the questionnaire that I have constructed to 
address Iran's Privatisation programme which forms the final part of the research I am 
conducting towards completion of my doctorate at Durham University. 
I would be grateful if you could kindly respond to the questions in the questionnaire in 
an effort to assist me in drawing my conclusions to this research work. Whilst your 
efforts in this undertaking will not have a material gain for you, I am certain that it shall 
be profitable in spiritual benefits. 
In conclusion, I would wish to draw your attention to a number of key issues in 
responding to the questionnaire. 
1. Please be as concise as possible in your responses to the questions. 
2. In case you need more room for your responses, please use a blank page with the 
question number clearly stated on the page. 
3. Should you agree, kindly fill in the resume' page, also attached, about yourself. 
4. Your early return of the questionnaires with your answers will be greatly 
appreciated. 
Finally, it is incumbent upon me to thank you for your cooperation. I am most grateful 
and indebted to you. 
Yours sincerely, 
Reza Molavi 
Ph.D. Candidate, School of Government & 
International Affairs 
Durham University 
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
Ouenstionnaire on privatisation in Iran: 
We are conducting a survey concerning the context, legal and institutional 
framework, and future of privatisation. Your comments on this quesitonnaire will 
be very helpful in furthering our research. 
Please fill out the answers to the questions below in the space provided. If you need 
more room to answer a quesiton, feel free to use another sheet of paper.lf you feel 
unable to answer a quesiton, you may leave the space blank. 
Thank you for your time. 
Background to the privatisation policy: 
1) What have been the main debates leading up to the formulation of the Iranian 
privatisation policy? At least three categories of debates must be analysed: 
academic, political, economic? 
305 
2) Were there differences of opinion between the team in charge of the practical 
drafting the law and the Cabinet? If yes, on what issues? 
3) What was the profile of the expert group in charge of drafting the privatisation law? 
4) Which actors (politicians, religious elite, interest groups, formal and informal 
associations, etc.) were most involved and put most weight in drafting the initial 
privatisation legislation and its subsequent by-laws and amendments? 
5) Does the privatisation framework favour a particular social, economic, political, etc. 
group? Does it make clear distinction between domestic and foreign capital? 
306 
6) Why so much time elapsed between 1995 (when the privatisation programme of Iran 
was officially inaugurated) and 2000 (when the Third Plan actually codified 
procedures and institutions)? What are the reasons for this delay? 
7) In those five years who were the most active actors in pushing for the actual 
priviatisation codification and the go-ahead for the Iranian privatisation programme 
by the Third Plan? 
Legal framework 
8) Did the privatisation legislation regulate the most important issues? If not, what 
were the areas that were insufficiently regulated or omitted altogether? How did this 
change at later stages? 
307 
9) Consistency of legislation: are the by-laws decreed subsequently by the Cabinet in 
accordance with the general framework set out in the Third Plan? Who were the 
initiators and the most influential actors in devising the by-laws? 
1 0) What are the main areas allowing for discretion of key institutions and officials in 
charge of carrying out the privatisation programme? Please give examples. How has 
this discretion been exercised and to whose benefit? 
11) Within the legislative and institutional set-up which has come to be the central and 
most influential institutional actor? Why? 
308 
Implementation 
12) What is the level of political control and interference in the privatisation process? 
Are there concrete examples of how this was done in practice? 
13) Methods of privatisation: who is in charge of selecting among various privatisation 
methods? Which ones are the most frequent types used? What are the most common 
types of preferences and closures? 
14) Who is responsible for evaluating assets of companies slated for privatisation? How 
has this been done? 
15) Are there detailed criteria that have to be met for the privatisation deal to be 
approved? 
309 
16) What was the most common form of breaching the legislation on privatisation? How 
are such cases dealt with? 
17) What is the practical impact of the relationship between ehnancing economic 
efficiency and privatisation, which is clearly stated in the laws and regulations? 
Outcomes and follow up 
18) Who are currently the main winners and losers from the privatisation process? 
Public perceptions of privatisation 
19) In your opinion, to what extent privatisation was something of importance to local 
people? 
310 
20) Do you believe that this has changed during the past ten years? 
Political Influence 
21) Has the direction of the privatisation programme changed with changes in 
government? 
22) Is there any political purpose perfonned by the oil and gas sectors, i.e. is it a 
politically intensive industry in the sense that the way it is being regulated creates 
dis/advantages for different political parties? 
The Oil and Gas Sector 
23) How much has been already deregulated in the Iranian oil and gas sector? 
311 
24) What trend do statistics reveal, i.e. in which direction is Iran moving- a global 
strategy for the whole sector or compartmentalising it and decising different 
strategies for each separate area? 
25) Has the legal and institutional framework been devised to account for substantial 
privatisation in the oil and gas industry? 
26) Has a framework been devised to account for modernisation in the oil and gas 
industry? 
312 
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ENGLISH TRANSLATION 
Interview Questions 
Background to the privatisation policy: 
1) Were there differences of opinion between the team in charge of the practical 
drafting the law and the Cabinet? If yes, on what issues? 
2) Does the privatisation framework favour a particular social, economic, political, 
etc. group? Does it make clear distinction between domestic and foreign capital? 
Legal framework 
3) What are the main areas allowing for discretion of key institutions and officials 
in charge of carrying out the privatisation programme? Please give examples. 
How has this discretion been exercised and to whose benefit? 
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Implementation 
4) What is the level of political control and interference in the privatisation 
process? Are there concrete examples of how this was done in practice? 
5) Are there detailed criteria that have to be met for the privatisation deal to be 
approved? 
Public perceptions of privatisation 
6) In your opinion, to what extent privatisation was something of importance to 
local people? 
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Political Influence 
7) Has the direction of the privatisation programme changed with changes in 
government? 
8) Is there any political purpose performed by the oil and gas sectors, i.e. is it a 
politically intensive industry in the sense that the way it is being regulated 
creates dis/advantages for different political parties? 
The Oil and Gas Sector 
9) Has the legal and institutional framework been devised to account for substantial 
privatisation in the oil and gas industry? 
1 0) Has a framework been devised to account for modernisation in the oil and gas 
industry? 
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APPENDIX IV: 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Mr. Gholam Hassan Abiri, Lecturer, MPO and Tehran University, Applied Economics 
Research, Tehran, 19 December 2005. 
Professor Hossein Afarideh, MP, Member of the Committee for Energy at Majlis, 
Deputy to Iran's Head of Nuclear Agency, 24 December 2006. 
Dr. Parviz Aghili, Managing Director, Karafarin Bank, Tehran, 29 December 2005. 
Mr. Hossein Kazempour Ardebili, Deputy Minister of Petroleum/Head of Iran 
delegation to OPEC, Member of NIOC Board of Directors and Chairman of NICO. 
Interview took place at the ministry HQ on 26 December 2005 (also called into the 
meeting: Mr. Mohammad Alipour-Jeddi, Head Petroleum Market Analysis Dept., 
OPEC, Austria. 
Dr. Mehdi Assali, President, Institute for International Energy Studies (liES), Tehran, 
19 December 2005. 
Dr. Mehdi M. Behkish, Secretary General, Int'l Chamber of Commerce-Iran, and 
Associate Professor in Economics, 18 December 2005. 
Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director of Foreign Exchange Research 
Department of Central Bank of Iran, 28 December 2005. 
Engineer Kamal Daneshyar, MP, Head of Energy Commission, Majlis, 24 December 
2005. 
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Dr. H. Ghanimi Fard, Executive Director, International Affairs, NIOC Petroleum 
Ministry HQ, Tehran, 22 December 2005. 
Dr. Narsi Ghorban, Managing Director, NarKangan (NGTLC) Gas to Liquid Int'l Co., 
Tehran, 18 December 2005. 
Dr. Ali Hamadani, Legal Advisor, Society for Industrial Management, Tehran, 17 
December 2005. 
En gr. Mohamed Hossein Nejad Hosseini an, Deputy Minister of Petroleum, International 
Affairs, Tehran, 18 December 2005. 
Mr. Ali Khorram (former Ambassador to China), Deputy, High Council of Free Trade-
Industrial Zones Secretariat, Tehran, 17 December 2005. 
Mr. Hassan Khoshpour, Deputy Economic Affairs/Privatisation, Management and 
Planning Organisation (MPO), 26 December 2005. 
Dr. Akbar Komijani, Vice Governor, Economic Directorate, The Central Bank of Iran, 
25 December 2005. 
Mr. Hassan Lajevardi, Lecturer and, Deputy Director Econ. Research, Centre for 
Energy Studies-MA TN, Tehran, 20 December 2005. 
Mr. Saeed Leylaz, Vice President-Sales and Marketing, Iran Khodro Diesel Co. Pic., 19 
December 2005 at their HQ. 
Dr. Abbas Maleki, Chairman, International Institute for Caspian Studies, Tehran, 24 
December 2005. 
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Mr. Hossein Mamdooh, Member of Board of Directors, Iran Helicopter Services 
Company (IHC) and Head of Quality Assurance, Tehran, 22 December 2005. 
Dr. Alinaghi Mashayekhi, Economics Dept., Sharif Technical University, 24 December 
2005. 
Mr. Houshang Naderian, Chairman & Managing Director, Audit Organization, Tehran, 
22 December 2005. 
Mr. Iraj Nadimi, MP I Deputy Head of Majlis Economic Committee, and University 
Lecturer, Tehran, 24 December 2005. 
Dr. Massoud Nily, Head of Economics Dept., Sharif University, 31 December 2005. 
Dr. Ebrahim Razaghi, Professor of Economics, Tehran University, Tehran, 26 
December 2005. 
Dr. Mehdi Sadeghi, Alameh University, Economics Dept., 28 December 2005. 
Dr. Sohrab Shahabi, Deputy Secretary General, Economic Cooperation Organization 
and University Lecturer (interview conducted in Tehran), 27 December 2005. 
328 
APPENDIXV: 
LIST OF RESPONDENTS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRES 
Dr. Abolghassem Hashemi, Associate Professor of Economics, Dept. of Economics, 
Shahid Beheshti University, 30 December 2005 (this form was filled out during a 
personal interview). 
Dr. Parviz Aghili, Managing Director, Karafarin Bank (first private bank in Iran), 
Questionnaire form was later used in the personal semi-structured interview of 29 
December 2005. 
Mr. Hossein Mamdooh, Member of Board of Directors, Iran Helicopter Services 
Company (IHC) a company owned by NIOC and singled out for privatisation, and Head 
of Quality Assurance, December 2005. 
Mr. Houshang Naderian, Chairman & Managing Director, Audit Organization, 
December 2005, very kindly filled out the questionnaire whilst also agreeing that I carry 
out the semi-structured interview with him as well (was appointed by the government to 
check the accounts and audit approximately 2000 government companies). 
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APPENDIX VI: 
EXAMPLE OF TYPICAL WRITTEN 
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONNAIRE 
Quenstionnaire on privatisation in Iran: 
Mr. Houshang Naderian, Chainnan & Managing Director, Audit Organization, Dec. 
2005, very kindly filled out the questionnaire whilst also agreeing that I carry out the 
semi-structured interview with him, as well. 
(Was appointed by the government to check the accounts and audit roughy 2000 
government companies) 
Background to the privatisation policy: 
1) What have been the main debates leading up to the formulation of the Iranian 
privatisation policy? At least three categories of debates must be analysed: 
academic, political, economic? 
Economic - lack of proper management, functionality of the companies, together with 
lack of profitability of the government companies. 
Political- Volume and the size of the government companies and their interaction with 
the people. 
Academic!Iheoretical - Government( s) is and has never been a good business person. 
To get involved in entrepreneurial endeavours for the government companies, lS a 
mistake. 
2) Were there differences of opinion between the team in charge of the practical 
drafting the law and the Cabinet? If yes, on what issues? 
No, I think there is harmony and consensus amongst the political elite. The differences 
are usually pronounced in some using privatisation as a tool to balance their yearly 
budgets, whilst others think of it as the engine for economic progress and development. 
These two differing opinions are probably still in place. Compounded with this 
dilemma, one could also mention that some middle management people feel that the loss 
of the companies under their jurisdiction, means loss of power and their old power 
base. 
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3) What was the profile of the expert group in charge of drafting the privatisation 
law? 
Generally this issue is dealt with by the experts within the Management and Planning 
Organisation (MPO) and then after its approval by the Cabinet, it goes to the Majlis for 
ratification. The Edicts from the Expediency Council (EC) are investigated and 
researched by the economic experts within the government and EC before it is handed 
over to the Privatisation Organisation, for their implementation. 
4) Which actors (politicians, religious elite, interest groups, formal and informal 
associations, etc.) were most involved and put most weight in drafting the initial 
privatisation legislation and its subsequent by-laws and amendments? 
The Government (Ministry of Economy and Finance, MPO, in consort with the 
economic commission within the Expediency Council. 
5) Does the privatisation framework favour a particular social, economic, political, 
etc. group? Does it make clear distinction between domestic and foreign capital? 
No it was not drafted to favour a particular group, however, the deprived sections and 
people of the society will get some priority in the implementations phase, in purchasing 
the shares. Naturally there is a distinction between domestic and foreign capital in that, 
priority is given to domestic investors. 
6) Why so much time elapsed between 1995 (when the privatisation programme of 
Iran was officially inaugurated) and 2000 (when the Third Plan actually codified 
procedures and institutions)? What are the reasons for this delay? 
A) Lack of a well thought of, appropriate macro planning 
B) Lack of supervision and controls from Majlis 
C) Reluctance and resistance by mid-management 
D) Complex and burdensome burequcracy within the government sector 
7) In those five years who were the most active actors in pushing for the actual 
priviatisation codification and the go-ahead for the Iranian privatisation 
programme by the Third Plan? 
The Government (Ministry of Economy and Finance, MPO ), zn consort with the 
economic commission within the Expediency Council. 
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Legal Framework 
8) Did the privatisation legislation regulate the most important issues? If not, what 
were the areas that were insufficiently regulated or omitted altogether? How did 
this change at later stages? 
The areas needing modification and requires correction are: The Privatisation Laws, 
Appropriate Planning, Political Will of the executors, All encompassing supervision by 
Majlis, and, a concerted effort in trying to simplify the regulations and the laws 
governing privatisation. All these matters can be addressed, if the political elite, will 
this to move forward. 
9) Consistency of legislation: are the by-laws decreed subsequently by the Cabinet 
in accordance with the general framework set out in the Third Plan? Who were 
the initiators and the most influential actors in devising the by-laws? 
None of the targets have been met over the last 15 years. The main problem has been 
the slow pace with which the executive body has been able to propel this issue forward. 
1 0) What are the main areas allowing for discretion of key institutions and officials 
in charge of carrying out the privatisation programme? Please give examples. 
How has this discretion been exercised and to whose benefit? 
In the past, the Supreme Privatisation Council, which consists of a mix of government 
executives, using the Privatisation Organisation, to implement their plans. Since not 
much has been done, once can not say that there were any discretion. 
11) Within the legislative and institutional set-up which has come to be the central 
and most influential institutional actor? Why? 
The Privatisation Organisation, MPO (management and planning organization), and 
the Ministry of Finance & Economy. These same organizations play a major role in the 
Supreme Privatisation Council, which includes many of the decision makers from within 
these organizations, which in tum, executes their plans through the Privatisation 
Organisation. 
Implementation 
12) What is the level of political control and interference in the privatisation 
process? Are there concrete examples of how this was done in practice? 
I do not believe there has been an effective control mechanism. The slow pace and the 
statistics we have confirms the lack of positive controls. 
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13) Methods of privatisation: who is in charge of selecting among various 
privatisation methods? Which ones are the most frequent types used? What are 
the most common types of preferences and closures? 
I can answer the first part of your question by repeating what I said earlier in question 
11 ie: The Privatisation Organisation, MPO (management and planning organization), 
and the Ministry of Finance & Economy. These same organizations play a major role 
in the Supreme Privatisation Council, which includes many of the decision makers from 
within these organizations, which in tum, executes their plans through the Privatisation 
Organisation. 
To answer the second part of your question, I should say the method by which one 
audits the assets of the targeted organization, would be preferred. 
14) Who is responsible for evaluating assets of companies slated for privatisation? 
How has this been done? 
The Privatisation Organisation. It provides the information, and the documentation 
collected from the relevant government ministry/body. The auditing of its value lS 
conducted by independent accountancy and auditing firms/bodies/organizations. 
15) Are there detailed criteria that have to be met for the privatisation deal to be 
approved? 
As a general rule, there are no detailed criteria, however, the preferred method by 
which the companies are privatised is through auction, and in some cases by IPO,s 
through the Tehran Stock Exchange (Bourse). 
16) What was the most common form of breaching the legislation on privatisation? 
How are such cases dealt with? 
In the first instance, not meeting the targeted budgets and or privatisation plans. In the 
second part of your question, I must say, we have not seen any cases in which the 
government has dealt with such anomalies. 
17) What is the practical impact of the relationship between ehnancing economic 
efficiency and privatisation, which is clearly stated in the laws and regulations? 
With privatisation in place, the entity will operate with a profit motivation and with 
view that it must compete fairly and head on. This phenomenon will improve the 
profitability of the entity and hence will benefit the workers and the shareholders alike. 
Furthermore, this will reduce the size and the burdens of the government enabling it to 
regulate and supervise the activities, to everyone's benefit. 
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Outcomes and Follow-up 
18) Who are currently the main winners and losers from the privatisation process? 
In view of the slow pace with which we have moved towards privatisation, there are no 
winners. The losers have been the government and the population at large, which still 
has to carry the burden of running a non competitive and non profitable companies. 
Public Perceptions of Privatisation 
19) In your opinion, to what extent privatisation was something of importance to 
local people? 
The masses, ie: blue collar workers, farmers, and generally the common people, are 
not too bothered by this concept. The Academics, Management people, Upper Middle 
Classes with knowledge of economic issues, this concept is considered to be very 
important. 
20) Do you believe that this has changed during the past ten years? 
No. I don't believe so. 
Political Influence 
21) Has the direction of the privatisation programme changed with changes in 
government? 
The direction has not changed, however, the pace has changed from time to time. 
No. 
22) Is there any political purpose performed by the oil and gas sectors, i.e. is it a 
politically intensive industry in the sense that the way it is being regulated 
creates dis/advantages for different political parties? 
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The Oil and Gas Sector 
23) How much has been already deregulated in the Iranian oil and gas sector? 
Not much. At least, not to a tangible or a perceptible degree. 
24) What trend do statistics reveal, i.e. in which direction is Iran moving- a global 
strategy for the whole sector or compartmentalising it and decising different 
strategies for each separate area? 
Compartmentalising it and decising different strategies for each separate area, using 
the experience of other countries. 
25) Has the legal and institutional framework been devised to account for substantial 
privatisation in the oil and gas industry? 
No. It is the same here as in other sectors. 
26) Has a framework been devised to account for modernisation in the oil and gas 
industry? 
A 20 year" vision plan" has been drawn up. But nothing tangible has been propagated. 
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APPENDIX VII: 
EXAMPLE OF TYPICAL RESPONSE 
TO INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Interview Questions 
Dr. Bijan Bidabadi, Faculty Member & Director of Foreign Exchange Research 
Department of Central Bank of Iran. Interview 28 December 2005. 
Background to the privatisation policy: 
1) Were there differences of opinion between the team in charge of the practical 
drafting the law and the Cabinet? If yes, on what issues? 
Privatisation has been discussed and has been mentioned from inception of the Five 
Year Development Plans (FYDP). Particular attention has been put on Privatisation 
issues in FYDPs of 2, 3, and 4. The government, otherwise, the executive branch, and 
the Majlis has been favourable towards privatisation, however some interested parties 
try to create stumbling blocks. The reason for this is that the government (Executive 
Branch) does not possess the powers of a sovereign country. These are given to the 
Expediency Council, the Council of the Guardians, and the Spiritual Leader. 
2) Does the privatisation framework favour a particular social, economic, political, 
etc. group? Does it make clear distinction between domestic and foreign capital? 
The framework which has been revamped during the 3'd and 4'h FYDP, does not favour 
any particular group. In implementation, we have seen lobbying and jockeying for 
position by people close to the political elite. 
There is a distinction between domestic and foreign capital, however, foreigners could 
use some of the recent ratifications in laws, to own 100% of the stocks of an Iranian 
Company. 
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Legal framework 
3) What are the main areas allowing for discretion of key institutions and officials 
in charge of carrying out the privatisation programme? Please give examples. 
How has this discretion been exercised and to whose benefit? 
The Privatisation Organisation has been tasked with the implementation of the 
privatisation programme, within the defined laws passed by the Majlis. It can decide on 
the priority of which company to be sold off first, or if it wishes, to stop from going 
forward the sale of a particular company pegged to be privatised. 
Implementation 
4) What is the level of political control and interference in the privatisation 
process? Are there concrete examples of how this was done in practice? 
If by this we mean the lobbying behind the scenes or overtly, yes there are political 
interferences. Furthermore, due to weak management in execution of the original 
privatised companies, no one wishes to stick their necks out. They do not wish to be 
singled out for making decisions, hence, decisions are made in committees and this 
takes way too much time. The delays, offer an opportunity for the lobbyists to interfere 
and or change the course of the plans being discussed or being implemented. 
5) Are there detailed criteria that have to be met for the privatisation deal to be 
approved? 
The privatisation laws have detailed criterion. For instance there are sections dealing 
with loss making SOEs and or security issues are areas that are focused on diligently. 
Public perceptions of privatisation 
6) In your opinion, to what extent privatisation was something of importance to 
local people? 
Unfortunately, the masses are sceptical about the government's true intentions. They 
know there could be changes to reverse everything or undo what has taken place. The 
public at large, do not have a favourable impression or faith in what the government 
wishes to carry out. 
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Political Influence 
7) Has the direction of the privatisation programme changed with changes in 
government? 
In Iran, unlike the western democracies, the direction of the programs/policies do not 
change. It is the governments which tries to synchronize itself with the new policies. 
8) Is there any political purpose performed by the oil and gas sectors, i.e. is it a 
politically intensive industry in the sense that the way it is being regulated 
creates dis/advantages for different political parties? 
Not only the industry is highly politicised, but also, all activities which support or 
somehow is collaborating with this industry, belong to an 'invisible network'. 
The Oil and Gas Sector 
9) Has the legal and institutional framework been devised to account for substantial 
privatisation in the oil and gas industry? 
Due to the volume of income derived from this industry, the interested parties and the 
'invisible hands behind this industry' will stop any attempt at transparency or change in 
the nature of its policies. 
l 0) Has a framework been devised to account for modernisation in the oil and gas 
industry? 
No. I don't think in the short term, there are any such plans in place. This could only 
happen when the current management and their political backers and supporters are set 
aside. The current management follows a 'gently gently' approach, so that it will not 
offend anyone. 
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theoretical and practical, with the impact of and challenges posed by this 'new' 
macroeconomic recipe. The British experience stood out particularly, and was used by 
many scholars and professionals as the paradigmatic example from which to draw both 
positive and negative lessons. 
Whitehead (1988) provided one of the earlier accounts of the British shift towards 
privatisation. The author's verdict regarding the British government's initiatives is 
positive overall. However, she also recognises that only the easier parts of the 
adjustment measures had so far been implemented. Along with privatisation, the 
introduction of competition to markets which had been previously restricted and a 
firmer control on the management of the companies whose ownership remained in 
public hands, were the kind of initiatives taken by the British government in order to 
enhance the efficiency of the industries and their markets. Within the energy sector, it is 
argued that the case of British Gas was one of the less glorified examples of 
privatisation; the 1986 Gas Act being merely a transfer of a monopoly from public to 
private hands. Veljanovski (1989:28) argues that: 
The challenge for policy makers over the next decade or two 
will be to examine the mistakes which have been made in 
privatising the utility industries and how to foster more 
competition and less regulation. 
The key sectors that were the object of the British privatisation programme 
(communications, energy and transport) are covered. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1989) cover both theory and facts in their analysis of the British 
privatisation programme. The authors discuss the evolution of the programme within 
different industrial and service sectors: from the more spectacular cases of the sale of 
British Telecom and British Gas, which proved less successful in the end, to the 
privatisation of Cable and Wireless, Jaguar and other companies, which were potentially 
more prone to competition to begin with and therefore offered more positive results 
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according to the authors' primary criterion of judgement; that is, the improvement of 
industrial efficiency. What also becomes clear in tracing the evolution of the British 
privatisation programme is that the 'learning by error' maxim also applied to the British 
administration. 
Ghobadian et al. (1998) evaluate the applicability of the Miles and Snow typology to 
the electricity distribution and supply industry of England and Wales in the late 1990s. 
They consider that the Miles and Snow approach focuses on the adaptive cycle of 
industries in which major changes occur. The authors assess the largely advocated 
benefits of privatisation on business performance in the context of the takeover of the 
U.K. electricity industry by American utility companies between 1995-1998. The 
takeover itself is discussed by Ghobadian and Viney (2000). 
Bishop et al. (1994) are aware that the UK privatisation programme has had 
considerable influence on economic policy throughout the world and their purpose was, 
consequently, to stand back and examine what has been learnt from this extensive 
programme. According to the authors, there are three factors that can justify 
privatisation: finance (state revenues), information (bureaucratic transparency) and 
control (decreasing public control). On finance, it is argued that privatisation has only 
modest effects. On information, it is suggested that the 'free rider' problems in 
information collection in financial markets are serious. On control, the authors argue 
that there has clearly been a weakening of control exerted by the government. Finally, 
the authors argue that privatisation has also helped to rebalance the control between 
trade unions and management. 
Stevens (2004) views privatisation as the persistent legacy of the political economy of 
Thatcherism, although from an historical point of view. He claims that privatisation 
developed an important electoral dimension during the second Thatcher government 
(Stevens, 2004), a point which does not often come up in the studies of economists and 
political scientists. Essentially, Stevens argues it was the prominence of private 
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ownership in Conservative philosophy that allowed Mrs Thatcher to legitimise and 
defend privatisation before the electorate. 
To summarise, there is abundant literature on the British privatisation programme, 
which approaches the topic and evaluates the outcome slightly differently. There seems 
to be an overall agreement, however, that the British experience was, in many ways, 
groundbreaking. 
1.1.1.2 International Examples 
The relevance of the British experience seems clear. But what about other countries 
which also began to experiment with the privatisation formula? Butler (1992) provides 
an interesting account of the aims of privatisation, the nature of the process and a 
number of relevant international experiences of privatisation. According to Pirie (1988), 
there are ten objectives of privatisation: lowering costs, depoliticising decisions, better 
service quality, better management, better labour relations, wider share ownership, 
restoring profitability, replacing capital, competition and choice and, finally, keener 
prices. Cook and Kirkpatrick's (1995) interesting book includes contributions from 
international scholars and professional economists. It looks first at transitional and 
European countries, then at developing countries, covering a range of countries in the 
five continents. The editors suggest that the policy objectives and motives for 
privatisation vary between countries. In industrialised countries, the main motive turns 
out to be ideological, whereas for developing countries, privatisation is linked with the 
macroeconomic burden of the public enterprise sector. Moreover, the early notion that 
privatisation would be a panacea for major structural imbalances and economic 
discontent was due, in part, to the tendency to understand privatisation as synonymous 
of economic liberalisation, instead of seeing it as just one ingredient in a wider 
programme of economic policy reform. 
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Hossain and Malbon (1998) are concerned with who actually gains with corporatisation 
and privatisation. Drawing from experiences of privatisation in the 1990s in New 
Zealand, Australia, the UK, the US, Sweden, Malaysia and India, the contributing 
researchers in this edited study provide theoretical insights and reflections on the 
reasons for and against privatisation. The underlying goal is to warn against extreme 
positions of either dismissal or glorification of the two decades of privatisation 
initiatives. There might be a danger in: 
.. .following the models of those societies which have in fact 
introduced a feverish degree of market competition within their 
own countries but have failed in the international competition 
on which those companies and ultimately their people depend 
(Hossain and Malbon, 1998:262). 
It is also suggested that the success of the British model of privatisation has been clearly 
overestimated and should actually rather be seen as a warning sign. 
Whether the British model has been idealised or not, Basu (1994) is concerned with the 
mystique of privatisation in developing countries where it is often viewed as an 
imposition coming from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. There 
are several misconceptions underlying this mystique, he argues, like the idea that 
privatisation removes all state-run welfare activities. At the same time, successful 
privatisation involves complementary strategies of public sector restructuring, reform-
cum-commercialisation, training and cadre development as well as private sector 
development with financial sector strengthening (Basu, 1994). 
The attempt to grasp the advantages and disadvantages of privatisation is also 
considered by Prizzia (2001), who provides a comparative critical assessment of a 
number of relevant experiences of privatisation worldwide. He suggests that, up to now, 
the economic benefits of privatisation activities are on average modest, while the social 
benefits are often mixed and uneven (Prizzia, 2001). The challenge for future 
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privatisation programmes should be to balance economic and social performance in a 
way that assures long-term benefits for all sectors of the affected communities. 
Banerjee and Munger (2004) offer another, more recent, interesting comparative study 
of privatisation in 35 low or middle-income developing countries. Through a rigorous 
analysis of data they attempt to explain the essential political-economic interactions 
affecting privatisation decisions and find, for example, that early adopters of 
privatisation tend to be later implementers, and that privatisation policy is much more 
likely to be a crisis-driven, last ditch effort to tum the economy around, rather than a 
carefully chosen policy with explicit, long-term goals (Banerjee and Munger, 2004). 
Further international insights are provided by Ramanadham (1994), who focuses on the 
aftermath of privatisation. The book is one of a series of studies undertaken by the 
Interregional Network of Privatisation, established by the UNDP's Division for Global 
and Interregional Programmes. 118 Various scholars highlight the monitoring and 
regulatory aspects of privatisation in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Guyana, Argentina 
and in five former centrally-planned economies. Ramanadham (1994) suggests that 
governments may not have yet appreciated the importance of monitoring privatisation, 
but should be aware that the benefits far outweigh any possible damage through self-
exposure. Amongst other things, he recommends that the nature of the agencies to be 
entrusted with monitoring ought to be country-specific and implies that the substantive 
area to bring under monitoring may be expanded over time. He also makes the point that 
privatisation in developing countries and in centrally-planned economies in transition 
takes many years to accomplish. Finally, monitoring, it is argued, should not be 
confused with either regulation or evaluation - monitoring implies a close observation 
over the implementation of a programme or activity; that is, over the process itself and 
not merely its final outcome. 
118 UNDP =United Nations Development Programme. 
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1.1.2 Key Literature on Refonns and Privatisation in Developing Economies and 
Fonnerly Centrally-planned Economies 
There appears to be a need to distinguish between developed, developing and formerly 
centrally-planned economies to be able to assess the different experiences of 
privatisation. Chandra (1992) provides a good overview of developing economies, 
helping the reader to better understand their possibilities and challenges. The book 
covers fairly standard topics which range from the historical dimensions of Third World 
industrialisation, its level and structure, the organisation and location of manufacturing 
in Third World countries, through to the role of the state in the industrialisation 
processes. According to Chandra, a central issue in development studies is the fact that 
there is only one world system, which means that what happens in one part of the world 
eventually impacts on other parts. Therefore, he argues "the future industrial prospects 
of developing countries depend both on the domestic policies and the international 
economic environment" (1992:14). Chandra's recipe for domestic policies for bettering 
the industrial sector follows mainstream development scholarship, and includes clarity 
(in the formulation of such policies), stability, social consensus among the different 
economic actors, a commitment to competition in the manufacturing sector, and the 
reduction of regional, social and ethnic inequalities. 
O'Neill (2004) delves into the history and pros and cons of globalisation. His argument 
is very much informed by his position as a business leader and scholar, maintaining that 
globalisation has improved the economic welfare of both rich and poor nations and, 
moreover, that the macroeconomic impacts of globalisation (basically on inflation and 
employment) are very limited. 
A more nuanced view, perhaps, is offered by Abu Shair (1997), who tries to bring 
together privatisation and development through a case study of privatisation in Jordan. 
His aim is to provide a different view of privatisation as a way of enhancing human 
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capabilities and choices (Abu Shair, 1997) instead of merely considering its effects on 
efficiency and economic growth which most conventional studies do. Abu Shair argues 
that where privatisation is linked to participation, decentralisation and development, 
there emerge actual opportunities to increase people's choices and capabilities. 
The Arab-British Chamber of Commerce (1990) provides another comparative 
perspective in a short but insightful survey of privatisation policies and instruments in 
the industrial, developing and Arab countries. The role of the World Bank and IMF as 
major promoters of privatisation since the late 1980s is particularly emphasised. For 
many developing countries, privatisation becomes a chance to solve the external debt 
problem. As for the Arab countries, it is argued that their stances towards privatisation 
vary considerably, but that they are in no sense immune to the world move towards 
privatisation. 
Economic reforms in formerly centrally-planned economies are of particular interest to 
an increasing number of scholars. One of the earliest assessments of these reforms is by 
Blanchard et al. (1991). The pace of events in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s caught 
the attention of this group of renowned scholars and challenged them to tackle the main 
issues involved in the reforms. The authors argue, in the end, that stabilisation, price 
liberalisation and privatisation must occur fast, whereas restructuring will take longer: a 
decade or more. Their proposals for stabilisation draw extensively on Latin American 
experiences. Their proposals for privatisation, on the other hand, are sustained on the 
principles of fairness and efficiency. The result of their contributions is a compact and 
well-outlined book, written, it should be kept in mind, at the beginning of the Eastern 
European transition to a market economy. 
An equally early viewpoint on the transition of the former communist countries to a 
market economy is offered by Bird (1992). The nine contributors reflect on different 
aspects of the economic reforms in Eastern Europe, arguing that the challenges to a 
properly functioning market economy in these countries may have been initially 
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underestimated. The tension between going too fast and engaging in too comprehensive 
reforms that may become unmanageable, on the one hand, and going too slowly and 
therefore not producing results immediately enough, which tends to generate discontent 
among different social groups, on the other, seems to define the general scenario in 
which Eastern European countries found themselves in the 1990s. Among the 
contributions, there is a chapter devoted to the reform in Hungary, which discusses the 
challenges of sequencing and privatisation. In this, Newbery begins the discussion by 
asking which is the desirable sequencing of demonopolisation, liberalising domestic 
markets and liberalising trade (Newbery, 1992). The Polish example would be one in 
which market liberalisation preceded demonopolisation, whereas the Hungarian and the 
(at that time) Czechoslovakian programmes started with demonopolisation. However, 
Newbery carefully insists that the problem is in no way simple. He therefore proceeds to 
analyse the country-specific economic and financial constraints that may lead to a 
particular choice of sequencing, as well as the outcomes of these different choices. He 
concludes by emphasising the role of demonopolisation and claims that its urgency 
depends on the speed of liberalisation and the form of privatisation. 
A more recent study of the transition economies is provided by Professor Goldman 
(Director of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University), 
who specifically investigated the Russian situation. Goldman (2003) provides a detailed 
account of how a few individuals, namely seven, turned the collapse of the Soviet 
economy in the early 1990s into an opportunity for amassing immense private wealth 
over the span of a few years. According to Goldman, this was possible thanks to the 
lack of policy control and, sometimes, also the complicity of politicians and certain 
groups within the government and administration. Furthermore, he argues, the problems 
of corruption and the emergence of mafias in Russia are partly the result of the way in 
which the economic reforms were tackled from the start; for instance, the absence of 
adequate timing and the ease and speed with which old and new interest groups 
consolidated. 
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Marangos (2002) analyses the neoclassical privatisation policies implemented in 
transition economies from a post-Keynesian point of view. According to him, the 
neoclassical privatisation policies contributed to a large reduction in output, high 
unemployment and inflation, as well as a breakdown of legality leading to corruption. 
The social cost of privatisation would have been smaller if post-Keynesian principles, 
such as the free distribution of shares to workers and the establishment of labour 
managed firms, had been followed. 
A brighter perspective is provided by Hanousek and Kocenda (2003), who analyse the 
privatisation process in the Czech Republic. Although they recognise that they still lack 
sufficient data, they are able to make the claim that the improvement in profitability of 
the enterprises they surveyed was due to improvement in corporate governance. 
It appears from the literature on economic reform and privatisation in developing and 
former centrally-planned economies that there are multiple views on these issues. Since 
these economies are particularly vulnerable, the advantages and disadvantages of 
privatisation become perhaps more visible in their context. 
Whilst much effort has been put into removing the paradoxes in article 44 of the Iranian 
Constitutional Law and thereby demonstrating the political will among the leadership in 
Iran for pushing through with the privatisation programme, we have seen more 
government entities register in 2005 and 2006 compared to those which were privati sed. 
Dr. Mohamad Hadi Zahedivafa, the Deputy Minister of Economy in President 
Ahmadinejad's government, in charge of economic affairs, believes119 that the most 
challenging issue slowing down the privatisation drive is not the lack of political will 
among the elite in the country, but the lack of financial institutions with appropriate 
119 Personal interview 12 January 2007, Tehran, Iran. 
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regulations, liquidity in society and the restrictions on foreign ownership of the shares to 
be offered through the Tehran Stock Market. 
Ayatolah Khamenei, the spiritual leader, expressed his concerns and dismay at the lack 
of any tangible progress in the privatisation of government entities in early February 
2007. Ahmadinejad's government and the media have been hard at work trying to find 
out what obstacles have been instrumental in slowing down the plans for privatisation of 
the nationalised industries. On 21 February 2007, the Bill for privatisation of 
government entities was presented to parliament for ratification and, if need be, 
replacement of those by-laws which under clause 44 of the constitution are hindering 
the government. The new set of changes and amendments to the labour laws and foreign 
ownership should provide the government with the bases and necessary tools to meet 
their anticipated privatisation of 20% of the government's holdings per year. 
1.1.3 Key Literature on the Oil Industry and Privatisation of the Oil Sector 
This section is devoted to the evolution and challenges of the oil industry. Drollas and 
Greenman (1989) attempt to respond to an increasing public interest in the historical 
evolution of the oil industry in the aftermath of the oil crises in the 1970s by addressing 
some of the most basic conundrums. How were the sudden increases in oil prices 
ultimately possible? Were they solely contingent upon the political turmoil that took 
place in the Middle East in the mid- and late 1970s? Or were they due to a sudden 
global realisation that oil was a scarce resource? Why did the prices remain at those 
historically high levels? Their discussion on the myths and misunderstandings that 
historically unfolded among the different actors with an interest in the oil industry 
(basically the companies, states and consumers) which ultimately all derive from the 
contradictory nature of the oil phenomenon itself (oil being viewed as either 'the devil' s 
gold' or 'the devil's excrement') are of particular interest. 
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Perhaps in contrast to Droll as and Greenman's more divulgation-oriented piece, 
Mitchell et al. (2001) offer a thorough and impressive piece on the current situation of 
the oil industry. One of the main ideas under discussion is that acceptability of oil is 
becoming more important than availability, as the oil industry faces the challenges 
posed by new patterns of transportation, increasing fuel demand in economically 
emergent regions and, at the same time, conflicting attitudes towards oil consumption. 
A good way to approach the history of the oil industry and understand its gradually 
-increasing importance for the world economy are two books depicting the history of the 
British Petroleum Company (Ferrier, 1982; Bamberg, 1994). The first book, The 
Developing Years 1901-1932 (Ferrier, 1982), is devoted to the emergence and early 
days of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), as it was called at the time. The 
timeframe encompasses the years that the D' Arcy concession was granted, up until the 
termination of the concession by the Iranian monarch, Reza Shah Pahlavi. In the later 
publication, The History of the British Petroleum Company - The Anglo - Iranian years 
1928-1954, Bamberg discusses, among other things, the details of the D' Arcy 
concession and Burmah Oil's involvement when the company ran into difficulties. He is 
also particularly keen on explaining the reasons for, and procedures by which, the 
British government acquired a major interest in APOC, once the British navy converted 
from coal to oil in 1914. The Iranian government rejected the British offer to become a 
'principal of participation' on the basis that a minority shareholding in APOC was 
contrary to their national sovereignty. Ferrier's (1982) account offers relevant insights 
into the roots of the problems that eventually led to the nationalisation of the oil 
industry in 1951. 
Twelve years after the publication of Ferrier's account, the second book on the history 
of the British Petroleum Company came out (Bamberg, 1994). This is more orthodox in 
its structure, fundamentally providing an account of the company's affairs over time, a 
discussion of corporate development, particularly in the immediate post-war period, and 
a detailed description and analysis of the years of crisis between 1947 and 1954, when 
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APOC eventually became the British Petroleum Company. Both books constitute a 
must for anyone interested, not only in the history of the British Petroleum Company, 
but also in the general history of oil development and the economic history of the 
Middle East. Hoopes addresses the sale of Britain's oil assets, claiming that control of 
energy resources has traditionally been a source of power for states; yet the sale of 
Britain's oil assets, vital resources in an oil-dependent world, passed without much 
opposition or even much notice (Hoopes, 1997). She aims to explain why the 
government pursued this "seemingly irrational policy" (1997: 188). Written from a 
public choice perspective, she comes to the conclusion that: 
[a] government voluntarily relinquishing control of valuable 
national assets is not a rational act - at least when examined as 
a whole from the macro level. But when the act is broken down 
into pieces, and factors are isolated at different levels of 
analysis, the pieces of the process can be understood as rational 
(Hoopes, 1997:188). 
Locatelli (1999) provides a rich description of the situation at the end of the 1990s. 
Amongst other things, he argues that the way in which the industry behaves is still 
regulated to a significant extent by planned economic relationships. On the other hand, 
he also claims that the 'survival' strategies are based on the willingness to maximise 
exports. There seems to be a compromise in Russia, which is summarised in the 
following equation: foreign currency in exchange for non-payments and for preserving 
jobs in the oil industry's holding companies. 
From Russia, we move to the oil industry in the Gulf, which is key for obvious reasons. 
Privatization and Deregulation in the Gulf Energy Sector (ECSSR, 1999) is the result 
of contributions from practitioners and scholars who attended the Annual Energy 
Conference at the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research held in Abu 
Dhabi in 1997 to discuss different micro- and macro-issues related to the privatisation 
and deregulation of the energy sector. Particular attention is devoted to the British 
experience as a leading example. The final chapter presents the pros and cons of 
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privatisation and deregulation of the energy sector in the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) countries. Their conclusion is that there is a potential for deregulation and 
privatisation of the energy sub-sectors (e.g., petroleum, power, water and gas) which 
would provide net gains to the economies of the GCC countries. Furthermore, the 
energy sub-sector is ready for privatisation. Sale of public sector petroleum enterprises 
downstream can be achieved in a relatively short period of time, as the local capabilities 
are well developed and operations under conditions dictated by the international 
markets are well established. Public sector power and water utilities in the GCC 
countries will require a relatively longer time. It is suggested that the development of 
the concept of BOO (Build-Own-Operate) for financing new investments could provide 
the bridging from public ownership to privatisation. 
Privatization is expected to be implemented gradually and as 
part of a more comprehensive structural reform plan aimed at 
boosting non-oil sources of revenues and re-orienting the 
economies of the GCC countries from growth based on oil and 
public sector activities to one where the private sector takes the 
lead (Azzam, 1995). 
Azzam (1995) goes through the objectives, concerns and mechanisms of privatisation, 
but with a particular emphasis on non-oil resources. 
Even though Iran will be dealt with in detail from the historical and political aspects to a 
large extent in the next section and subsequent chapters, we will now tum to the Iranian 
oil industry by throwing some light on Iran's oil nationalisation and its aftermath (Elm, 
1994). Elm's critical views on the British and the American governments' interventions 
in 1950s Iran are already present in the preface, where he overtly implies that the British 
Petroleum Company became a giant international corporation "at the expense of the 
producer country" (Elm, 1994:preface) i.e., Iran. This well-researched account follows a 
chronological order, which leads the reader through the intricate games of economic 
power that began among Iranian and colonial rulers in the late nineteenth century and 
continued in the twentieth consolidating the role of Iran as a major oil supplier and 
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hence a country in the eye of two of the main foreign powers in the region: Britain and 
the US. The emphasis of the book is on the period that runs between the Oil 
Nationalisation Act and the coup that reinstated the Shah. 
Mitchell (2001), in his book entitled The New Economy of Oil, looks at the new 
elements which may influence, or indeed determine, the shape of the oil industry, the 
behaviour of the main actors, the forces of supply and demand, and the price path. In the 
foreword, Mabro questions if our world is subject to sudden and radical transformations. 
He questions whether historians always fully grasp the fact that change can be properly 
understood only in relation to continuities. He argues that most people focus on the 
novelty of an event, such as a revolution, only to be followed a few years later by a 
reformist who will stress continuities, arguing that nothing significant has occurred. The 
common thread in The New Economy of Oil is about a world where social acceptability 
is an increasingly important issue. For social acceptability to make a difference, it will 
have to acquire the momentum of a considerable political force, through development of 
a strong political will. 
Amuzegar (1999) examines and evaluates the experience of thirteen OPEC members 
during the crucial 197 4-1994 period. Within the framework of some major hypotheses 
regarding the dynamics of economic development in an oil-based economy, several 
fundamental questions are raised: how did the members allocate their oil windfalls 
among competing needs? What strategies and policies did they pursue in optimising 
returns on their fortunes during the oil boom, and controlling the damage during the oil 
bust? And, to what extent did those allocations and strategies help them achieve their 
stated or implied national socioeconomic agenda? It is with this in mind that Amuzegar 
discusses OPEC members' underlying national characteristics and structural differences 
in order to show how their astonishingly similar experiences defied such divergences. 
Privatisation in Britain has been heralded by British politicians, the press and political 
observers alike as a radical break in government policy - not only for the British 
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government, but for any government. Hoopes (1997) attempts to explain how a major 
part of the British government's sales of its oil assets were conducted and how Britoil, 
Enterprise Oil, Wytch Farm and a majority shareholding in British Petroleum were sold 
within a ten year period (1977 -87) without much opposition or even much notice, 
reversing a policy which had lasted 73 years. 
Parra (2005) considers the politics of oil and illuminates how it revolves around its price 
and the reliability of its suppliers. He explains the historical background to the 
formation of OPEC and delves into the reasons for widespread international tensions 
and armed conflicts which he believes are the root causes for the tensions between the 
seven major oil companies who control the technology, distribution and marketing. 
Parra asks, taking into account the current political volatility in the Middle East, 
whether the major oil companies and their respective countries in the West can avert a 
deepening of the crisis. 
Bahgat (2003) examines the US's growing dependence on fossil fuels and the main 
challenges it faces in securing supplies from two energy-rich regions, the Persian Gulf 
and Caspian Sea. He argues that long-term US energy strategy must be built on 
diversity of both the fuel mix and the geographical origin of that fuel. Bahgat does 
contend, however, that the goal should not be energy dependence on oil supplies from 
abroad. 
Finally, Ala's (2000) discussion on the privatisation of NIOC at the 75th British Iranian 
Business Association (BIBA) Business Meeting in 2000 concludes by stating, among 
other things, that: 
Iran can gain access to [world wide capital] for the 
development of its oil and gas related industries by improving 
its image and softening its political stance on the world stage ... 
The NIOC must follow consistent, long term and commercially 
viable objectives and avoid half-hearted measures and sudden 
policy changes (Ala, 2000). 
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1.1.4 Key Literature on the Politics and Economy of the Middle East 
Before we look at the specific literature on Iran, we will refer to a few works on the 
general political and economical situation in the Middle East. Richards and Waterbury 
(1996) combine a political science and economics approach. They are interested in the 
interactive effects between economic growth and structural change, on the one hand, 
state agencies that implement policies, on the other, and the social groups (especially 
classes) that shape, and are shaped by, those policies. They argue that regime stability in 
the regions has systematically occurred at the cost of political exclusion, which has 
created a crisis of confidence. Furthermore, the authors discuss the material 
improvement in the region during the preceding four decades, acknowledging at the 
same time the common aspects that the Middle East shares with the rest of the 
developing world. They argue that there are some omissions in the work, like the lack of 
attention to regional conflict, political personalities and political culture. This is perhaps 
why the authors believe their work is useful as an analysis of Third World economies in 
general; they do not delve into the particularities of the region, but try to extract the 
structural features, making it comparable to other regions. 
Despite certain practical difficulties in assessing the history of the Middle Eastern 
economies due to the lack of (sometimes) fundamental data, Owen and Pamuk (1998) 
provide an historical-economic account. Interestingly, they choose to locate the Middle 
East in the latest wave of globalisation. The authors base their inquiry on how the 
economies of the Middle East grew from the 1930s to the 1970s and why some 
economies grew faster than others. They examine the role of the state, and the impact of 
growth on society and its welfare. Lastly, the study looks at the impact of the 1970s' oil 
boom and the present process of liberalisation and structural adjustment. 
The challenges, as well as opportunities, facing the Middle East and North Africa 
regions in the twenty-first century are the subject of analysis in the edited work by 
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Shafik (1998). The research work contributed to this book aims to answer some of the 
questions on why the region has not been able to introduce sufficient reform momentum 
to sustain economic growth, or what might be the social consequences of economic 
stagnation. The papers examine the vast opportunities facing the region, should the 
political elite and reformers exercise their political will in pursuing the structural 
adjustments necessary to bring about sustainable growth to their countries. 
In another edited work from several researchers gathered in Cairo for a forum 
(Handousa, 1997), the papers presented attempt to draw upon economic, political and 
institutional theory in order to appraise and compare development models and apply 
new development concepts to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). The contributing authors have addressed the key questions of globalisation, 
deregulation, privatisation and institutional reform. 
Moreover, there are numerous pieces on the historical and political context of the 
Middle East. The following are but a selection of the literature available. Owen (2000), 
for example, traces the historical outline of the modem Middle Eastern states, beginning 
with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of colonial institutions. 
Owen's comprehensive work focuses on the unfolding of the diverse institutional 
frameworks in the region, assuming the fluid, conflictive and evolving nature of 
political and social institutions and the particular situation of the Middle East as part of 
the global context of modernity, and yet situated in the Third World. 
Armajani (1970) presents his work by going back to the advent and spread of Islam 
when developing his assessment of the cultural progression within Turkic, Persian and 
Arabic speaking countries of the Middle East. He then focuses on the Ottoman and 
Safavid empires to draw some lessons about the changes which took shape in the 
region. Lastly, Armajani looks at the effects of Western imperialism until the region 
was divided up into many nation states, as we know them now. 
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Bill and Springborg (1994) offer a comprehensive outlook on the contemporary political 
situation in the Middle East. Their work addresses, among other issues, the challenge of 
modernisation for political development, Islam and politics, leadership, the role of the 
military and the role of ideology. 
Milton-Edwards (2000) explores the pace with which developments in Middle Eastern 
countries have taken place, keeping societal developments and changes in the forefront 
of their focus. Some of these issues with particularly remarkable insight with regard to 
the politics of gender and ethnic rights in the region, and the increasing presence of 
political Islam. 
Niblock and Murphy (1993) have put together an impressive list of contributors in their 
seminal edited anthology that covers various aspects of economic liberalisation and 
walks us through to international integration. Their work explores everything from the 
links between economic and political liberalisation to individual analysis of the 
privatisation experience in some of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. 
Henry and Springborg (2001), in their research on the effects of globalisation in the 
twenty-first century in the Middle East, investigate how the merits of colonialism in the 
past have been superseded by a phenomenon now pursued under the auspices of 
economic globalisation. In their book, they have attempted to throw light on how 
globalisation has induced the countries in the region to move further towards 
democratisation. They contend that those countries who have moved further towards 
democratising have also been more effective in responding to globalisation. 
Finally, Zahlan (1998) narrows down the geographical scope, analysing the political 
history of various Gulf states. She provides an insightful examination of the evolution 
of these countries, which is characterised in many ways by the contradictory pattern of 
economic globalisation and political traditionalism in the Arabian peninsula. 
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1.1.5 Key Literature on the Politics and Economy of Iran 
The authors reviewed in this section discuss the contemporary social and political 
situation of Iran, the position of Iran in the world, and the economic situation of the 
country. Ansari focuses on the post-Khomeini era. 
This is in essence a book about ideas, as espoused and traded 
by different political factions. Not only does it suggest a 
method by which to understand political developments in 
contemporary Iran, but it also seeks to explain how ideas 
operate to motivate and initiate political change in Iran (Ansari, 
2000:2). 
Ansari is interested in the dynamic qualities of social and political processes, and 
departs from the idea that Iran is an international player of a calibre that does not reflect 
either its economic or political strength. Again, the oil and gas resources account for this 
paradoxical situation, which does not make the Iranian case less fascinating. 
Sick (1985), who was the principal White House official at the time of the Iranian 
revolution, concentrates on the historical events which led to the Shah's downfall. He 
offers views and reasons for the confrontation between the US and Iran. He also 
contends that the Iranian revolution, which he refers to as a "political earthquake", 
changed the landscape of politics not only Iran but also for the whole of the region. 
Another study of events which led to political upheavals and finally the Iranian 
revolution in 1979 is Abrahamian's (1982) analysis of the tum of events. Abrahamian 
looks at the make-up of societal and tribal cultures within Iran to develop his argument 
about the effects of the political and sociological root causes of the constitutional 
revolution of 1906. The historical background to this study finds strong linkages 
between Islam and the uprisings of the two revolutions which were seventy years apart. 
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Without understanding the underlying currents of thought among the Iranian opinion 
formers and intellectuals who pursue their aspirations in politics with a political will 
that is dressed up in religious clothing, it would be hard to find the symbiosis for the 
changes Iran has been experiencing. Boroujerdi (1996) examines the Iranian Revolution 
in terms of its socio-economic and cultural effects, as well as ideological factors. The 
study looks at how Americans perceive present-day Iran, whilst also shedding light on 
how Iranians view the West. 
Mottahedeh (1986) takes a look at the Iranian revolution from the perspective of Shia 
schooling at the religious seminaries. He examines how, through a mediaeval system of 
learning, the interweaving linkages are made between history, philosophy, biography 
and the study of religion, to arrive at the current political thought prevailing in Iran. 
A growing popularity of religion and mysticism had already taken place among the 
secular intellectuals in the earlier years of the decade prior to the revolution of 1979. 
Their concept of religion, argues Nabavi (2003), was not a rigid Islamic state, since they 
had arrived at the idea under the influence of Western thinkers who had become 
disillusioned with the technocratic state; instead, they viewed religion as a concept that 
had the potential of being a catalyst for bringing about change. 
Katouzian (2003) offers a critical overview of contemporary Iranian politics and 
society, based on different pieces written by the author over a period of more than 
twenty years. One of the main arguments is that the Shah's 'White Revolution' in 1963 
was not a change from democracy to dictatorship, but rather a change from limited 
constitutionalism to arbitrary government. Katouzian insists, however, that the 
exploding oil revenues did not create arbitrary rule, although they facilitated it, because 
arbitrary rule has been the norm in Iranian politics. Moreover, the author believes that, 
by digging into the social and political history of Iran, his work contributes to clarifying 
the reasons for the unaccountability of the state and the ungovernability of the society 
(Katouzian, 2003). 
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Ehteshami (1995) focuses on what he calls the 'Thermidor of the Iranian revolution', 
that is the end of the revolutionary process and the beginning of the definitive 
establishment of the new regime. In fact, the Thermidor can be viewed as the most 
revolutionary change that could have affected the Islamic Republic. It is usually 
suggested that the closeness in time between the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war and 
Ayatollah Khomeini's death accelerated this process of consolidation. The author deals 
with the question on what is actually replacing the revolutionary regime: 
To denote the changes in the formal distribution of power in 
Iran since Ayatollah Khomeini's death, the constitutional 
changes of 1989, the leadership style of Ayatollah Khomeini's 
heirs, the content of the policies of the post-Khomeini 
leadership and the ways in which their policies differ from 
those of the Khomeini era, I have adopted the term of the 
Second Republic (Ehteshami, 1995:xiv). 
Playing with a term that has been used by various writers, Fuller (1991) aims to explain 
and understand the idiosyncrasies of Iran, on the one hand, and the country's relations 
with its neighbours and other nations, on the other. The geopolitical aspects of Iran as a 
result of historical events and cultural and geographical features are analysed, as well as 
Iran's relations with Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, other Arab states and Russia. 
Perhaps understandably, a considerable part of the study is dedicated to Iran's relations 
with the Arab states in the Gulf region. The relations with Russia and the former Soviet 
Union also receive particular attention and Iran's interest in the emergent Muslim 
countries and former Soviet regions is discussed as well. 
Katouzian' s ( 1981) exploration of the political economy of modern Iran brings forth the 
idea that Iranian society was never particularly familiar with private forms of property, 
which explains the difficulties for a middle class with entrepreneurial skills to emerge 
and consolidate. While the author strongly dismisses the Pahlavi period as a 
combination of despotism and false modern consciousness, he also challenges the . 
recurrent myth in Iranian discourses by which domestic political problems and struggles 
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are viewed as the result of the conspiracy of foreign powers. Hence, Katouzian (1981) 
vindicates the role of the Iranian people, its actions and ideas, in the shaping of their 
country's history and, by extension, its economic development. On this note, we 
proceed to discuss the actual research question behind this thesis. 
Nili et al. (2004) focus on how human life is fraught with strenuous efforts to raise 
living standards and enhance welfare, suggesting that as an historical regularity, public 
policy embedded in social and political institutions has always played an important role 
in directing and transforming individualistic efforts into socially desirable outcomes. 
Thus, Nili et al. contend, in the absence of public policy, the world's per capita income 
during thousands of years prior to the nineteenth century remained fairly unchanged. 
Nili et al. draw parallels from the age of enlightenment, the industrial revolution, along 
with more recent technological and scientific advances to illustrate the necessity for 
institutions and institutional fundamentals within Iran's socio-political and economic 
fields. Discussing the issue of privatisation in Iran, Nili (2004) emphasises the need to 
review how and why Iran has failed in its attempts to privatise so far, why Iran has been 
so unsuccessful in its experimentation with structural reform, and the lack of political 
will amongst the elite opinion formers and policy-makers to adopt a more gradual 
process. 
Finally, two further volumes deserve a mention in this section before I move on to my 
research question, namely those of Ramazani ( 1990) and Milani ( 1988). Ramazani has 
compiled a book with six leading scholars, describing and analysing key aspects of the 
revolution in Iran, whereas Milani has framed his research work based on the historical 
politics which culminated in the revolution of 1979, and the post-revolutionary politics 
of the land. 
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